發(fā)布時間：2018-03-21 22:22

  本文選題：高管激勵　切入點(diǎn)：職工激勵　出處：《管理世界》2015年05期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：高管和職工皆為企業(yè)價值創(chuàng)造者,皆是重要的須激勵的人力資源。已有研究更多地集中于高管激勵的研究,研究職工激勵的少,更加缺乏將兩者加以結(jié)合進(jìn)行研究的。對于激勵高管還是激勵職工哪個更有效,以及兩者之間的互動關(guān)系,既有研究沒有給予足夠的關(guān)注。本文以我國上市公司為樣本,分析了企業(yè)對兩類人力資源的激勵效果比較及其互動關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),高管和職工薪酬均對企業(yè)業(yè)績反應(yīng)敏感,并且高管的薪酬業(yè)績敏感性顯著高于職工,說明兩類激勵對未來業(yè)績增長都具有積極作用。并且,職工對企業(yè)未來業(yè)績的積極作用高于高管;高管與職工薪酬變化同步性越強(qiáng),對未來業(yè)績的積極作用越明顯。本文首次研究了高管與職工激勵效果的比較及其互動關(guān)系,拓展了激勵領(lǐng)域的研究。
[Abstract]:Executives and employees are both enterprise value creators and important human resources that need to be encouraged. More lack of the combination of the two to carry out research. To motivate executives or employees, which is more effective, and the interaction between the two, the existing research did not give enough attention. This paper takes our listed companies as a sample. This paper analyzes the incentive effects of the two types of human resources and their interaction. The results show that both executive and employee compensation are sensitive to enterprise performance, and the sensitivity of executive pay performance is significantly higher than that of employees. It shows that both types of incentives have positive effects on future performance growth. Moreover, the positive effect of employees on the future performance of enterprises is higher than that of executives. The positive effect on future performance is more obvious. This paper first studies the comparison of incentive effect between executives and employees and their interactive relationship, and expands the research of incentive field.
【作者單位】： 南京大學(xué)商學(xué)院;南京財經(jīng)大學(xué);
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金課題(項(xiàng)目批準(zhǔn)號:71372032) 國家社會科學(xué)基金課題重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目(項(xiàng)目批準(zhǔn)號:11AJL003) 教育部人文社科青年基金項(xiàng)目(項(xiàng)目批準(zhǔn)號:14YJC630108) 博士后面上基金項(xiàng)目(項(xiàng)目批準(zhǔn)號:2014M560022)的研究成果 江蘇高校工商管理優(yōu)勢學(xué)科建設(shè)工程項(xiàng)目資助(PADP)
【分類號】：F272.92

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本文編號：1645829