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基于供應(yīng)鏈契約的I公司汽車分銷供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)研究

發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-01-10 01:35

  本文關(guān)鍵詞:基于供應(yīng)鏈契約的I公司汽車分銷供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)研究 出處:《北京交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文


  更多相關(guān)文章: 分銷供應(yīng)鏈 銷售努力 數(shù)量彈性契約 收益共享契約 供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào) 汽車


【摘要】:隨著我國(guó)汽車工業(yè)的迅猛發(fā)展,汽車產(chǎn)銷量連續(xù)八年蟬聯(lián)全球第一,汽車業(yè)作為國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略性、支柱性產(chǎn)業(yè),是穩(wěn)增長(zhǎng)、擴(kuò)需求的關(guān)鍵領(lǐng)域。分銷是汽車營(yíng)銷的重要組成部分,是連接制造企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者的關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié),汽車分銷供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展對(duì)汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)有重要影響。本文以I汽車供應(yīng)商與經(jīng)銷商組成的汽車分銷供應(yīng)鏈存在不協(xié)調(diào)的現(xiàn)狀為出發(fā)點(diǎn),深入分析了I公司汽車分銷供應(yīng)鏈的需求特點(diǎn),分銷供應(yīng)鏈上供應(yīng)商和經(jīng)銷商的現(xiàn)狀,并總結(jié)I公司汽車分銷供應(yīng)鏈在銷售激勵(lì)策略及利潤(rùn)分配上出現(xiàn)的不協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題,提出新的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)方案。該方案改變了原方案的銷售激勵(lì)策略,首先,考慮了經(jīng)銷商銷售努力水平對(duì)顧客需求的影響因素;然后,通過(guò)對(duì)I公司及其下游經(jīng)銷商的供需關(guān)系及利益的分析,抽象出關(guān)于I公司及經(jīng)銷商的利潤(rùn)函數(shù),在傳統(tǒng)報(bào)童模型基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行了拓展,并引入了數(shù)量彈性契約和收益共享契約,建立了更適用于I公司的分銷供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)模型。隨后,本文運(yùn)用Stackelberg博弈理論進(jìn)行模型的推導(dǎo),其中I公司為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,經(jīng)銷商為追隨者,通過(guò)模型求解出供應(yīng)鏈實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)的契約條件。最后,結(jié)合I公司及經(jīng)銷商的實(shí)際情況對(duì)模型進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證,選取某個(gè)車型的一種級(jí)別的汽車對(duì)模型中的參數(shù)進(jìn)行初始值設(shè)定,用MATLAB軟件求解模型,來(lái)驗(yàn)證數(shù)量彈性契約和收益共享契約這兩種協(xié)調(diào)方案的可行性。從結(jié)果上來(lái)看,新的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)效果與原來(lái)相比有明顯改善,證明了模型的有效性。當(dāng)契約參數(shù)滿足一定條件時(shí),對(duì)經(jīng)銷商及I公司均可以起到激勵(lì)作用,同時(shí)解決了原來(lái)I公司汽車分銷供應(yīng)鏈的沖突問(wèn)題,實(shí)現(xiàn)了I公司及經(jīng)銷商利潤(rùn)的帕累托改進(jìn),使得汽車分銷供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào)最優(yōu)。本文又分析了外界環(huán)境變化時(shí)對(duì)模型的影響,對(duì)模型中的參數(shù)進(jìn)行靈敏度分析,討論當(dāng)零售價(jià)、進(jìn)貨價(jià)、庫(kù)存成本、缺貨成本、銷售努力敏感度、銷售努力成本系數(shù)等參數(shù)的改變對(duì)經(jīng)銷商的訂貨量、銷售努力水平、I公司、經(jīng)銷商及整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈的利潤(rùn)的影響,更具有實(shí)際意義。本文的研究成果對(duì)于汽車行業(yè)想通過(guò)供應(yīng)鏈契約來(lái)協(xié)調(diào)分銷供應(yīng)鏈的企業(yè)具有一定啟示意義,對(duì)已經(jīng)實(shí)施供應(yīng)鏈契約但效果不佳的也提供了新思路。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of automobile industry in China, automobile production and sales have been ranked first in the world for eight consecutive years. As a national strategic and pillar industry, automobile industry is growing steadily. Distribution is an important part of automobile marketing and the key link between manufacturing enterprises and consumers. The coordinated development of automotive distribution supply chain has an important impact on the automobile industry. The demand characteristics of I company's automobile distribution supply chain and the current situation of suppliers and dealers in the distribution supply chain are analyzed in depth. And summarizes the sales incentive strategy and profit distribution in the automotive distribution supply chain of company I incongruous problems, put forward a new supply chain coordination plan, this scheme changed the original plan of sales incentive strategy, first of all. Considering the influence factors of the dealer's sales effort level on the customer's demand; Then, through the analysis of the supply-demand relationship and benefit of I company and its downstream dealers, the profit function of I company and its dealers is abstracted and extended on the basis of the traditional newsboy model. Then the quantitative elastic contract and the revenue sharing contract are introduced to establish the distribution supply chain coordination model which is more suitable for I company. Then, this paper uses Stackelberg game theory to deduce the model. Among them, I company is the leader and the dealer is the follower, and the contract conditions of supply chain coordination are solved by the model. Finally, the model is verified according to the actual situation of the I company and the dealer. A class of vehicles of a certain type of vehicle is selected to set the initial value of the parameters in the model, and the model is solved by MATLAB software. From the results, the new supply chain coordination effect is obviously improved compared with the original. The validity of the model is proved. When the contract parameters meet certain conditions, both dealers and I companies can play an incentive role, and at the same time, the conflict of the original I company automobile distribution supply chain is solved. The Pareto improvement of I company and dealer profit is realized, which makes the automobile distribution supply chain achieve the optimal coordination. In this paper, the influence of the external environment on the model is analyzed, and the sensitivity of the parameters in the model is analyzed. Discuss when the retail price, purchase price, inventory cost, stock cost, sales effort sensitivity, sales effort cost coefficient and other parameters change to the dealer's order quantity, sales effort level. The influence of dealers and the profit of the whole supply chain is more practical. The research results of this paper have certain enlightenment significance for the enterprises that want to coordinate the distribution supply chain through the supply chain contract. It also provides a new idea for those who have already implemented supply chain contract but whose effect is not good.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類號(hào)】:F274;F416.471

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