發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-25 13:57

  本文選題：僵尸企業(yè) + 識(shí)別方法　； 參考：《中國(guó)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)》2017年03期

【摘要】：基于一種綜合方法,本文對(duì)中國(guó)工業(yè)企業(yè)和上市公司中存在的僵尸企業(yè)予以識(shí)別。結(jié)果表明,2001—2007年工業(yè)企業(yè)中僵尸企業(yè)數(shù)量占比為10.1%—19.7%,2000—2015年上市公司中僵尸企業(yè)數(shù)量占比為12.1%—26.0%。中國(guó)工業(yè)企業(yè)中的僵尸企業(yè)具有以下分布特征:總體上,數(shù)量和資產(chǎn)規(guī)模占比與經(jīng)濟(jì)周期存在相關(guān)性;分地區(qū)看,東部地區(qū)數(shù)量和資產(chǎn)規(guī)模占比皆為最低,西部地區(qū)數(shù)量占比最高,東北地區(qū)資產(chǎn)規(guī)模占比最高;分行業(yè)看,政府壟斷定價(jià)和國(guó)有企業(yè)為主的行業(yè)數(shù)量占比較高;分所有制看,國(guó)有企業(yè)中僵尸企業(yè)數(shù)量和資產(chǎn)規(guī)模占比始終最高。進(jìn)一步,本文根據(jù)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率水平對(duì)僵尸企業(yè)加以分類,把那些應(yīng)進(jìn)入破產(chǎn)程序、將剩余控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移給債權(quán)人的企業(yè),與股東可以繼續(xù)掌握剩余控制權(quán)的企業(yè)區(qū)別開來(lái),這一分類有助于對(duì)僵尸企業(yè)進(jìn)行差別化處置。本文認(rèn)為,僵尸企業(yè)現(xiàn)象既是由于政府補(bǔ)貼的"滋潤(rùn)效應(yīng)",同樣不容忽視的可能還有破產(chǎn)成本過(guò)高導(dǎo)致的"阻礙效應(yīng)"。處置僵尸企業(yè),除了改善公司治理、推動(dòng)股東采取改組董事會(huì)或經(jīng)理層以及資產(chǎn)重組等,本文還建議修改《企業(yè)破產(chǎn)法》以納入簡(jiǎn)易破產(chǎn)程序,并且各級(jí)政府要嚴(yán)格財(cái)經(jīng)紀(jì)律,防止僵尸企業(yè)繼續(xù)增加對(duì)生產(chǎn)要素的占用并惡化整體經(jīng)濟(jì)生產(chǎn)率。
[Abstract]:Based on a comprehensive method, this paper identifies zombie enterprises in Chinese industrial enterprises and listed companies. The results show that the proportion of zombie enterprises in industrial enterprises from 2001 to 2007 is 10.1-19.70.The proportion of zombie enterprises in listed companies from 2000 to 2015 is 12.1-26.0. The zombie enterprises in Chinese industrial enterprises have the following distribution characteristics: overall, the proportion of quantity and asset size is correlated with the economic cycle, and the proportion of quantity and assets in the eastern region is the lowest in different regions. The proportion of assets in the western region is the highest, the proportion of assets in the Northeast is the highest; the number of industries dominated by government monopoly and pricing and state-owned enterprises is relatively high in terms of industry, and the proportion of sectors dominated by state-owned enterprises is relatively high. The number of zombie enterprises and the proportion of assets are always the highest in state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, according to the level of asset-liability ratio, this paper classifies zombie enterprises, and distinguishes those enterprises that should enter bankruptcy procedure and transfer residual control rights to creditors, and that shareholders can continue to grasp residual control rights. This classification is helpful for the differential disposal of zombie enterprises. This paper holds that the phenomenon of zombie enterprises is not only due to the "nourishing effect" of government subsidies, but also the "hindrance effect" caused by the high bankruptcy cost. In dealing with zombie enterprises, besides improving corporate governance, promoting shareholders to adopt reorganization of the board of directors or managers and reorganization of assets, the article also suggests that the Enterprise bankruptcy Law be amended to include simple bankruptcy procedures, and that governments at all levels should strictly enforce financial and financial discipline. To prevent zombie enterprises from continuing to increase the occupation of factors of production and to worsen the overall economic productivity.
【作者單位】： 上海交通大學(xué)安泰經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目“現(xiàn)代產(chǎn)業(yè)體系發(fā)展的理論與政策研究”(批準(zhǔn)號(hào)11AZD080)
【分類號(hào)】：F279.2

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前3條

1 ;IN詞[J];中國(guó)品牌;2013年10期

2 ;“僵尸企業(yè)”成了經(jīng)濟(jì)的拖油瓶[J];資源再生;2012年09期

3 ;[J];;年期

相關(guān)重要報(bào)紙文章 前6條

1 和靜鈞;僵尸企業(yè)何以還魂？[N];中國(guó)經(jīng)營(yíng)報(bào);2009年

2 記者 劉瓊;潛在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)變成實(shí)際危機(jī) 僵尸企業(yè)該不該救？[N];第一財(cái)經(jīng)日?qǐng)?bào);2012年

3 韓哲;僵尸企業(yè)的成本，沒那么簡(jiǎn)單[N];北京商報(bào);2014年

4 新供給經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)50人論壇成員 金海年　姚余棟 周健男;防止“僵尸企業(yè)”蔓延成“僵尸經(jīng)濟(jì)”[N];中國(guó)證券報(bào);2014年

5 莫開偉;應(yīng)讓僵尸企業(yè)“壽終正寢”[N];證券時(shí)報(bào);2014年

6 莫開偉;優(yōu)化經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)須有僵尸企業(yè)退出機(jī)制[N];中華工商時(shí)報(bào);2014年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前3條

1 蓋耀文;制度背景、融資渠道與企業(yè)生存[D];內(nèi)蒙古大學(xué);2016年

2 盛成皿;“僵尸企業(yè)”的政府補(bǔ)貼、企業(yè)績(jī)效與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平[D];浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2016年

3 趙耀;僵尸企業(yè)的識(shí)別及出清過(guò)程中商業(yè)銀行的應(yīng)對(duì)策略[D];對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué);2016年

，

本文編號(hào)：1933364