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  本文關鍵詞：基于博弈論視角的企業(yè)財務舞弊的外部防范與治理　出處：《蘭州大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關文章： 外部審計 管理層 博弈 監(jiān)督 財務舞弊

【摘要】：財務舞弊是指上市公司及其管理當局為了達到他們的特殊目的,將對外公開報出的財務報告進行故意的錯報、瞞報、修飾和虛假披露或者披露信息不完全,導致信息使用者做出錯誤的決策,以謀取非法利益。資本市場的運行程度是否良好直接受到在資本市場上進行披露的信息質(zhì)量的影響。上市公司對外公開披露的財務報告所傳達的信息對投資者、債權人等利益相關者的決策具有非常重要的影響。在過去的十多年間,我國上市公司及其管理者財務舞弊的現(xiàn)象接連不斷地發(fā)生,上市公司及其管理者通過進行故意的錯報、瞞報、修飾和虛假披露或者披露信息不完全,利用扭曲的財務信息誤導信息使用者做出錯誤的決策,從而謀取非法利益。這些財務舞弊行為不僅給公司或者企業(yè)的利益相關者帶來嚴重的損失,還擾亂了經(jīng)濟運行的正常次序給社會造成了不良的后果,并且嚴重影響了資本市場的資源配置功能的發(fā)揮,破壞了“公平、公正、公開”這一資本市場賴以生存的原則的運行。鑒于這種情況,怎么樣有效防治和治理上市公司的財務舞弊行為,一直以來都被學術界重點對待。財務舞弊現(xiàn)象的頻繁發(fā)生暴露了我國目前的資本市場極度缺乏一套完善高效的外部監(jiān)督機制。既存在著監(jiān)管部門對上市公司及其管理當局監(jiān)管不到位的情況,也說明外部審計沒有充分發(fā)揮其經(jīng)濟警察的作用。 根據(jù)博弈論的定義,公司經(jīng)理層與外部審計之間,始終存在著博弈：為了自己個人和公司集體利益公司管理當局有進行財務舞弊的動機,而承擔審計業(yè)務的注冊會計師和其他審計人員的專業(yè)技能和經(jīng)驗、職業(yè)素養(yǎng)以及努力程度對審計質(zhì)量的高低起到關鍵的作用,也會對公司管理者的行為策略有影響。在這個研究背景下,本論文以舞弊治理為落腳點,基于一系列基本假設,構建關于上市公司管理者與外部審計的不完全信息動態(tài)博弈模型。在不完全信息動態(tài)博弈模型的基礎上,合理設計外部審計和管理層的效益函數(shù),并進行納什均衡的求解,對該納什均衡解進行分析與討論,分析公司管理者和外部審計的最優(yōu)選擇行為策略的影響因素,從而站在監(jiān)管部門和外部審計兩個角度提出有關財務舞弊的外部防范與治理的建議。目前我國的上市公司內(nèi)部審計制度不完善,內(nèi)部治理也不合理,在這種情況下,可以通過財務舞弊的外部防范與治理來降低上市公司管理者的舞弊可能性。
[Abstract]:Financial fraud refers to listed companies and their management in order to achieve their special purpose, the financial reports reported to the public are deliberately misreported, hidden, modified and false disclosure or disclosure of information is incomplete. Causes the information user to make the wrong decision. Whether the degree of operation of the capital market is good or not is directly affected by the quality of the information disclosed in the capital market. The decision of creditors and other stakeholders has a very important impact. In the past ten years, the phenomenon of financial fraud of listed companies and their managers in China has occurred one after another. Listed companies and their managers use distorted financial information to mislead information users by deliberately misreporting, concealing, modifying and false disclosing or disclosing incomplete information. These financial fraud not only brings serious losses to the stakeholders of the company or enterprise, but also disturbs the normal order of economic operation. And has seriously affected the capital market resources allocation function display, has destroyed "fair, just, open" this capital market survival principle movement. In view of this situation. How to effectively prevent and control the financial fraud of listed companies. The frequent occurrence of financial fraud has exposed the extreme lack of a set of perfect and efficient external supervision mechanism in China's capital market. Inadequate regulatory oversight by management. Also shows that the external audit does not give full play to its economic police role. According to the definition of game theory, there is always a game between the company manager and external audit: the corporate management has the motive of financial fraud for its own personal and corporate collective interests. The professional skills and experience, professional accomplishment and the degree of effort of the CPA and other auditors who undertake the audit business play a key role in the audit quality. In this research background, this paper takes fraud governance as the foothold, based on a series of basic assumptions. Based on the incomplete information dynamic game model of listed company managers and external audit, the benefit function of external audit and management is designed reasonably. The solution of Nash equilibrium is analyzed and discussed, and the influencing factors of optimal choice behavior strategy of managers and external audit are analyzed. From the perspective of supervision and external audit, this paper puts forward some suggestions on external prevention and governance of financial fraud. At present, the internal audit system of listed companies in our country is not perfect, and the internal governance is not reasonable. In this case, the external prevention and governance of financial fraud can reduce the possibility of fraud of listed company managers.
【學位授予單位】：蘭州大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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本文編號：1366519