【摘要】：目前,城市交通擁堵問題越來越嚴(yán)峻,要緩解擁堵的交通路徑情況,應(yīng)合理的運(yùn)用相關(guān)知識(shí)建立模型體系來進(jìn)一步優(yōu)化整個(gè)路徑選擇系統(tǒng)。為出行者路徑選擇提供更合理的建議,出行路徑最優(yōu)化是出行者的最終目標(biāo),也是交通系統(tǒng)的最佳選擇。同時(shí)提高了路徑的利用效率,使得出行者與管理者的收益值增大。研究合理的出行者路徑選擇模型和求解算法,可以節(jié)約出行成本、減少交通事故、提高交通效率,使出行者更為舒心,具有較高的理論價(jià)值和廣闊的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。現(xiàn)階段,著力研究出行者出行的路徑選擇優(yōu)化方案,成為提高出行者收益以及路徑利用效率(即就是緩解城市交通擁堵現(xiàn)象)的必要途徑。但是,在實(shí)際的路徑選擇過程中,由于出行者的選擇受到各種因素的影響,路徑的選擇結(jié)果具有很大的不可預(yù)測(cè)性。因此,探求更合理更明了的路徑選擇模型,對(duì)于出行者路徑的選擇以及管理者誘導(dǎo)信息的發(fā)布有著很大的幫助。并且有利于緩解道路擁堵,提高路徑利用效率和道路的整體運(yùn)行狀況。因此,在只考慮出行者的路徑選擇所獲得的收益條件下,因?yàn)樵诔鲂羞^程中出行費(fèi)用是大多數(shù)出行者首要考慮的問題,研究不完全信息靜態(tài)條件下和不完全信息動(dòng)態(tài)條件下的出行者路徑選擇均衡的問題,構(gòu)建模型并設(shè)計(jì)算法,用來求解出行者的最優(yōu)路徑選擇的均衡解,并給出具體的算例來驗(yàn)證所構(gòu)建的模型與算法的有效性和可行性,具體內(nèi)容如下:1.綜述了最優(yōu)路徑選擇的研究現(xiàn)狀和研究目的,主要包括博弈論的研究現(xiàn)狀與進(jìn)展,并且論述了博弈的要素、博弈的分類、貝葉斯均衡以及精煉貝葉斯均衡的概念與定義。最后介紹了本文所要研究的問題。2.研究了在不完全信息靜態(tài)條件下出行者的出行路徑選擇均衡問題,并給出不同策略下出行者的收益值,分析靜態(tài)條件下誘導(dǎo)信息對(duì)出行者心理活動(dòng)的影響,構(gòu)建路徑選擇模型、設(shè)計(jì)算法求解純策略與混合策略的納什均衡,進(jìn)而求解貝葉斯納什均衡。3.研究了不完全信息動(dòng)態(tài)條件下,在管理者發(fā)布的誘導(dǎo)信息基礎(chǔ)之上出行者與出行者之間的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈問題,在運(yùn)用海薩尼轉(zhuǎn)換和均衡的定義求解精煉貝葉斯納什均衡的基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)求解出的不同策略下的收益值,運(yùn)用貝葉斯先驗(yàn)概率進(jìn)行設(shè)定,進(jìn)而研究此過程的精煉貝葉斯納什均衡。4.研究了基于精煉貝葉斯均衡條件下的出行者路徑選擇,與上兩章不同的是博弈變?yōu)槁窂绞鹿逝c出行者之間的博弈,并且對(duì)于此博弈的特征進(jìn)行了研究。按照博弈的基本要求描述了路徑事故與出行者之間的重要博弈要素,構(gòu)造一種期望效用函數(shù),其是以出行者的期望效用最大為目標(biāo),根據(jù)貝葉斯均衡法則求解精煉貝葉斯均衡,并構(gòu)建路徑選擇策略的動(dòng)態(tài)應(yīng)對(duì)框架,通過博弈雙方之間反復(fù)博弈并不斷地修正應(yīng)對(duì)策略,直至出行結(jié)束。最后通過算例證明出行者模型的正確性和有效性。
[Abstract]:At present, the problem of urban traffic congestion is becoming more and more serious. In order to alleviate the congestion of traffic path, we should make use of relevant knowledge to establish a model system to further optimize the whole path selection system. It is the ultimate goal of travelers and the best choice of transportation system. At the same time, the efficiency of path utilization is improved, and the profit value of traveler and manager is increased. The study of reasonable route choice model and algorithm can save travel cost, reduce traffic accidents, improve traffic efficiency and make travelers more comfortable. It has high theoretical value and wide practical significance. At the present stage, it is necessary to study the route selection optimization scheme for travelers, which is the necessary way to improve the revenue of travelers and the efficiency of route utilization (that is, to alleviate the phenomenon of urban traffic congestion). However, in the course of actual path selection, due to the influence of various factors on the traveler's choice, the result of path selection is very unpredictable. Therefore, exploring a more reasonable and clear path selection model is of great help to the route selection of travelers and the release of manager induced information. And it is helpful to alleviate the road congestion, improve the efficiency of path utilization and the overall operation of the road. Therefore, under the condition of only considering the benefits of the route choice of the traveler, because the travel cost is the primary consideration of most travelers during the travel process, In this paper, the problem of path selection equilibrium for travelers under the static condition of incomplete information and the dynamic condition of incomplete information is studied, and the model is constructed and the algorithm is designed to solve the equilibrium solution of the optimal path choice of the traveler. A concrete example is given to verify the validity and feasibility of the proposed model and algorithm. The main contents are as follows: 1. This paper summarizes the research status and purpose of optimal path selection, including the research status and progress of game theory, and discusses the elements of game, the classification of game, the concept and definition of Bayesian equilibrium and refined Bayesian equilibrium. Finally, it introduces the problems to be studied in this paper. 2. This paper studies the problem of path selection equilibrium for travelers under the condition of incomplete information, and gives the profit value of travelers under different strategies, analyzes the influence of induced information on the psychological activities of travelers under static conditions, and constructs a path choice model. The algorithm is designed to solve the Nash equilibrium of pure strategy and mixed strategy, and then to solve Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 3. In this paper, the dynamic game problem between the traveler and the traveler under the dynamic condition of incomplete information is studied on the basis of the induced information released by the manager. On the basis of solving the refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium by using the definition of Hysani transformation and equilibrium, this paper studies the dynamic game problem between the traveler and the traveler based on the induced information released by the manager. The Bayesian priori probability is used to set the return value under different strategies, and then the refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium is studied. 4. This paper studies the path selection of travelers under the condition of refined Bayesian equilibrium. The difference from the previous two chapters is the game between the route accident and the traveller, and the characteristics of the game are studied. According to the basic requirements of the game, this paper describes the important elements of the game between the path accident and the traveler, and constructs an expected utility function, which aims at the maximum expected utility of the traveler and solves the refined Bayesian equilibrium according to the Bayesian equilibrium rule. The dynamic coping framework of the path selection strategy is constructed, and the strategy is revised through repeated games between the two sides of the game until the end of the trip. Finally, an example is given to prove the correctness and validity of the traveller model.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：U491;O225

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本文編號(hào)：2294063