本文選題：金融監(jiān)管　切入點(diǎn)：激勵(lì)審視　出處：《上海金融》2017年03期

【摘要】：全球金融危機(jī)表明是金融市場(chǎng)參與者的不當(dāng)激勵(lì)可以是系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的根本來源,主要的不當(dāng)激勵(lì)包括監(jiān)管制度不當(dāng)激勵(lì)、市場(chǎng)自律行為等。在全球金融危機(jī)之后,雖然各國進(jìn)行了金融監(jiān)管改革,然而其在監(jiān)管復(fù)雜性、壓力測(cè)試和國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、監(jiān)管政策局限性方面仍面臨著巨大挑戰(zhàn)。本文提出了激勵(lì)審視工具以幫助識(shí)別金融部門中的不當(dāng)激勵(lì),并闡述了其內(nèi)容和實(shí)施方式,進(jìn)而對(duì)我國的金融監(jiān)管提出建議。
[Abstract]:The global financial crisis has shown that improper incentives for financial market participants can be the fundamental source of systemic risk. The main improper incentives include improper regulatory incentives, market self-discipline, etc. After the global financial crisis, Although countries have undertaken financial regulatory reforms, they have been involved in regulatory complexity, stress testing and international standards. In order to help identify the improper incentives in the financial sector, this paper puts forward an incentive review tool to help identify the improper incentives in the financial sector, and expounds its contents and implementation methods, and then puts forward some suggestions for the financial supervision in our country.
【作者單位】： 浙江工業(yè)職業(yè)技術(shù)學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】：F832.0
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本文編號(hào)：1653342