發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-01 14:37

  本文選題：商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)化 + 假冒之訴��； 參考：《西南政法大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：當(dāng)前“商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)化”一詞已為廣大學(xué)者采用，尤以批評(píng)者居多。有的學(xué)者認(rèn)為，將商標(biāo)作為一種財(cái)產(chǎn)，背離了商標(biāo)法保護(hù)消費(fèi)者之目的；有的學(xué)者認(rèn)為，視商標(biāo)為財(cái)產(chǎn)，將會(huì)割裂了商標(biāo)與商品、服務(wù)之聯(lián)系，對(duì)消費(fèi)者構(gòu)成欺詐；有的學(xué)者認(rèn)為，商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)化引起了商標(biāo)權(quán)擴(kuò)張，嚴(yán)重危害了社會(huì)公共利益。結(jié)合上述爭(zhēng)議，本文以“商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)化”為研究對(duì)象，通過(guò)考察商標(biāo)法律制度的起源，全面闡釋商標(biāo)從“識(shí)別工具到私人財(cái)產(chǎn)”的發(fā)展歷程。 本文除了引言和結(jié)語(yǔ)外，尚有五章，凡十五萬(wàn)言。在第一章，筆者對(duì)英國(guó)假冒之訴進(jìn)行考察，探討財(cái)產(chǎn)語(yǔ)言在普通法商標(biāo)案件中是如何生成的。假冒之訴的歷史可回溯至1584年的“JG訴山姆福特案”，四位主審法官之一的安德森認(rèn)為：被告在商品上使用原告標(biāo)記的行為構(gòu)成了對(duì)消費(fèi)者的欺詐，應(yīng)當(dāng)承擔(dān)普通法上的責(zé)任。雖然沒有史料記載安德森的意見是否被采納，后世法院紛紛引入“欺詐”作為判案基礎(chǔ)。“欺詐”隨后逐漸淡出假冒之訴，原因在于普通法院與衡平法院的管轄權(quán)沖突。在普通法院審理的假冒案件中，商標(biāo)所有人可以得到損害賠償，但無(wú)權(quán)申請(qǐng)禁令救濟(jì)，無(wú)法制止假冒行為。衡平法院雖然可以頒布禁令，卻無(wú)法管轄假冒案件，因?yàn)榍謾?quán)人實(shí)施的是欺詐行為，而非侵害財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)。為了獲得假冒案件的管轄權(quán)，衡平法院將商標(biāo)解釋為一種財(cái)產(chǎn)，這樣它就有權(quán)對(duì)假冒案件進(jìn)行管轄。在1838年，韋斯特布里法官開啟了衡平法院以財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)為基礎(chǔ)審理假冒案件的先河。但對(duì)于商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)本質(zhì)的認(rèn)識(shí)，韋斯特布里法官也僅僅是模糊的提及了“侵害他人排他性的財(cái)產(chǎn)”，至于這是怎樣的財(cái)產(chǎn)？并未細(xì)說(shuō)。他的見解也沒有獲得同行們的一致認(rèn)同。到了20世紀(jì)初期，帕克法官將“商譽(yù)”概念引入假冒之訴，并區(qū)分了商譽(yù)與其他財(cái)產(chǎn)的區(qū)別，即商譽(yù)是商標(biāo)所有人在商業(yè)活動(dòng)中產(chǎn)生的，它的存在依靠他人的感知。對(duì)于假冒之訴而言，商譽(yù)的引進(jìn)為其確立了獨(dú)立的保護(hù)對(duì)象，使其在商標(biāo)成文立法日益昌盛的今日，仍保持了旺盛的生命力。而觀察古今普通法對(duì)假冒案件的判決，商標(biāo)只是作為識(shí)別工具存在，其本身并無(wú)任何財(cái)產(chǎn)價(jià)值。 假冒之訴開啟了商標(biāo)保護(hù)的先河，現(xiàn)代商標(biāo)制度從中得到啟發(fā)，并確立其架構(gòu)。在第二章中，筆者分析現(xiàn)代商標(biāo)法是如何加入知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法大家庭，又怎樣從假冒之訴中獨(dú)立出來(lái)，將商標(biāo)作為財(cái)產(chǎn)進(jìn)行保護(hù)。從知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的發(fā)展史可以得知，當(dāng)專利法、著作權(quán)法紛紛制定之時(shí)，商標(biāo)法仍處于“拖沓而雜亂不堪”，從未被考慮可以納入現(xiàn)代知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法的范疇之中。但在19世紀(jì)下半葉，由于諸多因素的推動(dòng)，商標(biāo)法成為了一個(gè)獨(dú)立的現(xiàn)代知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法法域。首要的原因便是社會(huì)環(huán)境的變化。工業(yè)革命的開展，為市場(chǎng)的崛起提供了動(dòng)力。市場(chǎng)活動(dòng)的日益繁榮，商標(biāo)在商業(yè)實(shí)踐中得到越來(lái)越多的使用與價(jià)值認(rèn)可。商人團(tuán)體利用政治話語(yǔ)權(quán)向政府進(jìn)行施壓，要求進(jìn)行商標(biāo)立法保護(hù)他們的商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)。1860年，，英國(guó)謝菲爾德商會(huì)的議案，則代表了當(dāng)時(shí)商人對(duì)政府保護(hù)商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)的強(qiáng)烈訴求。他們要求政府建立商標(biāo)注冊(cè)制度，并允許自由轉(zhuǎn)讓商標(biāo)。這類型的呼吁為后來(lái)注冊(cè)制度的建立埋下了伏筆。其次，將商標(biāo)法納入知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法最大的問題是，缺少理論的支撐。在19世紀(jì)，人們對(duì)財(cái)產(chǎn)的觀念停留在布萊克斯通的理論上，即財(cái)產(chǎn)是對(duì)“物”的絕對(duì)控制。而根據(jù)當(dāng)其時(shí)假冒之訴案件的判決，商標(biāo)并非是什么物，它只是一種識(shí)別工具。商標(biāo)案件的判決基礎(chǔ)是“欺詐”，脫離了“欺詐”無(wú)任何侵權(quán)可言。后來(lái)，法院在司法實(shí)踐中逐漸對(duì)布萊克斯通的理論感到困惑。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，財(cái)產(chǎn)并非僅限于“物”，許多非物質(zhì)的具有重大財(cái)產(chǎn)價(jià)值的利益也應(yīng)該受到保護(hù)。學(xué)者們也逐漸意識(shí)到，財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)并非是人與物的關(guān)系，而是人與人之間的關(guān)系。并且在當(dāng)其時(shí)之“自由與財(cái)產(chǎn)福音”的洛克理論的影響下，認(rèn)識(shí)到“使用創(chuàng)造財(cái)產(chǎn)”，而這種財(cái)產(chǎn)就是商譽(yù)。商譽(yù)在化解了商標(biāo)作為“物”的尷尬之同時(shí)，也符合了知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法客體之無(wú)形性特征，為商標(biāo)立法掃除了理論障礙。其三、注冊(cè)制度為商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)保護(hù)之關(guān)鍵一環(huán)，如果商標(biāo)獲得注冊(cè)，則自發(fā)出注冊(cè)證的那一刻起，它就當(dāng)然成為該注冊(cè)證上列明者的財(cái)產(chǎn)了。不過(guò)，在使用取得商標(biāo)權(quán)制度的國(guó)家中，注冊(cè)的意義僅僅是對(duì)在先權(quán)利的確認(rèn)，而非授權(quán)。在注冊(cè)制度的保護(hù)下，商標(biāo)也只是發(fā)揮著識(shí)別工具的作用，商標(biāo)侵權(quán)仍是依消費(fèi)者混淆之虞為判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。直至后來(lái)，反淡化立法的出現(xiàn)，法院關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)已不是消費(fèi)者是否混淆，而是將重心放在商標(biāo)本身的財(cái)產(chǎn)價(jià)值。 在商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)化觀念的影響下，法院在實(shí)踐中不斷加大了對(duì)商標(biāo)權(quán)人的保護(hù)。在第三章，筆者探討商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)化的表現(xiàn)，闡明商標(biāo)權(quán)人的利益如何在“財(cái)產(chǎn)”的庇護(hù)下得到加強(qiáng)。傳統(tǒng)的混淆之虞，向來(lái)是以消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買商品或服務(wù)之時(shí)為判斷基點(diǎn)。近年來(lái)，由于商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)化的觀念不斷蔓延，特別是商標(biāo)廣告功能被強(qiáng)化之后，美國(guó)等國(guó)家已經(jīng)將傳統(tǒng)上關(guān)于混淆之虞的判斷時(shí)間提前或挪后，不斷擴(kuò)大了商標(biāo)權(quán)的保護(hù)范圍。其次是商標(biāo)的自由轉(zhuǎn)讓和許可。傳統(tǒng)上認(rèn)為，商標(biāo)與其商譽(yù)具有不可分離的關(guān)系。除非企業(yè)與商譽(yù)一起連同轉(zhuǎn)讓，否則商標(biāo)轉(zhuǎn)讓無(wú)效。而現(xiàn)代將商標(biāo)視為一種財(cái)產(chǎn)，自由處分就成為應(yīng)有之義。所以，TRIPS協(xié)定清晰地說(shuō)明，無(wú)論是否連同所屬企業(yè)，商標(biāo)均可以單獨(dú)轉(zhuǎn)讓。美國(guó)法院也放寬對(duì)轉(zhuǎn)讓的限制。聯(lián)邦最高法院馬丁法官說(shuō)到，對(duì)商標(biāo)單獨(dú)轉(zhuǎn)讓的有效性不能一概認(rèn)為無(wú)效，只要受讓人制造的商品與讓與人先前生產(chǎn)的產(chǎn)品具有相同品質(zhì)且為相同種類。商標(biāo)是否可以許可，之前在理論上也是存在障礙的。法院認(rèn)為，商標(biāo)只是識(shí)別工具。如果商標(biāo)是由許可人擁有，但是商品確由被許可人提供，割裂了商標(biāo)與商品之間的來(lái)源指示關(guān)系。法官后來(lái)意識(shí)到，商標(biāo)不只是一種識(shí)別工具，還具有財(cái)產(chǎn)價(jià)值。只要被許可人的品質(zhì)能夠與許可人保持一致，不僅商標(biāo)所有人能夠獲利，消費(fèi)者利益也沒受到損害。最后是商標(biāo)商品化。商標(biāo)商品化的提出，引起眾多學(xué)者的反對(duì)。理由在于，商標(biāo)只是識(shí)別的工具，傳統(tǒng)商標(biāo)法的首要目的是保護(hù)消費(fèi)者，而對(duì)商標(biāo)商品化的保護(hù)，無(wú)疑是賦予了商標(biāo)權(quán)人對(duì)商標(biāo)擁有一個(gè)無(wú)限擴(kuò)展的權(quán)利。盡管出現(xiàn)這種反對(duì)的聲音，美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)和法院通過(guò)引入贊助或者關(guān)聯(lián)混淆，逐漸擴(kuò)大了對(duì)商標(biāo)商品化權(quán)的保護(hù)。 將商標(biāo)視為財(cái)產(chǎn)，并不是沒有爭(zhēng)議的。晚近，商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)化的話題牽扯到商標(biāo)權(quán)的憲法基礎(chǔ)，以及商標(biāo)權(quán)與人權(quán)、言論自由的關(guān)系等。在第四章，筆者首先對(duì)美國(guó)商標(biāo)法的憲法命運(yùn)進(jìn)行描述，揭示出商標(biāo)權(quán)雖然與著作權(quán)、專利權(quán)并列為知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)。實(shí)際上，商標(biāo)法的憲法基礎(chǔ)并不是依據(jù)“知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)條款”，而是“貿(mào)易條款”。建立在此基礎(chǔ)上的商標(biāo)法一方面要保護(hù)商標(biāo)權(quán)人和消費(fèi)者的利益，另一方面要從國(guó)家貿(mào)易政策出發(fā)維護(hù)市場(chǎng)的公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。其次，通過(guò)分析2007年歐洲人權(quán)法院審理的“商標(biāo)與人權(quán)第一案”，認(rèn)為商標(biāo)權(quán)在國(guó)際人權(quán)公約中沒有合適的地位，商標(biāo)權(quán)本身不是人權(quán)，但可以依據(jù)《歐洲人權(quán)公約第一議定書》的“財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)條款”獲得人權(quán)公約的保護(hù)。最后，與其他財(cái)產(chǎn)不同，商標(biāo)（特別是馳名商標(biāo)）往往蘊(yùn)含著特殊的社會(huì)屬性。一方面，商標(biāo)具有文化價(jià)值，特定商標(biāo)之形象成為消費(fèi)者分享的語(yǔ)言。另一方面，商標(biāo)屬于一種“商業(yè)言論”。法律在保護(hù)商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)時(shí)，要防止權(quán)利人壟斷符號(hào)、壓制公眾言論空間。商標(biāo)的社會(huì)屬性孕育了商標(biāo)權(quán)與言論自由的內(nèi)在沖突，也決定了言論自由成為商標(biāo)權(quán)的限制因素，其中商標(biāo)戲仿和比較廣告是限制商標(biāo)權(quán)的最典型情形。 在考察完商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)化的起源、表現(xiàn)與爭(zhēng)議后，筆者在第五章對(duì)商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)化進(jìn)行反思。針對(duì)商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)本質(zhì)的討論，筆者依照“信息說(shuō)”的進(jìn)路，認(rèn)為商標(biāo)只是信息的傳播媒介，標(biāo)記本身不能被當(dāng)做財(cái)產(chǎn)。相比之下，商標(biāo)的財(cái)產(chǎn)本質(zhì)是商譽(yù)的觀點(diǎn)與信息說(shuō)的理論較為吻合。但是，將商標(biāo)財(cái)產(chǎn)本質(zhì)界定為商譽(yù)，并不是沒有問題的。商譽(yù)作為財(cái)產(chǎn)不僅面臨定義的問題，而且與傳統(tǒng)的有形財(cái)產(chǎn)或者知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)相比，其具有存在時(shí)間非確定性、存在地域非確定性以及存在價(jià)值非確定性等特點(diǎn)。并且，商譽(yù)與商標(biāo)常常是重疊、交織。商譽(yù)不等于商標(biāo)，甚至意味著更多。可以說(shuō)，商標(biāo)的財(cái)產(chǎn)價(jià)值離不開商譽(yù)，而商譽(yù)的財(cái)產(chǎn)價(jià)值卻不限于商標(biāo)。針對(duì)商標(biāo)立法目的之討論，筆者認(rèn)為必須厘清一組概念：宗旨與目的。宗旨，是宏觀的、長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)的、相對(duì)靜態(tài)不變的。目的，是具體的、可以變化和調(diào)整的。默察商標(biāo)法的發(fā)展史，維護(hù)“公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”是商標(biāo)法恒久不變的宗旨。保護(hù)“商標(biāo)權(quán)”與“消費(fèi)者利益”則是一體兩面之目的。針對(duì)商標(biāo)侵權(quán)責(zé)任的探討，筆者認(rèn)為賠禮道歉不應(yīng)適用于商標(biāo)侵權(quán)糾紛。因?yàn)樯虡?biāo)權(quán)不具有人身權(quán)的內(nèi)容。而且，從對(duì)象上看，商標(biāo)權(quán)人一般為法人，法人在遭受商標(biāo)權(quán)侵害時(shí)，其并無(wú)“精神損害”也無(wú)需“精神撫慰”。最后，從功效上看，在商標(biāo)侵權(quán)案件中，賠禮道歉無(wú)法發(fā)揮引導(dǎo)侵權(quán)人真誠(chéng)悔過(guò)的道德功能。鑒于賠禮道歉的局限性，筆者認(rèn)為“消除影響”更契合商標(biāo)侵權(quán)案件的需要。
[Abstract]:At present, the word "trademark property" has been used by many scholars, especially the critics. Some scholars believe that the trademark act as a kind of property deviates from the purpose of the trademark law to protect the consumer; some scholars believe that the trademark as property will split the trade mark and commodity, the connection of service and the fraud of the consumer; some scholars recognize that As a result, trademark property expansion has caused the expansion of trademark rights and seriously endangers the social and public interests. Based on the above dispute, this article takes "trademark property" as the research object. Through the investigation of the origin of the legal system of trademark, the article comprehensively explains the course of the development of trademark from "recognition tool to private property".
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, there are five chapters and one hundred and fifty thousand words. In the first chapter, the author investigates the counterfeit action in Britain and discusses how the property language is generated in the common law trademark cases. The history of the fake lawsuit can be traced back to the "JG v. Sam Ford case" in 1584, and Anderson, one of the four judge judges, thinks that the defendant is the defendant. The use of the label of the plaintiff on a commodity constitutes a fraud of the consumer and should be responsible for the common law. Although there is no historical record of the adoption of Anderson's opinion, the later courts have introduced "fraud" as the basis of the case. "Fraud" gradually fade out of the false prosecution, because of the ordinary court and the equitable court. The conflict of jurisdiction. In the counterfeit cases heard by the ordinary court, the owner of the trademark can get damages, but it is not entitled to apply for the injunction to prevent the counterfeiting. The equitable court, although it can enact the injunction, can not control the counterfeit cases, because the infringer carries out fraud, not infringing property rights. In order to obtain the counterfeit In the case of jurisdiction, the equitable court interpreted the trademark as a property so that it had the right to jurisdiction over the counterfeit cases. In 1838, judge West opened the precedent of the equity court to hear the counterfeit cases on the basis of property rights. But judge West was only a vague reference to the nature of the trademark property. In the early twentieth Century, judge Parke introduced the concept of "goodwill" to the counterfeit lawsuit and distinguished the distinction between goodwill and other property, that is, the goodwill is the product of the trademark owner in business activities. Its existence depends on the perception of others. For the counterfeit complaint, the introduction of goodwill has established an independent protection object and maintained its vigorous vitality in the day of the growing prosperity of the trademark legislation. What is the value of property?
The counterfeit lawsuit opens the precedent of trademark protection. The modern trademark system is inspired by the modern trademark system and establishes its structure. In the second chapter, the author analyzes how the modern trademark law is to join the large family of intellectual property law, and how to independent from the counterfeit lawsuit and protect the trademark as property. When the patent law and copyright law are set up in succession, the trademark law is still in a "procrastination and disorderly" and has never been considered into the category of modern intellectual property law. But in the second half of the nineteenth Century, because of many factors, the trademark law became an independent domain of modern intellectual property law. The first reason was the social environment. The development of the industrial revolution has provided the impetus for the rise of the market. The increasing prosperity of the market activities, the increasing use and recognition of the value of the trade mark in the business practice. The merchant groups use political discourse power to press the government to protect their trademark property for.1860, the British Sheffield merchants. The bill, which represents the strong appeal for the government to protect the trademark and property, requires the government to establish a trademark registration system and allow the free transfer of the trademark. This type of appeal has laid a burden on the establishment of the later registration system. Secondly, the biggest problem of the incorporation of Trademark Law into the knowledge rights law is the lack of theoretical support. In nineteenth Century, people's concept of property remained in the theory of Blackstone, that is, the property is the absolute control of the "thing". And according to the judgment of the case of counterfeiting, the trademark is not what the trademark is, it is only a kind of identification tool. The basis of the trademark case is "deceit", which is divorced from the "fraud" without any infringement. In the judicial practice, the court is gradually puzzled by the theory of blemstone. They find that property is not only "objects", and that many non material interests that have significant property values should also be protected. Under the influence of Rock's theory of "freedom and the gospel of property", the "use of the creation of property" is recognized, and this property is a goodwill. At the same time, goodwill also conforms to the intangible characteristics of the object of intellectual property law as well as the embarrassment of the trademark as "things", and has removed the theoretical obstacles for the trademark legislation. A key link of the protection of the standard property, if the trademark is registered, it is of course the property of the listed person from the moment the registration certificate is issued. However, in the country where the system of trademark rights is used, the significance of registration is only to recognize the prior right rather than to authorize it. Under the protection of the registration system, the trademark is also Only to play the role of identification tools, trademark infringement is still in accordance with the consumer confusion as the criterion of judgment. Until later, the emergence of anti dilution legislation, the focus of attention of the court is not whether the consumer is confused, but focus on the value of the property of the trademark itself.
Under the influence of the concept of trademark property, the court has continuously increased the protection of the trademark owner in practice. In the third chapter, the author discusses the manifestation of the trademark property and clarifies that the interests of the trademark owners are strengthened under the shelter of the "property". In recent years, because of the spread of the concept of trademark property, especially after the enhancement of the function of trademark advertising, the United States and other countries have expanded the scope of the protection of the trademark right in advance or after the time of the judgment of the risk of confusion. The second is the transfer and license of the trademark. There is an inseparable relationship. Unless the enterprise and the goodwill join together with the transfer, the transfer of the trademark is invalid. While the modern trademark is regarded as a property, the free disposal will be the proper meaning. Therefore, the TRIPS agreement clearly states whether the trade mark can be transferred individually or not. The United States Court also relaxes the restrictions on the transfer. The Federal Supreme Court, judge Martin, said that the validity of a separate trade mark can not be considered null and void. As long as the goods made by the assignee have the same quality and the same type previously produced by the transferor. Whether the trademark can be permitted or not, it is in theory a barrier before. The court believes that the trademark is only a tool for identification. If a trademark is owned by a licensor, but the commodity is provided by the licensee, it separates the relationship between the mark and the source. The judge later realized that the trademark is not only a tool of identification but also a property value. As long as the quality of the licensee can be consistent with the Licensor, not only the owner of the trademark can make a profit, but also the consumption of the trademark owner. The interests of the people have not been damaged. Finally, the commercialization of the trademark. The commercialization of the trademark has been raised by many scholars. The reason is that the trademark is only a tool for identification. The primary purpose of the traditional trademark law is to protect the consumer, and the protection of the commercialization of the trademark is undoubtedly endowed with the trademark owner with an unlimited expansion of the trademark. Despite this objection, the US Congress and the court gradually expanded the protection of trademark merchandising rights by introducing sponsorship or confusion.
It is not undisputed to see the trademark as property. In the fourth chapter, the author first describes the constitutional fate of the trademark law in the United States, and reveals that the trademark right, although with the copyright and the patent right, is listed as the knowledge production, and the trademark rights are related to the constitutional basis of the trademark right and the relationship between the trademark right and human rights and the freedom of speech. In fact, the constitutional basis of the trademark law is not based on "the terms of intellectual property" but "the terms of trade". On the one hand, the trademark law should protect the interests of the people of the trademark rights and the consumers, on the other hand, to maintain the fair competition of the market from the state trade policy. Secondly, through the analysis of the European human rights law in 2007, the European Law of human rights is analyzed. The "first case of trademark and human rights", which is heard by the hospital, holds that trademark rights do not have a proper position in international human rights conventions. Trademark right is not a human right in itself, but it can be protected by the human rights convention according to the "terms of property right" of the first protocol to the European Convention on human rights. Finally, unlike his property, the trademark (especially the well-known trademark) is often used. There is a special social attribute. On the one hand, the trademark has cultural value, the image of a specific trademark becomes the language of the consumer. On the other hand, the trademark belongs to a kind of "commercial speech". In the protection of the trademark property, the law should prevent the monopoly of the right holder and suppress the public discourse space. The social attribute of the trademark has bred the trademark right and the trademark. The internal conflict of freedom of speech also determines that freedom of speech becomes the limiting factor of trademark right, in which trademark parody and comparative advertising are the most typical cases of restricting the right to trademark.
After reviewing the origin, performance and controversy of the trademark property, the author rethinks the trademark property after the fifth chapter. According to the discussion of the nature of the trademark property, the author believes that the trademark is only the medium of information and that the mark itself can not be regarded as the property. Point is more consistent with the theory of information theory. However, it is not without a problem to define the nature of trademark property as goodwill. As a property, goodwill not only faces the problem of definition, but also has time uncertainty, regional uncertainty and value uncertainty in comparison with traditional tangible property or intellectual property. In addition, goodwill and trademark often overlap and interweave. Goodwill is not equal to trademark and even more. It can be said that the value of the property of a trademark is not free from goodwill, but the value of the property of a goodwill is not limited to the trademark. Far, relatively static. Aim, it is specific, can change and adjust. To observe the development history of trademark law and maintain "fair competition" is the tenet of the trademark law for a long time. Protection of "trademark right" and "consumer interests" is one of the two purposes. In the discussion of trademark infringement liability, I believe that the apology should not be made. It is applicable to trademark infringement disputes. Because the trademark right does not have the content of personal rights. Moreover, from the object of the object, the trademark owner is generally a legal person. When the legal person is infringed on the trademark right, there is no "mental damage" or "spiritual comfort". Finally, in the case of trademark infringement, in the trademark infringement case, the apology cannot give full play to the guide tortfeasor In view of the moral function of sincere repentance, in view of the limitations of apology, I believe that "eliminating influence" is more suitable for trademark infringement cases.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D923.43

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