【摘要】：隨著社會經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,工傷保險(xiǎn)在職業(yè)安全方面的重要性尤其凸顯,工傷待遇在工傷保險(xiǎn)的范疇中又是處在核心位置。但是,我國工傷保險(xiǎn)制度建立較晚,屬地化管理的工傷保險(xiǎn)政策存在較大的差異,傷殘待遇水平參差不齊。我國工傷保險(xiǎn)勞動能力喪失等級待遇制定的合理性和科學(xué)性值得深究。關(guān)于我國工傷保險(xiǎn)勞動能力喪失等級待遇的研究主要集中在工傷待遇政策的梳理和分析,不同群體和行業(yè)工傷待遇水平研究和工傷待遇的國際比較等方面。以上研究并沒有深刻揭示我國工傷保險(xiǎn)勞動能力喪失等級待遇的設(shè)置是否是科學(xué)的?如果是不科學(xué)不合理的,那科學(xué)合理的工傷保險(xiǎn)待遇補(bǔ)償標(biāo)準(zhǔn)應(yīng)該是怎樣計(jì)算的?本文首先定量測算出我國工傷保險(xiǎn)勞動能力喪失等級與待遇匹配程度,然后通過文獻(xiàn)法和訪談法探究工傷等級與待遇不匹配原因,最終提出如何確立我國科學(xué)合理的工傷保險(xiǎn)勞動能力喪失等級待遇的問題。運(yùn)用歸納與演繹的研究方法,從理論上解釋工傷補(bǔ)償?shù)囊话銟?biāo)準(zhǔn);通過總結(jié)國外工傷保險(xiǎn)補(bǔ)償方式,歸納國外工傷保險(xiǎn)待遇的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)區(qū)間,并結(jié)合我國工傷保險(xiǎn)的歷史發(fā)展路徑,制定我國工傷保險(xiǎn)勞動能力喪失等級待遇的方案,最終得出以下結(jié)論:第一,我國工傷保險(xiǎn)無論是長期傷殘待遇還是一次性待遇的政策均存在不合理的問題。工傷保險(xiǎn)待遇給付與傷殘等級之間不對稱,地區(qū)補(bǔ)償制度呈現(xiàn)碎片化,補(bǔ)償水平參差不齊。我國工傷保險(xiǎn)勞動能力喪失傷殘待遇政策的制定科學(xué)性和合理性較差。第二,理論上分析出工傷的本質(zhì)是一種民事侵權(quán)行為,工傷補(bǔ)償責(zé)任經(jīng)歷了雇員自負(fù)、過失責(zé)任、嚴(yán)格過失責(zé)任到無過失責(zé)任的變遷,社會保險(xiǎn)框架下工傷補(bǔ)償?shù)谋举|(zhì)是勞資雙方相互妥協(xié)的定額賠償結(jié)果,綜合分析在理論上推導(dǎo)出工傷保險(xiǎn)勞動能力喪失傷殘待遇實(shí)質(zhì)上等于損失的勞動能力的工資價(jià)值。第三,通過128個(gè)國家或地區(qū)工傷保險(xiǎn)勞動能力喪失傷殘待遇區(qū)間的分析,長期支付津貼的方式為完全永久性傷殘待遇支付的主流,待遇計(jì)算模式為:待遇系數(shù)*待遇基數(shù)*待遇期限=完全永久性傷殘待遇;國外工傷保險(xiǎn)部分永久性傷殘待遇標(biāo)準(zhǔn)多為一定比例的全額完全永久性傷殘待遇。第四,根據(jù)理論解釋推導(dǎo)、國外工傷保險(xiǎn)勞動能力喪失傷殘待遇的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和我國工傷保險(xiǎn)補(bǔ)償待遇的歷史路徑綜合分析,我國工傷保險(xiǎn)勞動能力喪失等級待遇的高中低方案的計(jì)算模型為:DT=a*l*w*(t1-t2)+(29-2n)*w其中,DT為傷殘待遇,aa為傷殘待遇系數(shù),l為勞動能力喪失或者傷殘程度的百分比l∈(75-100%),n∈(1,2,3,4,5,6),w為本人工資,t1為退休年齡,t2為傷殘年齡。我國工傷保險(xiǎn)勞動能力喪失等級長期待遇高方案的待遇系數(shù)取值為90-100%;中方案的待遇系數(shù)取值為80-89%;低方案的待遇系數(shù)取值為70-79%。第五,我國工傷保險(xiǎn)勞動能力喪失一次性補(bǔ)償存在客觀必然性,我國工傷保險(xiǎn)勞動能力喪失待遇應(yīng)根據(jù)傷殘者意愿選擇待遇給付方式。對于一次性補(bǔ)償?shù)臉?biāo)準(zhǔn)應(yīng)該與對應(yīng)傷殘等級的長期津貼的折現(xiàn)額相一致。
[Abstract]:With the development of social economy, the importance of industrial injury insurance in occupational safety is especially prominent, and the treatment of industrial injury is in the core position in the category of industrial injury insurance. The rationality and scientificity of the formulation of the hierarchical treatment for the loss of working ability in industrial injury insurance in China are worth studying deeply. This paper profoundly reveals whether the establishment of the ranking treatment for the loss of labor ability in industrial injury insurance is scientific? If it is not scientific and unreasonable, how should the scientific and reasonable compensation standard for the loss of labor ability in industrial injury insurance be calculated? This paper probes into the causes of the mismatch between the class of industrial injury and the salary by means of presentations and interviews, and finally puts forward how to establish a scientific and reasonable class treatment for the loss of labor ability in industrial injury insurance in China. According to the standard interval of injury insurance treatment and the historical development path of China's industrial injury insurance, this paper formulates a scheme for the grading treatment of the loss of labor ability in China's industrial injury insurance, and finally draws the following conclusions: Firstly, there are unreasonable problems in the policy of China's industrial injury insurance, whether it is long-term disability treatment or one-time treatment. There is an asymmetry between the payment and the disability level, the regional compensation system is fragmented and the compensation level is uneven. The formulation of the disability treatment policy in China's industrial injury insurance is not scientific and reasonable. Secondly, it is theoretically analyzed that the nature of industrial injury is a kind of civil tort, and the liability for industrial injury compensation has experienced the employee's own responsibility and fault. The essence of industrial injury compensation under the framework of social insurance is the result of quota compensation of mutual compromise between labor and management. Comprehensive analysis theoretically deduces that the treatment of disability in industrial injury insurance is essentially equal to the wage value of lost labor capacity. Thirdly, through 128 countries. Or the analysis of the treatment interval of disability in the area of industrial injury insurance, the way of long-term payment of allowance is the mainstream of complete permanent disability treatment, and the calculation model of treatment is: treatment coefficient * treatment base * treatment period = complete permanent disability treatment; the standard of partial permanent disability treatment in foreign industrial injury insurance is mostly a certain proportion. Fourthly, according to the theoretical explanation and deduction, the experience of foreign countries and the historical path of China's industrial injury insurance compensation treatment, the calculating model of the high-middle and low-grade treatment of industrial injury insurance is DT = a * L * w * (t1-t2) + (29-2n) * W. Among them, DT is the treatment of disability, AA is the treatment coefficient of disability, L is the percentage of loss of labor ability or degree of disability l < (75-100%), n < (1,2,3,4,5,6), W is the wage of the local people, T1 is the retirement age, T2 is the disabled age. Fifth, there is an objective inevitability of one-off compensation for the loss of labor ability in China's industrial injury insurance. The treatment for the loss of labor ability in China's industrial injury insurance should be based on the willingness of the disabled to choose the mode of payment. The standard of one-time compensation should be long-term corresponding to the level of disability. The discount of the allowance is consistent.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F842.616

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本文編號：2200541