本文選題：高管薪酬　切入點：股權(quán)激勵　出處：《鄭州航空工業(yè)管理學(xué)院》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在我國市場競爭日益激烈的今天,企業(yè)高級管理者對市場發(fā)展動向的把握會直接影響企業(yè)未來的發(fā)展方向。高管對于市場環(huán)境的把握,主要體現(xiàn)為高管對市場中的風(fēng)險的態(tài)度。如果高管對風(fēng)險持積極應(yīng)對態(tài)度,企業(yè)有可能會利用這種機遇實現(xiàn)企業(yè)效益的提高。但如果高管對風(fēng)險持規(guī)避態(tài)度,那么企業(yè)有可能會失去獲得利益的機會,從而影響企業(yè)發(fā)展。這也使得如何激勵高管進行風(fēng)險承擔(dān)行為,成為近幾年來理論研究與實踐中都關(guān)注的熱點問題。在對高管進行激勵的方式選擇上,對高管實施股權(quán)激勵被認為是較為有效的激勵機制。而在高管股權(quán)激勵的研究中,以探討股權(quán)激勵與企業(yè)績效之間相關(guān)性的文獻居多,卻很少有文獻從企業(yè)風(fēng)險承擔(dān)的角度探討如何對高管進行股權(quán)激勵以提高企業(yè)績效。因此,從理論上研究高管股權(quán)激勵、風(fēng)險承擔(dān)與企業(yè)績效三者之間關(guān)系,并深入分析風(fēng)險承擔(dān)在三者之間的作用路徑就顯得十分必要。本文在對國內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻進行梳理與歸納的基礎(chǔ)上,以委托代理理論為本文分析的起點,并結(jié)合激勵理論的作用機制,提出了關(guān)于高管股權(quán)激勵、企業(yè)風(fēng)險承擔(dān)與企業(yè)績效三者之間關(guān)系的理論假設(shè);接著,以我國滬深A(yù)股上市公司2010—2014年的數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,通過數(shù)據(jù)篩選,共得到5035個樣本數(shù)據(jù)。使用實證分析方法,檢驗了高管股權(quán)激勵、企業(yè)風(fēng)險承擔(dān)與企業(yè)績效兩兩之間的關(guān)系,并重點探討了風(fēng)險承擔(dān)在兩者中的作用。通過分析后發(fā)現(xiàn):高管得到股權(quán)激勵后,公司績效會得到提升;對高管實施股權(quán)激勵后,企業(yè)的風(fēng)險承擔(dān)水平會提高;企業(yè)風(fēng)險水平的增加,會提升企業(yè)的經(jīng)營績效;風(fēng)險承擔(dān)通過 高管股權(quán)激勵—企業(yè)風(fēng)險承擔(dān)—企業(yè)績效‖的路徑對企業(yè)績效產(chǎn)生影響,風(fēng)險承擔(dān)在高管股權(quán)激勵與企業(yè)績效之間發(fā)揮部分中介作用。之后的穩(wěn)健性檢驗測試也驗證了上述結(jié)論的可靠性。最后,本文提出了完善我國上市企業(yè)薪酬管理制度、高管股權(quán)激勵機制和公司內(nèi)部治理制度的建議。
[Abstract]:With the increasingly fierce market competition in our country, the grasp of the market development trend by the senior managers will directly affect the future development direction of the enterprises. If the executives have a positive attitude to risk, they may use this opportunity to improve their efficiency. But if the executives have an evasive attitude toward risk, Then the enterprise may lose the opportunity to gain benefits, thus affecting the development of the enterprise. This also makes it possible to motivate senior executives to engage in risk-taking behavior. In recent years, it has become a hot issue in theory research and practice. In the way of incentive, equity incentive is considered to be a more effective incentive mechanism. In the research of executive equity incentive, Most of the literatures discuss the correlation between equity incentive and enterprise performance, but few discuss how to improve the performance of the enterprise from the perspective of enterprise risk taking. Therefore, the theoretical study of executive equity incentive. It is necessary to analyze the relationship between risk-taking and enterprise performance, and to analyze the action path of risk-taking among them. Taking the principal-agent theory as the starting point of this paper and combining the mechanism of incentive theory, this paper puts forward the theoretical hypothesis about the relationship among executive equity incentive, enterprise risk-taking and enterprise performance. Taking the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2014 as samples, a total of 5035 sample data are obtained through data screening. The empirical analysis is used to test the relationship between executive equity incentive, corporate risk-taking and corporate performance. Through the analysis, it is found that the corporate performance will be improved after the executives get equity incentive, and the risk-bearing level of the enterprise will be improved after the implementation of equity incentive to the senior executives. The increase of the level of enterprise risk will improve the performance of the enterprise, and the risk-taking will affect the performance of the enterprise through the path of executive equity incentive, enterprise risk-taking and enterprise performance. Risk-taking plays a part of intermediary role between executive equity incentive and corporate performance. The reliability of the above conclusions is also verified by the robustness test. Finally, this paper proposes to improve the salary management system of listed enterprises in China. Executive equity incentive mechanism and corporate internal governance system recommendations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：鄭州航空工業(yè)管理學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F272.92

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