發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-06-10 21:05

  本文選題：信號博弈 + 債務(wù)融資　； 參考：《哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)是經(jīng)濟(jì)體系中的一個(gè)重要行業(yè)，債務(wù)融資作為房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)目前最常用的融資手段，不僅關(guān)系著企業(yè)發(fā)展，更關(guān)系著行業(yè)和社會經(jīng)濟(jì)安全，研究房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)債務(wù)融資所帶來的效應(yīng)不僅能夠豐富相關(guān)理論文獻(xiàn)，更能為企業(yè)日常經(jīng)營決策提供實(shí)際借鑒。 本文針對目前我國房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)的發(fā)展?fàn)顟B(tài)以及行業(yè)特點(diǎn)，對整個(gè)房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)的情況進(jìn)行了宏觀上的數(shù)據(jù)分析，鑒于房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)在負(fù)債率這一指標(biāo)上突出于其他行業(yè)這一特征，結(jié)合信號博弈相關(guān)理論，提出了高管薪酬、企業(yè)績效和市場價(jià)值的債務(wù)融資效應(yīng)的問題，并通過理論研究結(jié)合實(shí)證研究的方法，將高管薪酬與資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率視為管理者和所有者的內(nèi)部博弈體現(xiàn)，將企業(yè)績效與企業(yè)市場價(jià)值視為管理者與投資者的外部博弈體現(xiàn)，將企業(yè)績效視為博弈關(guān)系的指標(biāo)體現(xiàn)，，利用多元線性回歸的方法對高管薪酬、企業(yè)績效和市場價(jià)值與資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率的博弈問題進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究，再利用計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)聯(lián)立方程模型對這幾個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)特征值形成的簡易經(jīng)濟(jì)系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行分析，試圖定性定量的得出高管薪酬、企業(yè)績效、市場價(jià)值和債務(wù)融資比例之間相互依存、相互影響的關(guān)系。針對研究結(jié)果，并結(jié)合相關(guān)領(lǐng)域的理論，對所得研究結(jié)論進(jìn)行利弊分析和原因分析，并結(jié)合目前的市場條件給出針對性的政策建議。 研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，在經(jīng)營狀況較好的上市房地產(chǎn)公司中，高管薪酬與資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率之間是非顯著正相關(guān)的關(guān)系，而資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率與績效也是非顯著正相關(guān)的關(guān)系；在經(jīng)營狀況較差的上市房地產(chǎn)公司中，高管薪酬與資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率之間是顯著負(fù)相關(guān)的關(guān)系，而資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率與績效是顯著正相關(guān)的關(guān)系；在所選取的樣本公司中，資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率正向影響市值，市值負(fù)向影響資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率；將所選指標(biāo)綜合建立為一個(gè)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)系統(tǒng)后研究則發(fā)現(xiàn)，管理層激勵(lì)在上市房地產(chǎn)公司的發(fā)展中起到重要作用。根據(jù)研究結(jié)論，對于上市房地產(chǎn)公司內(nèi)部博弈的負(fù)面效應(yīng)，提出應(yīng)該強(qiáng)化委托代理的契約關(guān)系和明確資金使用計(jì)劃的建議，而對于上市房地產(chǎn)公司外部博弈的負(fù)面效應(yīng)，則提出了應(yīng)該為投資者和債權(quán)人提供監(jiān)督空間以及平衡長短期債務(wù)融資比例的建議。
[Abstract]:The real estate industry is an important industry in the economic system. As the most commonly used financing means of the real estate industry, debt financing is not only related to the development of enterprises, but also related to the industry and social economic security. The study of the effects of debt financing in real estate industry can not only enrich the relevant theoretical literature, but also provide practical reference for the daily business decisions of enterprises. This paper aims at the development status and characteristics of the real estate industry in China. Based on the macro data analysis of the whole real estate industry, in view of the fact that the debt ratio of the real estate industry is prominent in other industries, combined with the signal game theory, the paper puts forward the executive compensation. The problem of debt financing effect of enterprise performance and market value, and through theoretical research combined with empirical research method, the executive compensation and asset-liability ratio are regarded as the internal game between manager and owner. This paper regards enterprise performance and enterprise market value as the external game between manager and investor, and regards enterprise performance as the index of game relation. The paper uses multiple linear regression method to analyze executive compensation. This paper makes an empirical study on the game problem of enterprise performance, market value and asset-liability ratio, and then analyzes the simple economic system formed by these economic characteristic values by using the econometric simultaneous equation model. This paper tries to get the relationship between executive compensation, firm performance, market value and debt financing ratio. According to the research results, combined with the theory of related fields, the advantages and disadvantages of the conclusions and the reasons are analyzed, and combined with the current market conditions to give targeted policy recommendations. In listed real estate companies with good operating conditions, the relationship between executive compensation and asset-liability ratio is non-significant positive correlation, and the relationship between asset-liability ratio and performance is also non-significant positive correlation. In listed real estate companies with poor operating conditions, the relationship between executive compensation and asset-liability ratio is significantly negative, while the relationship between asset-liability ratio and performance is significantly positive. The asset-liability ratio positively affects market value and market value negatively affects asset-liability ratio, and the research shows that management incentive plays an important role in the development of listed real estate companies by synthesizing the selected indexes into a macroeconomic system. According to the conclusion of the study, for the negative effects of the internal game of listed real estate companies, this paper puts forward the suggestion that the contract relationship of principal-agent should be strengthened and the plan of capital utilization should be clarified, while the negative effects of external game on listed real estate companies. It suggests that investors and creditors should be given room to monitor and balance the ratio of long-and short-term debt financing.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F299.233.42;F224.32

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本文編號：2004651