發(fā)布時間：2018-01-13 01:37

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：管理層激勵與上市公司業(yè)績的關(guān)系研究　出處：《甘肅政法學(xué)院》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 貨幣薪酬激勵 股權(quán)激勵 股票期權(quán)激勵 限制性股票激勵 上市公司業(yè)績

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代公司的一個主要特征就是所有者與經(jīng)營者的兩權(quán)分離,這一特征使上市公司的代理成本增加。為了降低委托代理成本,公司的所有者不斷學(xué)習(xí)和更新公司的內(nèi)部治理方法--管理層激勵機制,將管理層的自身利益與公司利益結(jié)合起來。管理層激勵能否提高上市公司業(yè)績一直是該領(lǐng)域研究的熱點。我國學(xué)者對管理層激勵理論領(lǐng)域的文獻(xiàn)研究起步較晚,管理層激勵機制現(xiàn)在還很不健全,尤其是在股權(quán)激勵機制方面。最近幾年,公司治理理念的不斷更新以及資本市場的蓬勃發(fā)展,為完善我國管理層激勵機制提供了良好的契機。關(guān)于管理層激勵的研究也逐漸增多,我國學(xué)者對管理層激勵理論有了更加深入的認(rèn)識。本文是立足于前人研究的基礎(chǔ)對管理層激勵與公司經(jīng)營業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究,期望為完善我國管理層激勵機制理論獻(xiàn)上微薄之力。本文在對管理層激勵、上市公司業(yè)績的影響因素和二者的關(guān)系進(jìn)行文獻(xiàn)梳理的基礎(chǔ)上,根據(jù)文獻(xiàn)的研究成果和理論基礎(chǔ),提出了四個研究假設(shè)。文章以我國上市公司2010-2014年的數(shù)據(jù)作為研究樣本,分別從管理層貨幣薪酬激勵、股權(quán)激勵這兩個方面研究其與上市公司業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系。在選擇上市公司的公司規(guī)模、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)以及財務(wù)杠桿為控制變量的基礎(chǔ)上,通過構(gòu)建多元回歸模型對管理層貨幣薪酬激勵與上市公司業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行實證研究;運用PSM分析法來分析管理層股權(quán)激勵與上市公司業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系。通過實證研究發(fā)現(xiàn),對管理層進(jìn)行貨幣薪酬激勵和股權(quán)激勵都能提高公司的經(jīng)營業(yè)績。關(guān)于產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的研究,國有控股公司的管理層貨幣薪酬激勵的效果好于民營;而民營控股公司的管理層股權(quán)激勵的效果好于國有。對不同股權(quán)激勵方式進(jìn)行對比,發(fā)現(xiàn)限制性股票激勵的效果要好于股票期權(quán)激勵。考慮股權(quán)集中度的影響,發(fā)現(xiàn)股權(quán)集中度越高,股權(quán)激勵效果越差。文章的實證結(jié)果在一定程度上可以為上市公司選擇合適的管理層激勵機制提供借鑒,使上市公司將管理層的自身利益與公司的長期利益結(jié)合起來,以提高公司的經(jīng)營業(yè)績。
[Abstract]:One of the main characteristics of modern companies is the separation of owners and managers, which makes the agency cost of listed companies increase, in order to reduce the cost of principal-agent. The owner of the company is constantly learning and updating the internal governance method of the company-management incentive mechanism. Combining the self-interest of the management with the interests of the company. Whether the management incentive can improve the performance of listed companies has been a hot topic in this field. The management incentive mechanism is not perfect, especially in the equity incentive mechanism. In recent years, the concept of corporate governance has been updated and the capital market is booming. It provides a good opportunity for perfecting the incentive mechanism of management in our country, and the research on the incentive of management is also increasing gradually. Chinese scholars have a deeper understanding of the management incentive theory. This paper is based on the previous research on the relationship between management incentive and corporate performance. In order to improve the theory of management incentive mechanism, this paper reviews the literature on the management incentive, the factors affecting the performance of listed companies and the relationship between them. According to the research results and theoretical basis of the literature, this paper puts forward four research hypotheses. This paper takes the data of Chinese listed companies from 2010-2014 as the research sample, respectively from the management monetary compensation incentive. This paper studies the relationship between equity incentive and the performance of listed companies, on the basis of choosing the size, ownership structure and financial leverage of listed companies as control variables. An empirical study on the relationship between management monetary compensation incentive and the performance of listed companies is carried out by constructing a multiple regression model. PSM analysis method is used to analyze the relationship between management equity incentive and listed company performance. Monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive can improve the performance of the company. The research on the nature of property right shows that the effect of monetary compensation incentive of state-owned holding company is better than that of private company. The effect of management equity incentive of private holding company is better than that of state-owned. By comparing different equity incentive methods, we find that the effect of restricted stock incentive is better than stock option incentive. Consider the effect of equity concentration. It is found that the higher the degree of equity concentration, the worse the effect of equity incentive. The empirical results of this paper can provide a reference for the listed companies to choose the appropriate incentive mechanism of management to a certain extent. In order to improve the company's operating performance, the listed company combines the self-interest of the management with the long-term interest of the company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：甘肅政法學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51;F272.92

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