本文選題：金融企業(yè) + 高管薪酬��； 參考：《東岳論叢》2017年06期

【摘要】：既有文獻(xiàn)表明,高管薪酬與內(nèi)部控制之間存在明顯的敏感性。但由于金融企業(yè)自身經(jīng)營的獨(dú)特性,在既有研究中經(jīng)常被剔除或忽略,金融業(yè)高管薪酬與內(nèi)部控制信息披露質(zhì)量之間是否也存在這種顯著的敏感性,需深入研究。通過以2009-2014年滬深兩市A股上市金融公司為研究樣本,研究表明:我國金融業(yè)上市公司內(nèi)部控制信息披露整體質(zhì)量呈顯著提高的趨勢;高管短期薪酬激勵(lì)與金融企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制信息披露質(zhì)量存在顯著正向關(guān)系;高管長期薪酬激勵(lì)則與金融企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制信息披露質(zhì)量之間的關(guān)系不顯著;相對于非國有控股金融企業(yè),國有控股金融企業(yè)高管薪酬對內(nèi)部控制信息披露質(zhì)量的影響要弱很多。
[Abstract]:The existing literature shows that there is an obvious sensitivity between executive compensation and internal control. However, due to the uniqueness of financial enterprises' own management, they are often excluded or ignored in the existing research. Whether there is such a significant sensitivity between financial executives' compensation and the quality of internal control information disclosure also needs further study. By taking the A-share listed financial companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2009-2014 as the research sample, the study shows that the overall quality of internal control information disclosure of listed companies in China's financial industry shows a trend of significant improvement; There is a significant positive relationship between short-term executive compensation incentive and internal control information disclosure quality of financial enterprises, while there is no significant relationship between long-term executive compensation incentive and financial enterprise internal control information disclosure quality. Compared with non-state-owned holding financial enterprises, the effect of executive compensation on the quality of internal control information disclosure is much weaker.
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本文編號：1933078