發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-01 17:11

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：中國(guó)上市公司違規(guī)行為研究：1992～2011　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年博士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 上市公司違規(guī)行為 終極控制權(quán) 終極所有權(quán) 公司治理機(jī)制 制度環(huán)境

【摘要】：中國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)經(jīng)歷20多年的發(fā)展后,上市公司數(shù)量不斷增加,其總市值也在以超乎常規(guī)的速度遞增。但在快速發(fā)展的過(guò)程中,證券市場(chǎng)中層出不窮的違規(guī)事件,不僅使得投資者遭受極大的損失,而且嚴(yán)重妨礙了證券市場(chǎng)資源配置功能的發(fā)揮,同時(shí)也不斷敲擊著監(jiān)管部門(mén)脆弱的神經(jīng),使得公司違規(guī)成為各方關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。面對(duì)這一重要問(wèn)題,學(xué)者們從不同角度,采用不同的數(shù)據(jù)及研究方法研究公司違規(guī)行為,希望能找出影響公司違規(guī)的最根本原因。作為市場(chǎng)重要參與者的市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管方,一方面力圖通過(guò)相關(guān)法律法規(guī)來(lái)約束上市公司違規(guī)行為,另一方面通過(guò)呼吁各方(包括媒體、投資者)加強(qiáng)對(duì)上市公司行為的監(jiān)督,對(duì)出現(xiàn)有違規(guī)行為的公司予以堅(jiān)決處罰,希望以此通過(guò)嚴(yán)厲的處罰措施增加上市公司違規(guī)成本,以此達(dá)到降低上市公司違規(guī)的目的。 雖然監(jiān)管方為徹底制止公司違規(guī)絞盡腦汁,但中國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)中上市公司違規(guī)卻并未得到有效的遏制,甚至在相當(dāng)長(zhǎng)的一段時(shí)間內(nèi),上市公司違規(guī)比例呈現(xiàn)出逐年增加的態(tài)勢(shì),以至于到2001年的時(shí)候,公司違規(guī)比例竟高達(dá)10%左右。即使在這以后,公司違規(guī)比例出現(xiàn)一定程度的下降,但與歐美發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家相比,中國(guó)上市公司每年出現(xiàn)違規(guī)的比例仍然較高；同時(shí),中國(guó)上市公司中股東違規(guī)從無(wú)到有,且其違規(guī)比例呈現(xiàn)出逐年增加的新趨勢(shì)。面對(duì)這樣的現(xiàn)實(shí)狀況,我們不僅要思索,到底是市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管不力,還是公司治理不完善,抑或是其他原因所導(dǎo)致。 本文以滬深兩市A股市場(chǎng)1992-2011共計(jì)20年全樣本數(shù)據(jù),依據(jù)相關(guān)研究的理論分析,重點(diǎn)采用2003-2009年的面板數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究。首先,從終極控制人角度出發(fā),研究終極所有權(quán)、分離度對(duì)公司違規(guī)行為的影響,重點(diǎn)分析終極所有權(quán)、分離度在終極控制權(quán)-終極所有權(quán)發(fā)生分離與否條件下,分別對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)層違規(guī)、股東違規(guī)的影響,不僅實(shí)現(xiàn)了對(duì)第一類(lèi)和第二類(lèi)委托代理理論進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)的目的,且結(jié)論為相關(guān)政策的制定提供了極其重要的參考依據(jù)。其次,以董事會(huì)為核心的公司治理機(jī)制作為緩解委托代理問(wèn)題重要的工具,以往的研究大多集中于研究其變量對(duì)公司違規(guī)的影響,從既有的研究來(lái)看,對(duì)公司治理機(jī)制與違規(guī)的研究缺乏深入研究,本文不僅研究以董事會(huì)為核心的公司治理機(jī)制對(duì)公司違規(guī)行為的影響,同時(shí)在多個(gè)模型中間接實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)其穩(wěn)健性的檢驗(yàn),使最終得到的公司治理機(jī)制與公司違規(guī)關(guān)系的結(jié)論才更能經(jīng)得起考驗(yàn)。再次,制度環(huán)境作為公司經(jīng)營(yíng)所在地環(huán)境變量,在一定條件下能對(duì)公司起到治理的作用,從既往的相關(guān)研究文獻(xiàn)來(lái)看,研究制度環(huán)境對(duì)公司違規(guī)的影響缺乏深入剖析,鮮有同一文獻(xiàn)研究多種外部環(huán)境變量對(duì)公司違規(guī)的影響；本文選取的制度環(huán)境變量不僅包括有經(jīng)營(yíng)所在地現(xiàn)代的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平,同時(shí)包括有市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程總指數(shù)、市場(chǎng)法律制度環(huán)境、政府干預(yù)程度。以此研究制度環(huán)境對(duì)公司違規(guī)的影響,有助于達(dá)到對(duì)制度環(huán)境治理作用的全面而且深入的研究。 為此從問(wèn)題的提出→研究背景及其回顧→理論分析及研究假設(shè)→計(jì)量結(jié)果及其分析→研究結(jié)論,幾個(gè)層面逐步展開(kāi)相關(guān)研究。第1部分“引言”明確提出了本文所研究的問(wèn)題,并對(duì)所研究問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了陳述,詳細(xì)說(shuō)明了本文的研究方法及結(jié)構(gòu)。第2部分“文獻(xiàn)綜述及評(píng)析”,回顧終極控制人終極所有權(quán)及分離度與公司經(jīng)營(yíng)行為、以董事會(huì)為核心的公司治理機(jī)制及制度環(huán)境與公司違規(guī)的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)研究,梳理了這幾方面已有的研究成果,并對(duì)相關(guān)的研究給出了述評(píng),這為本文進(jìn)一步研究奠定了堅(jiān)實(shí)的理論基礎(chǔ)。第3部分“研究的市場(chǎng)背景及其現(xiàn)狀”,詳細(xì)列舉了中國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)上公司嚴(yán)重違規(guī)事件及其最終處罰結(jié)果,并通過(guò)圖表的方式詳細(xì)展示了中國(guó)上市公司整體違規(guī)比例、違規(guī)類(lèi)型、違規(guī)程度、違規(guī)主體的變化趨勢(shì)及現(xiàn)狀；對(duì)中國(guó)證券監(jiān)管的發(fā)展做了詳細(xì)的描述,并對(duì)中國(guó)上市公司治理機(jī)制的變化及改進(jìn)進(jìn)行了細(xì)致的梳理。第4部分“理論分析及研究假設(shè)”,在結(jié)合相關(guān)研究文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)之上,對(duì)本文的幾個(gè)方面的研究,進(jìn)行了理論分析,并對(duì)相關(guān)變量與公司違規(guī)之間的關(guān)系提出了相關(guān)假設(shè)研究。第5部分“研究設(shè)計(jì)”,詳細(xì)說(shuō)明了本文研究所用數(shù)據(jù)的來(lái)源,及重要數(shù)據(jù)的獲取方式；對(duì)文章研究所涉及到的每一個(gè)變量進(jìn)行了具體的定義與測(cè)度；給出了在每一個(gè)具體研究問(wèn)題中,所用到的計(jì)量模型。第6部分“計(jì)量結(jié)果及其分析”,首先對(duì)本文研究中所涉及的終極控制人終極控制權(quán)、終極所有權(quán)、終極控制權(quán)-所有權(quán)分離度,以董事會(huì)為核心的公司治理機(jī)制變量、制度環(huán)境中的各個(gè)變量進(jìn)行了描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析；其次研究了終極所有權(quán)、分離度,公司治理機(jī)制變量及制度環(huán)境變量與公司違規(guī)之間的關(guān)系；重點(diǎn)研究了終極所有權(quán)、分離度與經(jīng)營(yíng)層違規(guī)、股東違規(guī)之間的關(guān)系,并對(duì)相關(guān)模型結(jié)果進(jìn)行分析,針對(duì)論文所提出的研究假設(shè)進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證。第7部分“結(jié)論”,主要包括本文研究的結(jié)論及政策涵義,研究的局限及進(jìn)一步研究的方向。通過(guò)上述的研究,本文主要得到以下結(jié)論： (1)終極控制人所有權(quán)、分離度均對(duì)公司違規(guī)起到遏制作用,但終極所有權(quán)比例的作用更明顯；終極控制人的性質(zhì)對(duì)公司違規(guī)行為沒(méi)有顯著的影響,而公司的行業(yè)屬性是影響公司治理機(jī)制的重要原因,在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性行業(yè)中,終極控制人所有權(quán)比例、分離度與公司違規(guī)均顯著負(fù)相關(guān),但在行政性壟斷行業(yè)中,終極控制人所有權(quán)比例、分離度與公司違規(guī)均不顯著。 (2)終極控制權(quán)與終極所有權(quán)的分離,明顯弱化了終極控制人所有權(quán)比例對(duì)上市公司經(jīng)營(yíng)層違規(guī)概率的影響；終極控制人控制權(quán)與終極所有權(quán)的分離度加劇了企業(yè)股東違規(guī)概率,而終極控制人所有權(quán)比例對(duì)股東違規(guī)概率的的作用則不明顯,同時(shí)在此條件下公司治理未能發(fā)揮應(yīng)有的作用。 (3)從公司層面分析,公司治理機(jī)制變量中第一大股東持股比例能對(duì)公司違規(guī)起到抑制作用,其余的以董事會(huì)為核心的公司治理機(jī)制并未發(fā)揮應(yīng)有的作用,表現(xiàn)出與公司違規(guī)行為不相關(guān)。 (4)公司經(jīng)營(yíng)所在地的部分制度環(huán)境變量對(duì)公司違規(guī)行為具有顯著的遏制作用,經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平越高對(duì)公司違規(guī)概率有顯著抑制,而市場(chǎng)化指數(shù)、市場(chǎng)法律制度、政府干預(yù)程度對(duì)公司違規(guī)行為影響不顯著。 (5)通過(guò)進(jìn)一步的分析發(fā)現(xiàn),在國(guó)有控制的上市公司中,特別是行政壟斷性行業(yè)的上市公司,控制性股東持股比例過(guò)高是影響公司治理機(jī)制作用發(fā)揮的決定性因素。 通過(guò)相關(guān)的分析,本文的創(chuàng)新之處主要有： (1)采用中國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)20年全樣本數(shù)據(jù),全面展示了中國(guó)上市公司違規(guī)行為變化趨勢(shì)及現(xiàn)狀,并從終極控制人角度出發(fā),重點(diǎn)應(yīng)用了2003-2009年共7年面板數(shù)據(jù),研究公司違規(guī)行為與終極控制權(quán)、終極所有權(quán)及分離度之間的關(guān)系,彌補(bǔ)了相關(guān)研究的不足。 (2)首次對(duì)公司違規(guī)按違規(guī)主體進(jìn)行劃分,將其分為經(jīng)營(yíng)層違規(guī)與股東違規(guī),進(jìn)一步研究終極控制人所有權(quán)比例、終極控制權(quán)-所有權(quán)分離度與經(jīng)營(yíng)層違規(guī)及股東違規(guī)之間的關(guān)系；重點(diǎn)研究了在兩權(quán)發(fā)生分離與否條件下,終極所有權(quán)、分離度分別對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)層違規(guī)、股東違規(guī)的影響,并為研究終極控制人與管理層(經(jīng)營(yíng)層)之間的第一類(lèi)委托代理問(wèn)題(激勵(lì)效應(yīng)),終極控制人與中小股東的第二類(lèi)委托代理問(wèn)題(壁壘效應(yīng))提供了機(jī)制性的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),并對(duì)相關(guān)模型進(jìn)行了穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn),使所得結(jié)果更具有說(shuō)服力。 (3)通過(guò)進(jìn)一步深入研究,挖掘出了最終影響中國(guó)上市公司治理機(jī)制構(gòu)建及作用發(fā)揮的原因,為從根本上解決中國(guó)上市公司治理問(wèn)題提供了新的證據(jù)。 本研究雖經(jīng)作者認(rèn)真努力,但由于自身能力和客觀條件的限制,本研究尚存在一定的局限性： (1)盡管本文的研究想以自中國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)成立到2013年底的所有上市公司為樣本,但由于從公司違規(guī)到被監(jiān)管層發(fā)現(xiàn)、處罰,到最后做出處罰公告,在這過(guò)程中存在有時(shí)間延遲,使得我們從數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)能獲得的最新公司違規(guī)數(shù)據(jù)僅到2011年,迫使我們不能對(duì)最近幾年公司違規(guī)情況做出一個(gè)比較清晰了解。 (2)在研究中,由于數(shù)據(jù)收集及樣本大小的關(guān)系,對(duì)于那些在一個(gè)會(huì)計(jì)年度內(nèi)出現(xiàn)2次及以上違規(guī)的公司,我們并沒(méi)有對(duì)其進(jìn)行更細(xì)致的單獨(dú)研究,也沒(méi)有進(jìn)一步研究其與只發(fā)生一次違規(guī)行為公司之間的關(guān)系。 (3)公司治理數(shù)據(jù)的收集,從數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)獲得的最早公司治理數(shù)據(jù)是從2000年開(kāi)始,同時(shí)終極控制人所有權(quán)、分離度的數(shù)據(jù)從2003年才開(kāi)始有完整數(shù)據(jù),市場(chǎng)化指數(shù)最新數(shù)據(jù)僅到2009年,這使得我們的相關(guān)研究?jī)H能采用2003-2009年7年的面板數(shù)據(jù),因此本文的研究樣本還應(yīng)該在更大樣本下繼續(xù)進(jìn)行研究,這樣得到的結(jié)論說(shuō)服力將會(huì)更強(qiáng)。
[Abstract]:Chinese stock market experienced 20 years of development, the number of listed companies is increasing, the total market value is also in more conventional speed increasing. But in the process of rapid development, illegal events emerge in an endless stream in the stock market, not only make investors suffer a great loss, but also hinder the resource allocation function of securities markets at the same time, knocking regulators fragile nerves, making companies become the focus of attention. In the face of this problem, scholars from different angles, using different methods of data and research the illegal behavior of the company, hoping to find the most fundamental reasons affect the company's violations. As an important participant in the market market regulators on the one hand, trying to control the listed company violations by the relevant laws and regulations, on the other hand, called on all parties (including the media, to strengthen the investment) The supervision of the company's behavior is punishments for the companies that have committed irregularities, hoping to increase the violation cost of the listed company through severe punishment measures, so as to reduce the purpose of the violation of the listed company.
Although regulators for the company to stop illegal but Chinese brains, securities market irregularities of listed companies has not been effectively curbed, even in quite a long period of time, the proportion of listed companies shows a rising trend, so that when in 2001, the company in violation of the ratio was as high as 10%. Even in after this, the proportion of companies decreased to some extent, but compared with the developed countries, there is still a high proportion of violations Chinese listed companies each year; at the same time, Chinese listed company shareholders violations from scratch, and the illegal ratio shows a new trend has increased year by year. Facing this situation, we should not only think in the end, the market is the lack of supervision, and the imperfect corporate governance, or other causes.
In this paper, the sample data of Shanghai and Shenzhen two city stock market A 1992-2011 a total of 20 years, based on the analysis of the related theories, focusing on empirical research using panel data for 2003-2009 years. First of all, starting from the perspective of the ultimate controller, the degree of separation of ultimate ownership, impact on corporate behavior, focus on the analysis of ultimate ownership, separation or not in the condition of ultimate control rights - the ultimate ownership, management of violations, violations of the influence of shareholders, not only the first and the second kind of principal-agent theory for empirical test purpose, provide the important reference for the development and conclusion of related policy. Secondly, the board of directors as the core the mechanism of corporate governance as an important tool to alleviate the agency problem, most previous studies focused on the variables impact on the company's violations of the existing research, from the point of view Study, research on corporate governance mechanism and the lack of regulations, this paper not only on the board of directors as the core of the corporate governance mechanism affects the illegal behavior of the company, at the same time in the middle of a model to test the robustness of the system, so that the final violations of corporate governance and corporate relations conclusion can only stand the test again, as the company's operating system environment where environmental variables, to the role of governance for the company under certain conditions, from the relevant previous research literature, research on the institutional environment the lack of in-depth analysis on the impact of the company's violation of the same few literature research a variety of external environmental factors on the violation of the company; the system of environmental variables including not only operates the modern level of economic development, at the same time, including the process of marketization index, market legal system environment, government In order to study the impact of institutional environment on corporate irregularities, it will help to achieve a comprehensive and in-depth study of the role of institutional environment governance.
Therefore, from the problem put forward the research background and review, theoretical analysis and research hypothesis, measurement results and analysis, the conclusion of the study, several levels gradually related research. The first part is "the introduction" clearly put forward the research problem, and to carry on the statement, research methods and structure of this paper are illustrated in detail the second section "the literature review and analysis, review of management behavior of ultimate ownership and ultimate control and the degree of separation of the company, the board of directors as the core of corporate governance mechanism and the institutional environment and the companies of Xiang Guanwen offered research, combing the research results of these aspects and the existing research, given the relevant comments, which lay a solid theoretical basis for further research in this paper. The third part" the background and current situation of market research, a detailed list of the China stock market serious violation of company Random events and the final penalty results, and by way of the chart shows the details of the overall proportion of violations, violations of listed companies Chinese type, the degree of violation, change trend and current situation of the development of the subject of non-compliance; China securities regulation made a detailed description and detailed analysis of changes China governance mechanism of listed companies and the improvement of. The fourth part is theoretical analysis and research hypothesis, based on the relevant research literature, several aspects of the study of this paper, theoretical analysis was carried out, and the related research hypothesis put forward on the relationship between related variables and companies. The fifth part is the research design, a detailed description of the data sources used in this paper, and access to important data; each of the variables involved in the research of the definition and measure of concrete; given in every body. The problems in the use of econometric model. The sixth part is "the measurement results and analysis, firstly, the ultimate control of ultimate controller involved in this study and the right of ultimate ownership, ultimate control rights - ownership separation, will variables of corporate governance mechanism as the core to the board of directors, each variable in the system environment of the descriptive statistical analysis; followed by the study of the ultimate ownership, separation, corporate governance variables and system environment variables and the relationship between the company regulations; focus on the ultimate ownership, and the degree of separation of management irregularities, the relationship between the East illegal shares, and the results were analyzed to verify the model, according to the research hypothesis proposed. The seventh part is conclusion, mainly including the conclusion and policy meaning of this study, the limitations of the study and direction of further research. Through the research above, this paper The following conclusions should be obtained:
(1) the ultimate control of ownership, separation of companies to curb the role, but the role of the ultimate ownership proportion is more obvious; the nature of the ultimate controller has no significant effect on the illegal behavior of the company, and the company's property industry is the important reason influencing the corporate governance mechanism, in competitive industries, the ultimate control of ownership the proportion and the degree of separation of companies were significantly negatively correlated, but in the administrative monopoly industries, the ultimate control of the proportion of ownership, and the degree of separation of companies were not significant.
(2) the separation of ultimate ownership and ultimate control, obviously weakens the influence of ultimate ownership proportion management violation probability of the listed company; the control right of the ultimate controller and the degree of separation of ultimate ownership increased the probability of illegal corporate shareholders, and the role of the ultimate controller ownership proportion of shareholders violation probability is not obvious, at the same time under this condition, management failed to play its due role.
(3) from the company level, the proportion of the largest shareholder in the corporate governance mechanism can inhibit the company's violation. The rest of the corporate governance mechanisms based on the board of directors do not play their due role, showing no correlation with the company's irregularities.
(4) part of the institutional environment variables company's containment has significant effects on the illegal behavior of the company, the higher the level of economic development of the company has significantly inhibited the probability of illegal, and the market index, the market legal system, government intervention to corporate behavior influence is not significant.
(5) through further analysis, it is found that in the state-owned controlled listed companies, especially the listed companies in the administrative monopoly industries, the controlling shareholder's share proportion is too high, which is the decisive factor affecting the performance of the corporate governance mechanism.
Through the related analysis, the main innovations of this paper are as follows:
(1) the Chinese stock market 20 years of full sample data, a comprehensive display of the trend and current situation changes China violations of listed companies, and from the point of view of the ultimate controller, based on the 2003-2009 7 years of panel data, the illegal behavior of the company and the ultimate ownership and ultimate control right, the relationship between the degree of separation, make up the lack of relevant research.
(2) for the first time, divided according to the illegal violation of the subject, which is divided into management and shareholder illegal violations, to further study the ultimate controller ownership proportion, the relationship between ultimate control rights and the degree of separation of ownership - management irregularities and violations of the shareholders; focus on the separation and conditions in the two rights, ultimate ownership the degree of separation, respectively on management irregularities, violations of the shareholder, and for the study of the ultimate control and management (Management) first class (the principal-agent problem between the incentive effect), the ultimate controller and minority shareholders second kinds of principal-agent problem (barrier effect) provides an empirical test of the mechanism, and the related the model to test the stability, make the results more convincing.
(3) through further research, we find out the reasons that ultimately influence the construction and function of China's listed company governance mechanism, and provide new evidence for solving the governance problem of Chinese listed companies fundamentally.
In spite of the serious efforts of the author, the study still has some limitations due to the limitations of its own ability and objective conditions.
(1) although this research would like to Chinese since the establishment of the securities market to all listed companies at the end of 2013 as a sample, but because from the company's violations to the regulators found that punishment, to finally make the punishment announcement, there is a time delay in the process, we made illegal data obtained from the data base to the latest the company only to 2011, we can't force in recent years the company violations make a clearer understanding.
(2) in the study, the relationship between data collection and sample size, for those 2 and over violations of the company within a fiscal year, we are not alone for a more detailed study of the no further research on the relationship between the one and only violations of company.
(3) corporate governance data collection, the earliest corporate governance data obtained from the database is from the beginning of 2000, and the ultimate controller ownership, the degree of separation of data from 2003 began to have complete data, the market index of the latest data only to 2009, which makes the related research we can only use panel data of 2003-2009 7 years, so the sample of this study should also continue to study in a larger sample, so the conclusion of persuasion will be stronger.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51;F276.6

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