發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-25 07:14

  本文選題：雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn) + 樣板激勵(lì)��； 參考：《哈爾濱工程大學(xué)》2016年博士論文

【摘要】：隨著科學(xué)技術(shù)的發(fā)展及其帶動(dòng)起來的全球生產(chǎn)力水平的提高,企業(yè)之間競爭的核心由不斷改進(jìn)生產(chǎn)設(shè)備、引進(jìn)先進(jìn)技術(shù)和產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新等“硬實(shí)力”,逐漸轉(zhuǎn)移到提升員工素質(zhì)、優(yōu)化人員結(jié)構(gòu)和引入積極有效的激勵(lì)機(jī)制等“軟實(shí)力”來調(diào)動(dòng)和激發(fā)企業(yè)員工控制成本的積極性和主動(dòng)性,從而提高基于成本控制的激勵(lì)效應(yīng),實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)效益的最大化�，F(xiàn)有的成本控制及激勵(lì)機(jī)制大多遵循泰羅提出的《科學(xué)管理原理》,現(xiàn)代成本控制已經(jīng)基本實(shí)現(xiàn)了標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的工具、機(jī)器和材料,但是卻不在要求所有員工都是“一流的員工”。企業(yè)在鼓勵(lì)員工按照標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化流程穩(wěn)定地控制成本外,還希望員工不斷地改進(jìn)和提高自身的成本控制能力,計(jì)件工資制對(duì)員工的激勵(lì)效果已經(jīng)難以為繼。因此,本文提出了雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)這一概念來描述企業(yè)現(xiàn)行的成本理念。雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是指在考慮成本動(dòng)態(tài)性和人本管理的基礎(chǔ)上,依據(jù)會(huì)計(jì)科目的數(shù)據(jù)設(shè)定最優(yōu)成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(樣板標(biāo)準(zhǔn))和基本成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(基準(zhǔn)標(biāo)準(zhǔn))兩個(gè)相互呼應(yīng)的成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn),這兩個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)以會(huì)計(jì)成本為依據(jù),根據(jù)優(yōu)秀員工和全部員工的實(shí)際發(fā)生成本的統(tǒng)計(jì)結(jié)果分別進(jìn)行設(shè)定,用于控制和激勵(lì)不同類型員工的成本控制水平,達(dá)到“因勢(shì)利導(dǎo)、因人而異”的成本控制目標(biāo)。本研究從人本管理出發(fā)研究成本控制激勵(lì)問題,不僅為企業(yè)實(shí)施雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的成本核算模式提供與之匹配的激勵(lì)機(jī)制,不斷提高企業(yè)的成本控制能力,還為不同的激勵(lì)情景提供不同的激勵(lì)效應(yīng)評(píng)價(jià)方法,提高企業(yè)的激勵(lì)效率,最終實(shí)現(xiàn)將雙重成本控制整合到激勵(lì)理論中進(jìn)行激勵(lì)優(yōu)化和創(chuàng)新的目標(biāo)。研究的主要內(nèi)容包括以下六個(gè)部分:首先,論文分析了企業(yè)成本控制及激勵(lì)理論的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀及存在的問題,使用文獻(xiàn)萃取法和情景分析技術(shù)對(duì)雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行了界定,并挖掘出雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)對(duì)現(xiàn)有成本控制問題的適用性。在此基礎(chǔ)上,分析了雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)與企業(yè)激勵(lì)機(jī)制及激勵(lì)效應(yīng)的關(guān)系,提出了基于雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的激勵(lì)機(jī)制及激勵(lì)效應(yīng)研究的基本研究內(nèi)容。其次,論文建立了基于雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的員工激勵(lì)機(jī)制。分析了基于雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的員工價(jià)值取向,并將這種價(jià)值取向納入到企業(yè)成本控制的黑箱系統(tǒng)討論員工價(jià)值取向與企業(yè)的行為導(dǎo)向的關(guān)系。利用個(gè)體管理博弈機(jī)制來表述員工激勵(lì)與員工成本控制行為的博弈關(guān)系,依據(jù)博弈結(jié)果構(gòu)建了基于雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的員工激勵(lì)機(jī)制,并建立基于“樣板-基準(zhǔn)”控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的員工雙重激勵(lì)模型作為激勵(lì)的實(shí)施工具。第三,論述設(shè)立基于雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的企業(yè)成本控制中心的目的及其引發(fā)的“搭便車”現(xiàn)象,利用群體博弈模型分析企業(yè)成本控制中心內(nèi)部的群體博弈行為,設(shè)計(jì)企業(yè)的最優(yōu)激勵(lì)系數(shù),明確“搭便車”效應(yīng)產(chǎn)生的必要條件,并通過設(shè)置滿足多階段重復(fù)動(dòng)態(tài)博弈的最優(yōu)納什均衡解的激勵(lì)機(jī)制來解決團(tuán)隊(duì)工作中出現(xiàn)的“霍桑效應(yīng)”。為了逼近現(xiàn)實(shí),在上述博弈結(jié)果的基礎(chǔ)上將雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和信息不對(duì)稱引入到激勵(lì)機(jī)制中,建立了基于“樣板-基準(zhǔn)”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和員工努力的雙重激勵(lì)模型,實(shí)現(xiàn)了企業(yè)與員工、員工與員工之間的合作條件。第四,通過文獻(xiàn)萃取法對(duì)與激勵(lì)影響因素有關(guān)的文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行梳理和總結(jié),識(shí)別出影響激勵(lì)效應(yīng)的影響因素,通過將不同的變量引入到委托代理模型中分析各影響因素對(duì)激勵(lì)效果的作用程度,構(gòu)建包括管理者對(duì)員工傳達(dá)信任度和期望值(完美業(yè)績?cè)u(píng)估)、期待員工提高成本控制效度(不完美業(yè)績?cè)u(píng)估)和員工行動(dòng)的選擇(賦予自主控制權(quán))在內(nèi)的三種激勵(lì)情景的激勵(lì)效應(yīng)影響因素最優(yōu)組合形式。使用結(jié)構(gòu)方程模型分析以三種激勵(lì)情景為調(diào)節(jié)變量對(duì)激勵(lì)效應(yīng)產(chǎn)生調(diào)節(jié)作用的理論框架,揭示設(shè)定激勵(lì)情境下激勵(lì)效應(yīng)影響因素的演變路徑,為實(shí)現(xiàn)激勵(lì)效應(yīng)最大化提供定性參考。第五,論述激勵(lì)效應(yīng)評(píng)價(jià)機(jī)構(gòu)的可行性,并構(gòu)建基于雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的激勵(lì)效應(yīng)評(píng)價(jià)機(jī)制。根據(jù)激勵(lì)效應(yīng)的四個(gè)影響因素建立激勵(lì)效應(yīng)評(píng)價(jià)的指標(biāo)體系,探索評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)之間組合關(guān)系及其生產(chǎn)函數(shù)的表達(dá)形式。闡述了使用隨機(jī)前沿分析模型對(duì)激勵(lì)效應(yīng)進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)的優(yōu)勢(shì),建立了基于雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的激勵(lì)效應(yīng)評(píng)價(jià)機(jī)制,并分別選取了符合三種激勵(lì)情景的三家企業(yè)進(jìn)行激勵(lì)效應(yīng)評(píng)價(jià)的實(shí)證研究。第六,運(yùn)用理論推演、模型分析結(jié)論以及實(shí)證統(tǒng)計(jì)與檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果,提出基于雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的激勵(lì)機(jī)制實(shí)施的保障措施,并設(shè)計(jì)了保障措施的路徑選擇策略�？紤]到激勵(lì)效應(yīng)對(duì)雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的反饋?zhàn)饔?提出了基于雙重成本控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的激勵(lì)效應(yīng)提升措施。
[Abstract]:With the development of science and technology and the improvement of the level of global productivity, the core of competition among enterprises is to improve the production equipment, introduce advanced technology and product innovation, and gradually transfer to the quality of employees, the optimization of personnel structure and the introduction of active and effective incentive mechanism to adjust the "soft strength". Motivate and stimulate the enthusiasm and initiative of the employees to control the cost, so as to improve the incentive effect based on cost control to maximize the economic benefits of the enterprise. Most of the existing cost control and incentive mechanisms follow the principles of scientific management proposed by Taylor. Modern cost control has been basically standardized tools, machines and materials. But it is not required that all employees are "first-rate employees". Enterprises are encouraging employees to control costs steadily in accordance with standardized processes, and they also hope that employees will constantly improve and improve their own cost control capabilities. The incentive effect of piecework wage system to employees is difficult to assume. Therefore, this paper puts forward double cost control. The standard is a concept that describes the current cost concept of the enterprise. The dual cost control standard refers to the two costing cost control standards, which are based on the cost dynamics and the human based management, according to the data of the accounting subjects, and the basic cost control standard (standard standard), these two cost control standards. The standard is based on the accounting cost, according to the statistical results of the actual cost of the outstanding employees and all employees, to control and motivate the cost control level of the different types of employees, and to achieve the cost control goal of "changing the situation with the people and different people". This research is based on the human based management to study the cost control incentive problem. It not only provides an incentive mechanism that matches the cost accounting model which the enterprise implements the dual cost control standard, constantly improves the enterprise's cost control ability, but also provides different incentive effect evaluation methods for different incentive situations, and improves the incentive efficiency of the enterprise. Finally, the dual cost control is integrated into the incentive theory. The main content of the research is to motivate the optimization and innovation. The main contents of this study include the following six parts: first, the paper analyzes the development status and existing problems of the enterprise cost control and incentive theory, and uses the literature extraction and scenario analysis technology to define the double cost control standard, and excavates the dual cost control standard for the existing formation. On this basis, the relationship between double cost control standard and incentive mechanism and incentive effect is analyzed. The basic research content of incentive mechanism and incentive effect based on dual cost control standard is put forward. Secondly, the paper establishes employee incentive mechanism based on dual cost control standard. The employee value orientation based on the dual cost control standard is analyzed, and the value orientation is incorporated into the enterprise cost control black box system to discuss the relationship between employee value orientation and enterprise's behavior orientation. The employee incentive mechanism based on the dual cost control standard is built, and the employee dual incentive model based on the "sample base" control standard is established as an incentive implementation tool. Third, the purpose of setting up the enterprise cost control center based on the dual cost control standard and the "hitchhiking" phenomenon are discussed, and the group game is used. The model analyzes the group game behavior within the enterprise cost control center, designs the optimal incentive coefficient of the enterprise, defines the necessary conditions for the "hitchhiking" effect, and solves the "Hawthorne effect" in the team work by setting up the incentive mechanism of the optimal Nash equilibrium solution that satisfies the multi stage repetitive dynamic game. On the basis of the above game results, the dual cost control standard and information asymmetry are introduced into the incentive mechanism, and a dual incentive model based on the "template reference" standard and employee effort has been established, and the cooperation between enterprises and employees, employees and employees is realized. Fourth, the influence of the literature extraction method on the incentive system is caused by the literature extraction method. The related literature is combed and summarized to identify the influencing factors that affect the incentive effect. By introducing different variables into the principal-agent model, the effect degree of each influence factor on the incentive effect is analyzed, and the trust and expectation value (perfect performance evaluation) of the managers are constructed, and the employees are expected to improve the cost control. The optimal combination of the motivational effects of three incentive scenarios, such as the validity (imperfections) and the choice of the employee's action (impartial control). The structural equation model is used to analyze the theoretical framework that regulates the incentive effect with three incentive scenarios and reveals the incentive under the incentive situation. The evolution path of the effect factors will provide qualitative reference for maximizing the incentive effect. Fifth, the feasibility of the incentive effect evaluation institution is discussed, and the incentive effect evaluation mechanism based on the dual cost control standard is set up. According to the four influencing factors of the incentive effect, the index system of the excitation effect evaluation is established and the evaluation index is explored. The combination of the relationship and the expression form of the production function. The advantage of using the stochastic frontier analysis model to evaluate the incentive effect is expounded. The incentive effect evaluation mechanism based on the dual cost control standard is set up, and the empirical research on the incentive effect evaluation of the three enterprises of Fu Hesan incentive scenario is selected respectively. Sixth, Based on the theoretical deduction, model analysis and empirical statistics and test results, the guarantee measures based on the dual cost control standard are put forward, and the path selection strategy is designed. Considering the feedback effect of the incentive effect on the dual cost control standard, the excitation based on the dual cost control standard is proposed. The measures to improve the excitation effect.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱工程大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92
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本文編號(hào)：1932566