農(nóng)業(yè)保險公司道德風(fēng)險防范機(jī)制設(shè)計
發(fā)布時間：2018-09-13 08:42
【摘要】：農(nóng)業(yè)保險是國家農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展的一個重要部分,從政府層面講,農(nóng)業(yè)保險的制度完善與否,直接關(guān)系到區(qū)域農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展,農(nóng)業(yè)保險也是保險行業(yè)中重要的一部分,但與一般商業(yè)保險不同,作為一種政策性制度,是政府保護(hù)和發(fā)展農(nóng)業(yè)的一種重要保障。然而,由于農(nóng)業(yè)保險市場上存在嚴(yán)重的農(nóng)戶和保險公司信息不對稱情況,往往會引發(fā)保險公司和投保農(nóng)戶的道德風(fēng)險,尤其是投保農(nóng)戶的道德風(fēng)險行為,會嚴(yán)重地影響政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險在我國,尤其是像安徽省這樣的農(nóng)業(yè)大省實施的效率。另一方面,對于投保人道德風(fēng)險的防范的法律真空,缺乏相應(yīng)的法律懲戒和監(jiān)督機(jī)制加劇了道德風(fēng)險。因此,保險公司需要從保險契約設(shè)計來防范道德風(fēng)險。本文將從農(nóng)業(yè)保險公司角度出發(fā),對我國農(nóng)業(yè)保險發(fā)展和學(xué)術(shù)研究現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行全面分析和調(diào)研,并介紹了農(nóng)業(yè)風(fēng)險和風(fēng)險管理概念。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文利用博弈論理論分析了在實際的農(nóng)業(yè)保險過程中存在的投保農(nóng)戶道德風(fēng)險問題,研究投保農(nóng)戶在自身效用最大化的目標(biāo)下,是否會由于購買了農(nóng)業(yè)保險而減少農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)過程中的努力投入水平,以及在農(nóng)業(yè)災(zāi)害發(fā)生后,投保農(nóng)戶是否會為了獲取更高的賠償金額而虛報其災(zāi)害損失。針對農(nóng)業(yè)保險中的事前和事后道德風(fēng)險,本文從農(nóng)業(yè)保險激勵機(jī)制設(shè)計入手,研究如何針對農(nóng)業(yè)保險中存在的道德風(fēng)險,應(yīng)如何設(shè)計保險合同,使得投保農(nóng)戶可以提高其投入的努力水平,以及如何在災(zāi)害發(fā)生后,通過保險費用合理設(shè)定來減少農(nóng)戶虛報損失等行為,從而有效遏制道德風(fēng)險行為,維護(hù)保險公司正常收益。通過對投保農(nóng)戶道德風(fēng)險博弈分析發(fā)現(xiàn):在存在事前道德風(fēng)險時,投保農(nóng)戶有減少投入努力的風(fēng)險,而災(zāi)害發(fā)生后,投保農(nóng)戶有虛報謊報災(zāi)害損失的事后道德風(fēng)險行為。基于投保農(nóng)戶的這類行為,本文設(shè)計風(fēng)險防御契約,通過模型得到最優(yōu)解條件,并在最優(yōu)解情況下討論風(fēng)險分擔(dān)情況、最優(yōu)農(nóng)業(yè)保險費率和最優(yōu)的農(nóng)業(yè)災(zāi)害賠償機(jī)制。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)在事前道德風(fēng)險下,農(nóng)業(yè)保險公司可以通過部分風(fēng)險轉(zhuǎn)到投保農(nóng)戶身上,從而可以促進(jìn)投保農(nóng)戶提高投入努力水平,抑制事前道德風(fēng)險。針對事后道德風(fēng)險,最優(yōu)契約中,保險公司可以通過經(jīng)濟(jì)懲罰,審查監(jiān)管和險費調(diào)整等方式來設(shè)置農(nóng)業(yè)保險的激勵合同,從而有效的降低事后道德風(fēng)險行為。本文對于防范道德風(fēng)險保險契約的研究,不僅可以降低投保農(nóng)戶道德風(fēng)險,引導(dǎo)誠信意識,還可以增加農(nóng)業(yè)保險公司的利潤,為我國政策依賴型農(nóng)業(yè)保險公司,例如國元農(nóng)業(yè)保險公司等,對投保農(nóng)戶道德風(fēng)險防范機(jī)制設(shè)計提供了理論依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:Agricultural insurance is an important part of national agricultural development. From the government level, the perfection of agricultural insurance system is directly related to the development of regional agricultural economy, and agricultural insurance is also an important part of insurance industry. But different from general commercial insurance, as a policy system, it is an important guarantee for government to protect and develop agriculture. However, due to the serious information asymmetry of farmers and insurance companies in the agricultural insurance market, it often leads to moral hazard of insurance companies and insured farmers, especially the behavior of moral hazard of insured farmers. It will seriously affect the efficiency of policy-based agricultural insurance in China, especially in large agricultural provinces such as Anhui Province. On the other hand, the lack of corresponding legal punishment and supervision mechanism intensifies the moral hazard. Therefore, insurance companies need to design insurance contracts to guard against moral hazard. From the angle of agricultural insurance company, this paper makes a comprehensive analysis and investigation on the present situation of agricultural insurance development and academic research in China, and introduces the concepts of agricultural risk and risk management. On this basis, this paper analyzes the moral hazard of insured farmers in the process of actual agricultural insurance by using game theory, and studies the goal of maximizing the utility of insured farmers. Whether the level of investment in agricultural production will be reduced because of the purchase of agricultural insurance, and whether the insured farmers will falsely report their disaster losses in order to obtain a higher compensation amount after the agricultural disasters occur. In view of the moral hazard in agricultural insurance before and after, this paper starts with the design of the incentive mechanism of agricultural insurance, and studies how to design the insurance contract in view of the moral hazard existing in the agricultural insurance, and how to design the insurance contract. So that the insured farmers can improve the level of their efforts and how to reduce the losses of farmers by setting the insurance cost reasonably after the disaster, so as to effectively curb the moral hazard behavior and maintain the normal income of insurance companies. Through the game analysis of the insured farmers' moral hazard, it is found that when there is a prior moral hazard, the insured farmers have the risk of reducing their efforts, and after the disaster, the insured farmers have the post-moral-hazard behavior of falsely reporting the disaster losses. Based on this kind of behavior of insured farmers, this paper designs a risk defense contract, obtains the optimal solution conditions through the model, and discusses the risk sharing situation, the optimal agricultural insurance rate and the optimal agricultural disaster compensation mechanism under the optimal solution. We find that under the prior moral hazard, the agricultural insurance company can transfer part of the risk to the insured farmers, thus it can promote the insured farmers to raise the level of investment efforts and restrain the prior moral hazard. According to the moral hazard after the event, in the optimal contract, the insurance company can set up the incentive contract of agricultural insurance by means of economic punishment, examination of supervision and adjustment of insurance fee, so as to effectively reduce the behavior of moral hazard after the event. The research on the insurance contract of preventing moral hazard can not only reduce the moral hazard of insured farmers, guide the consciousness of honesty, but also increase the profit of agricultural insurance company, which is the policy dependent agricultural insurance company of our country. For example, Guoyuan Agricultural Insurance Company provides a theoretical basis for the design of moral hazard prevention mechanism for insured farmers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F842.66
本文編號：2240641
[Abstract]:Agricultural insurance is an important part of national agricultural development. From the government level, the perfection of agricultural insurance system is directly related to the development of regional agricultural economy, and agricultural insurance is also an important part of insurance industry. But different from general commercial insurance, as a policy system, it is an important guarantee for government to protect and develop agriculture. However, due to the serious information asymmetry of farmers and insurance companies in the agricultural insurance market, it often leads to moral hazard of insurance companies and insured farmers, especially the behavior of moral hazard of insured farmers. It will seriously affect the efficiency of policy-based agricultural insurance in China, especially in large agricultural provinces such as Anhui Province. On the other hand, the lack of corresponding legal punishment and supervision mechanism intensifies the moral hazard. Therefore, insurance companies need to design insurance contracts to guard against moral hazard. From the angle of agricultural insurance company, this paper makes a comprehensive analysis and investigation on the present situation of agricultural insurance development and academic research in China, and introduces the concepts of agricultural risk and risk management. On this basis, this paper analyzes the moral hazard of insured farmers in the process of actual agricultural insurance by using game theory, and studies the goal of maximizing the utility of insured farmers. Whether the level of investment in agricultural production will be reduced because of the purchase of agricultural insurance, and whether the insured farmers will falsely report their disaster losses in order to obtain a higher compensation amount after the agricultural disasters occur. In view of the moral hazard in agricultural insurance before and after, this paper starts with the design of the incentive mechanism of agricultural insurance, and studies how to design the insurance contract in view of the moral hazard existing in the agricultural insurance, and how to design the insurance contract. So that the insured farmers can improve the level of their efforts and how to reduce the losses of farmers by setting the insurance cost reasonably after the disaster, so as to effectively curb the moral hazard behavior and maintain the normal income of insurance companies. Through the game analysis of the insured farmers' moral hazard, it is found that when there is a prior moral hazard, the insured farmers have the risk of reducing their efforts, and after the disaster, the insured farmers have the post-moral-hazard behavior of falsely reporting the disaster losses. Based on this kind of behavior of insured farmers, this paper designs a risk defense contract, obtains the optimal solution conditions through the model, and discusses the risk sharing situation, the optimal agricultural insurance rate and the optimal agricultural disaster compensation mechanism under the optimal solution. We find that under the prior moral hazard, the agricultural insurance company can transfer part of the risk to the insured farmers, thus it can promote the insured farmers to raise the level of investment efforts and restrain the prior moral hazard. According to the moral hazard after the event, in the optimal contract, the insurance company can set up the incentive contract of agricultural insurance by means of economic punishment, examination of supervision and adjustment of insurance fee, so as to effectively reduce the behavior of moral hazard after the event. The research on the insurance contract of preventing moral hazard can not only reduce the moral hazard of insured farmers, guide the consciousness of honesty, but also increase the profit of agricultural insurance company, which is the policy dependent agricultural insurance company of our country. For example, Guoyuan Agricultural Insurance Company provides a theoretical basis for the design of moral hazard prevention mechanism for insured farmers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F842.66
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