發(fā)布時間：2018-03-14 21:10

  本文選題：高管薪酬　切入點：股權激勵　出處：《鄭州航空工業(yè)管理學院》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：在我國市場競爭日益激烈的今天,企業(yè)高級管理者對市場發(fā)展動向的把握會直接影響企業(yè)未來的發(fā)展方向。高管對于市場環(huán)境的把握,主要體現為高管對市場中的風險的態(tài)度。如果高管對風險持積極應對態(tài)度,企業(yè)有可能會利用這種機遇實現企業(yè)效益的提高。但如果高管對風險持規(guī)避態(tài)度,那么企業(yè)有可能會失去獲得利益的機會,從而影響企業(yè)發(fā)展。這也使得如何激勵高管進行風險承擔行為,成為近幾年來理論研究與實踐中都關注的熱點問題。在對高管進行激勵的方式選擇上,對高管實施股權激勵被認為是較為有效的激勵機制。而在高管股權激勵的研究中,以探討股權激勵與企業(yè)績效之間相關性的文獻居多,卻很少有文獻從企業(yè)風險承擔的角度探討如何對高管進行股權激勵以提高企業(yè)績效。因此,從理論上研究高管股權激勵、風險承擔與企業(yè)績效三者之間關系,并深入分析風險承擔在三者之間的作用路徑就顯得十分必要。本文在對國內外相關文獻進行梳理與歸納的基礎上,以委托代理理論為本文分析的起點,并結合激勵理論的作用機制,提出了關于高管股權激勵、企業(yè)風險承擔與企業(yè)績效三者之間關系的理論假設;接著,以我國滬深A股上市公司2010—2014年的數據為樣本,通過數據篩選,共得到5035個樣本數據。使用實證分析方法,檢驗了高管股權激勵、企業(yè)風險承擔與企業(yè)績效兩兩之間的關系,并重點探討了風險承擔在兩者中的作用。通過分析后發(fā)現:高管得到股權激勵后,公司績效會得到提升;對高管實施股權激勵后,企業(yè)的風險承擔水平會提高;企業(yè)風險水平的增加,會提升企業(yè)的經營績效;風險承擔通過 高管股權激勵—企業(yè)風險承擔—企業(yè)績效‖的路徑對企業(yè)績效產生影響,風險承擔在高管股權激勵與企業(yè)績效之間發(fā)揮部分中介作用。之后的穩(wěn)健性檢驗測試也驗證了上述結論的可靠性。最后,本文提出了完善我國上市企業(yè)薪酬管理制度、高管股權激勵機制和公司內部治理制度的建議。
[Abstract]:With the increasingly fierce market competition in our country, the grasp of the market development trend by the senior managers will directly affect the future development direction of the enterprises. If the executives have a positive attitude to risk, they may use this opportunity to improve their efficiency. But if the executives have an evasive attitude toward risk, Then the enterprise may lose the opportunity to gain benefits, thus affecting the development of the enterprise. This also makes it possible to motivate senior executives to engage in risk-taking behavior. In recent years, it has become a hot issue in theory research and practice. In the way of incentive, equity incentive is considered to be a more effective incentive mechanism. In the research of executive equity incentive, Most of the literatures discuss the correlation between equity incentive and enterprise performance, but few discuss how to improve the performance of the enterprise from the perspective of enterprise risk taking. Therefore, the theoretical study of executive equity incentive. It is necessary to analyze the relationship between risk-taking and enterprise performance, and to analyze the action path of risk-taking among them. Taking the principal-agent theory as the starting point of this paper and combining the mechanism of incentive theory, this paper puts forward the theoretical hypothesis about the relationship among executive equity incentive, enterprise risk-taking and enterprise performance. Taking the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2014 as samples, a total of 5035 sample data are obtained through data screening. The empirical analysis is used to test the relationship between executive equity incentive, corporate risk-taking and corporate performance. Through the analysis, it is found that the corporate performance will be improved after the executives get equity incentive, and the risk-bearing level of the enterprise will be improved after the implementation of equity incentive to the senior executives. The increase of the level of enterprise risk will improve the performance of the enterprise, and the risk-taking will affect the performance of the enterprise through the path of executive equity incentive, enterprise risk-taking and enterprise performance. Risk-taking plays a part of intermediary role between executive equity incentive and corporate performance. The reliability of the above conclusions is also verified by the robustness test. Finally, this paper proposes to improve the salary management system of listed enterprises in China. Executive equity incentive mechanism and corporate internal governance system recommendations.
【學位授予單位】：鄭州航空工業(yè)管理學院
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F272.92

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 蘇坤;;管理層股權激勵、風險承擔與資本配置效率[J];管理科學;2015年03期

2 游家興;鄒雨菲;;社會資本、多元化戰(zhàn)略與公司業(yè)績——基于企業(yè)家嵌入性網絡的分析視角[J];南開管理評論;2014年05期

3 李小榮;張瑞君;;股權激勵影響風險承擔:代理成本還是風險規(guī)避?[J];會計研究;2014年01期

4 朱焱;張孟昌;;企業(yè)管理團隊人力資本、研發(fā)投入與企業(yè)績效的實證研究[J];會計研究;2013年11期

5 戴小勇;成力為;;研發(fā)投入強度對企業(yè)績效影響的門檻效應研究[J];科學學研究;2013年11期

6 張瑞君;李小榮;許年行;;貨幣薪酬能激勵高管承擔風險嗎[J];經濟理論與經濟管理;2013年08期

7 范合君;初梓豪;;股權激勵對公司績效倒U型影響[J];經濟與管理研究;2013年02期

8 余明桂;李文貴;潘紅波;;管理者過度自信與企業(yè)風險承擔[J];金融研究;2013年01期

9 解維敏;唐清泉;;公司治理與風險承擔——來自中國上市公司的經驗證據[J];財經問題研究;2013年01期

10 位華;;CEO權力、薪酬激勵和城市商業(yè)銀行風險承擔[J];金融論壇;2012年09期

，

本文編號：1612938