本文關(guān)鍵詞： 分析師關(guān)注度 投資規(guī)模 投資偏好 信息機制 施壓機制　出處：《金融經(jīng)濟學研究》2017年03期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：以2009~2015年中國A股上市公司面板數(shù)據(jù)為基礎(chǔ),研究證券分析師對中國上市公司投資決策影響。實證結(jié)果表明,分析師關(guān)注度對上市公司的投資規(guī)模有促進作用,對企業(yè)的資本支出和研發(fā)支出規(guī)模都存在顯著的正向影響,對并購支出的影響并不顯著;但分析師關(guān)注度的增加提高了企業(yè)并購行為發(fā)生的概率。進一步研究顯示證券分析師扭曲了企業(yè)的投資偏好。在總體投資規(guī)模一定時,分析師對企業(yè)管理層起到了施壓作用,使得期限較長、風險較大的研發(fā)投資占比降低。
[Abstract]:Based on the panel data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2015, this paper studies the influence of securities analysts on the investment decisions of Chinese listed companies. The empirical results show that the attention of analysts can promote the investment scale of listed companies. There is a significant positive impact on capital expenditure and R & D expenditure, but not on M & A expenditure. But the increased attention of analysts increases the probability of mergers and acquisitions. Further research shows that securities analysts distort companies' investment preferences. When the overall size of investment is constant, analysts exert pressure on corporate management. Make the long term, the risk of R & D investment to reduce the proportion.
【作者單位】： 上海財經(jīng)大學商學院;上海財經(jīng)大學金融學院;
【分類號】：F275;F832.51
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本文編號：1496691