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  本文關(guān)鍵詞：農(nóng)村產(chǎn)權(quán)抵押貸款的博弈研究　出處：《西北農(nóng)林科技大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 農(nóng)村產(chǎn)權(quán) 抵押貸款 三方博弈 納什均衡

【摘要】：我國(guó)是一個(gè)農(nóng)業(yè)大國(guó)，但農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)力低下，城鎮(zhèn)家庭人均可支配收入已連續(xù)11年是農(nóng)村家庭人均純收入的3倍多，城鄉(xiāng)二元差異越來(lái)越嚴(yán)重，大力發(fā)展農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟(jì)，提高農(nóng)民收入迫在眉睫。由于大多數(shù)農(nóng)戶既沒(méi)有合理的抵押品，又沒(méi)有合適的擔(dān)保人，所以他們很難從信用社取得貸款，農(nóng)戶貸款難問(wèn)題已成為制約農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展、提高農(nóng)戶收入、影響農(nóng)村社會(huì)穩(wěn)定的關(guān)鍵性因素。近年來(lái)，農(nóng)村產(chǎn)權(quán)抵押貸款被認(rèn)為可以有效的解決農(nóng)戶貸款難、農(nóng)村金融供給不足的問(wèn)題，由此可見(jiàn)，對(duì)于我國(guó)農(nóng)村產(chǎn)權(quán)抵押貸款過(guò)程中農(nóng)戶、信用社及政府三者之間關(guān)系的研究尤為迫切。 在農(nóng)村產(chǎn)權(quán)抵押貸款的過(guò)程中，農(nóng)戶、信用社以及政府三個(gè)主體之間的關(guān)系既復(fù)雜又微妙，任何一個(gè)主體的策略行動(dòng)都會(huì)對(duì)其他兩個(gè)主體的行為選擇產(chǎn)生影響�？傮w來(lái)看，三者之間的關(guān)系可以概括為兩個(gè)方面：一是三個(gè)主體通過(guò)農(nóng)村產(chǎn)權(quán)抵押貸款過(guò)程互利互惠；二是在互惠互利的同時(shí)又存在著許多矛盾，三者之間的博弈關(guān)系明顯，用博弈理論研究三者間的關(guān)系具有優(yōu)勢(shì)。 國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者主要從以下三個(gè)方面來(lái)研究農(nóng)村產(chǎn)權(quán)抵押貸款：農(nóng)戶與信用社之間的關(guān)系；信用社與政府的關(guān)系；農(nóng)戶與政府的關(guān)系�，F(xiàn)有對(duì)于農(nóng)戶、信用社、政府三者之間關(guān)系的博弈研究，多采用兩兩之間的納什均衡博弈分析，或采用靜態(tài)分析方法而忽略了博弈各方策略的相互影響。 本文主要從以下三個(gè)方面進(jìn)行研究：一、討論了在有審查機(jī)制和沒(méi)有審查機(jī)制的情況下信用社對(duì)農(nóng)戶貸款申請(qǐng)的態(tài)度。二、討論了政府對(duì)信用社進(jìn)行檢查和不檢查時(shí)政府和信用社對(duì)新產(chǎn)權(quán)抵押貸款政策采取的行動(dòng)。三、建立了三方動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型，討論了農(nóng)戶、政府與信用社三者之間的關(guān)系，并求得混合策略的納什均衡。 最后，提出了以下政策建議：信用社建立對(duì)農(nóng)戶行之有效的審查機(jī)制，，只有信用社盡可能提高對(duì)農(nóng)戶資信判斷的準(zhǔn)確性，才可能將盡可能多的資金投入廣大農(nóng)村市場(chǎng)；政府要建立對(duì)信用社科學(xué)的補(bǔ)償機(jī)制，即對(duì)其稅收等進(jìn)行減免，并建立對(duì)信用社高效的監(jiān)管機(jī)制，使農(nóng)戶實(shí)實(shí)在在的享受到產(chǎn)權(quán)抵押貸款帶來(lái)的收益；政府加強(qiáng)對(duì)農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng)的監(jiān)管力度，對(duì)不償還借款的農(nóng)戶和騙取政府財(cái)政補(bǔ)貼的信用社進(jìn)行處罰，以期農(nóng)村信貸市場(chǎng)的良性發(fā)展；加強(qiáng)涉農(nóng)信貸與涉農(nóng)保險(xiǎn)的合作，營(yíng)造和諧的農(nóng)村借貸環(huán)境。
[Abstract]:China is a large agricultural country, but the agricultural productivity is low, the per capita disposable income of urban households has been more than three times of the per capita net income of rural households for 11 consecutive years, and the urban-rural dual difference is becoming more and more serious. It is urgent to vigorously develop rural economy and raise farmers' income. Because most farmers have neither reasonable collateral nor suitable guarantors, it is difficult for them to obtain loans from credit cooperatives. The problem of farmers' loan has become a key factor to restrict the development of rural economy, improve the income of farmers and affect the stability of rural society. In recent years, the mortgage loan of rural property rights is considered to be an effective solution to the difficulty of farmers' loans. It can be seen that the study of the relationship among the farmers, credit cooperatives and the government in the process of rural property right mortgage loan is particularly urgent. In the process of the property right mortgage loan in rural areas, the relationship among the farmers, credit cooperatives and the government is complex and delicate. The strategic actions of any one subject will have an impact on the behavior choices of the other two subjects. The relationship between the three can be summarized as two aspects: first, the three main bodies through the process of rural property rights mortgage loan mutual benefit; On the other hand, there are many contradictions in the process of mutual benefit and mutual benefit. The game relationship among the three is obvious, so it is advantageous to study the relationship between them by using the game theory. Scholars at home and abroad mainly from the following three aspects to study the rural property rights mortgage loans: the relationship between farmers and credit cooperatives; The relationship between the credit union and the government; The relationship between farmers and government. The existing game study on the relationship among farmers, credit cooperatives and government is mostly based on Nash equilibrium game analysis. Or the static analysis method is used to ignore the interaction of game strategies. This article mainly carries on the research from the following three aspects: first, has discussed in the examination mechanism and does not have the examination mechanism situation the credit union to the farmer loan application attitude. This paper discusses the actions taken by the government and the credit cooperatives on the new property right mortgage loan policy when the government checks and does not inspect the credit cooperatives. Thirdly, the three-way dynamic game model is established, and the farmers are discussed. The relationship between government and credit cooperatives, and the Nash equilibrium of mixed strategy. Finally, the following policy recommendations are put forward: credit cooperatives establish an effective review mechanism for farmers, and only credit cooperatives can improve the accuracy of credit judgment of farmers as much as possible. It is possible to put as much money as possible into the vast rural market; The government should establish a scientific compensation mechanism for credit cooperatives, that is, the tax relief, and establish an efficient regulatory mechanism for credit cooperatives, so that farmers can really enjoy the benefits of property rights mortgage loans; The government should strengthen the supervision of the rural financial market and punish the farmers who do not repay the loan and the credit cooperatives who defraud the government financial subsidies in order to develop the rural credit market. Strengthen the cooperation between agricultural credit and agricultural insurance, and create a harmonious rural lending environment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北農(nóng)林科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.43

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