貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的選擇研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-03-29 08:02
【摘要】：在貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端越來(lái)越頻繁的今天,如何更有效地解決爭(zhēng)端越來(lái)越重要。目前,在爭(zhēng)端解決中,經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家多是關(guān)注于WTO爭(zhēng)端機(jī)制,對(duì)于多種爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的選擇關(guān)注不多。對(duì)于中國(guó)而言,爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的運(yùn)用主要以雙邊磋商為主,使用WTO爭(zhēng)端機(jī)制尚顯不足,沒(méi)有充分利用其他爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制。針對(duì)這種現(xiàn)狀,中國(guó)要不斷改進(jìn)爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制選擇的不足,更好地促進(jìn)貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端的解決。因此,爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制選擇的研究具有重要的理論價(jià)值和實(shí)際意義。本文以“貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的選擇”為研究對(duì)象,從單邊行動(dòng)、雙邊磋商、區(qū)域協(xié)調(diào)、WTO爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制為切入點(diǎn),運(yùn)用理論研究中福利、博弈分析,以及經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究中統(tǒng)計(jì)、計(jì)量、案例分析的方法,從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)角度,得出以下結(jié)論：WTO爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的經(jīng)濟(jì)福利和政治福利要優(yōu)于單邊行動(dòng)、雙邊磋商、區(qū)域協(xié)調(diào),但是在具體爭(zhēng)端中,爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的選擇取決于雙方不斷博弈的結(jié)果,其中政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)因素影響搏弈的均衡結(jié)果,并且得到經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究的支持。中國(guó)在爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的選擇中,經(jīng)濟(jì)因素起著更重要的作用,行業(yè)利益團(tuán)體的影響力不大,在此基礎(chǔ)上給出了啟示。 本文圍繞這些問(wèn)題的研究,主要有七章的內(nèi)容： 第一章導(dǎo)論部分主要對(duì)研究背景與意義、方法、創(chuàng)新及不足的介紹,提出本文研究的重要價(jià)值。第二章文獻(xiàn)綜述部分得出,現(xiàn)有的文獻(xiàn)對(duì)于爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制選擇的研究不夠,特別是對(duì)于中國(guó)爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的選擇關(guān)注不多,為此引出本文所要研究的問(wèn)題。 第三章對(duì)單邊行動(dòng)、雙邊磋商、區(qū)域協(xié)調(diào)、WTO爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制理論分析中得出,在單邊行動(dòng)中,目標(biāo)國(guó)的福利受到損害；雙邊磋商、區(qū)域協(xié)調(diào)在爭(zhēng)端解決中有時(shí)會(huì)出現(xiàn)福利受損的情況,特別在利益集團(tuán)的影響下,福利受損更為嚴(yán)重；而WTO爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)福利最大化。在福利比較中,雙邊磋商優(yōu)于單邊行動(dòng),區(qū)域協(xié)調(diào)又優(yōu)于雙邊磋商,WTO爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的福利最高。 在第四章,本文試圖建立爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制選擇的博弈模型,包括從單邊行動(dòng)到WTO爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制、雙邊磋商到WTO爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制選擇的博弈模型,得出政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)因素影響博弈的均衡結(jié)果,政治因素使得爭(zhēng)端通過(guò)WTO爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的可能性增加。 第五章經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的選擇中,目標(biāo)國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)上依存于美國(guó),美國(guó)更愿意通過(guò)雙邊磋商,而在政治因素作用下美國(guó)更多地申訴到WTO,其中利益集團(tuán)的影響更大。 第六章研究得出,在爭(zhēng)端解決中,對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家,中國(guó)運(yùn)用雙邊磋商；對(duì)美歐等發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家,中國(guó)開始更多地訴諸WTO。作為發(fā)展中國(guó)家,中國(guó)在爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的選擇中,政治因素不同于發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家利益集團(tuán)的影響。中國(guó)在爭(zhēng)端解決中,經(jīng)濟(jì)因素作用更大；在政治因素中,利益團(tuán)體影響不明顯,政府的重視和作用更為顯著,并且得到中國(guó)案例的經(jīng)驗(yàn)支持,在此基礎(chǔ)上,提出了啟示。 第七章在整個(gè)結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上,再次強(qiáng)調(diào)對(duì)中國(guó)的啟示。中國(guó)在爭(zhēng)端解決中雙邊磋商是基礎(chǔ),WTO要加強(qiáng),其他機(jī)制要重視,利益團(tuán)體起作用。
[Abstract]:As trade disputes are becoming more and more frequent, how to more effectively resolve the dispute is becoming more and more important. At present, in the dispute settlement, many economists are concerned about the WTO dispute mechanism, and the choice of a variety of dispute settlement mechanisms is not limited. For China, the application of the dispute settlement mechanism is mainly based on bilateral consultation, and the use of the WTO dispute mechanism is not enough, and other dispute settlement mechanisms are not fully utilized. In view of the present situation, China will continuously improve the solution of the dispute settlement mechanism, and better promote the settlement of trade dispute. Therefore, the study of the choice of dispute settlement mechanism is of great theoretical value and practical significance. This paper takes the "The Choice of the Settlement Mechanism of Trade Dispute" as the research object, from unilateral action, bilateral consultation, regional coordination and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as the starting point, using the method of statistics, measurement and case analysis in the theoretical research, from the angle of economics and political economy, The conclusion is that the economic welfare and political welfare of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism should be better than unilateral action, bilateral consultation and regional coordination, but in the specific dispute, the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism depends on the result of the game between the two parties, in which politics, The economic factors influence the balance result of the fight and get the support of the empirical research. In the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism, China has played a more important role in the economic factors, and the influence of the industry's interest groups is not small, and the enlightenment is given on this basis. This paper focuses on the research of these problems, including seven chapters. The introduction of the first chapter mainly focuses on the background, meaning, method, innovation and deficiency of the research, and puts forward the research of this paper. The second part of the literature review concluded that the existing literature is not enough for the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism, especially for the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism in China. The third chapter analyses the unilateral action, the bilateral consultation, the regional coordination and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. In the unilateral action, the welfare of the target State is damaged; bilateral consultation and regional coordination are sometimes shown in the dispute settlement At present, the welfare is damaged, especially under the influence of the interest group, and the welfare is more serious; and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can The benefits are maximized. In the benefit comparison, bilateral consultation is superior to unilateral action, and the regional coordination is superior to bilateral consultation, and the WTO dispute solution In the fourth chapter, this paper tries to establish a game model of the choice of dispute settlement mechanism, including from unilateral action to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, bilateral consultation to the game model selected by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and the conclusion that the political and economic The factors influence the equilibrium of the game, and the political factors make the dispute through the WTO. The possibility of an end-to-end mechanism has increased. In chapter V, empirical studies have found that, in the choice of dispute settlement mechanisms, the target State is economically dependent on the United States, and the United States is more willing to adopt bilateral consultations, while the United States is more willing to appeal to W under the influence of political factors. The effects of interest groups are greater. Chapter VI studies the application of bilateral consultations to developing countries and China in the settlement of disputes, and to the United States of America and Europe In the developed countries, China has started to have more access to the WTO. As a developing country, China is in the choice of dispute settlement mechanism The factors of governance are different from the influence of the interest groups of the developed countries. In the settlement of disputes, the role of economic factors is greater; in the political factors, the influence of the interests group is not obvious, the attention and the role of the government are more obvious, and the case of China is obtained On the basis of this, the author puts forward some enlightenment. On the basis of the whole conclusion, we once again emphasize the enlightenment to China. China's bilateral consultation in dispute settlement is the basis, WT
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D996.1
本文編號(hào)：2449320
[Abstract]:As trade disputes are becoming more and more frequent, how to more effectively resolve the dispute is becoming more and more important. At present, in the dispute settlement, many economists are concerned about the WTO dispute mechanism, and the choice of a variety of dispute settlement mechanisms is not limited. For China, the application of the dispute settlement mechanism is mainly based on bilateral consultation, and the use of the WTO dispute mechanism is not enough, and other dispute settlement mechanisms are not fully utilized. In view of the present situation, China will continuously improve the solution of the dispute settlement mechanism, and better promote the settlement of trade dispute. Therefore, the study of the choice of dispute settlement mechanism is of great theoretical value and practical significance. This paper takes the "The Choice of the Settlement Mechanism of Trade Dispute" as the research object, from unilateral action, bilateral consultation, regional coordination and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as the starting point, using the method of statistics, measurement and case analysis in the theoretical research, from the angle of economics and political economy, The conclusion is that the economic welfare and political welfare of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism should be better than unilateral action, bilateral consultation and regional coordination, but in the specific dispute, the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism depends on the result of the game between the two parties, in which politics, The economic factors influence the balance result of the fight and get the support of the empirical research. In the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism, China has played a more important role in the economic factors, and the influence of the industry's interest groups is not small, and the enlightenment is given on this basis. This paper focuses on the research of these problems, including seven chapters. The introduction of the first chapter mainly focuses on the background, meaning, method, innovation and deficiency of the research, and puts forward the research of this paper. The second part of the literature review concluded that the existing literature is not enough for the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism, especially for the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism in China. The third chapter analyses the unilateral action, the bilateral consultation, the regional coordination and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. In the unilateral action, the welfare of the target State is damaged; bilateral consultation and regional coordination are sometimes shown in the dispute settlement At present, the welfare is damaged, especially under the influence of the interest group, and the welfare is more serious; and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can The benefits are maximized. In the benefit comparison, bilateral consultation is superior to unilateral action, and the regional coordination is superior to bilateral consultation, and the WTO dispute solution In the fourth chapter, this paper tries to establish a game model of the choice of dispute settlement mechanism, including from unilateral action to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, bilateral consultation to the game model selected by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and the conclusion that the political and economic The factors influence the equilibrium of the game, and the political factors make the dispute through the WTO. The possibility of an end-to-end mechanism has increased. In chapter V, empirical studies have found that, in the choice of dispute settlement mechanisms, the target State is economically dependent on the United States, and the United States is more willing to adopt bilateral consultations, while the United States is more willing to appeal to W under the influence of political factors. The effects of interest groups are greater. Chapter VI studies the application of bilateral consultations to developing countries and China in the settlement of disputes, and to the United States of America and Europe In the developed countries, China has started to have more access to the WTO. As a developing country, China is in the choice of dispute settlement mechanism The factors of governance are different from the influence of the interest groups of the developed countries. In the settlement of disputes, the role of economic factors is greater; in the political factors, the influence of the interests group is not obvious, the attention and the role of the government are more obvious, and the case of China is obtained On the basis of this, the author puts forward some enlightenment. On the basis of the whole conclusion, we once again emphasize the enlightenment to China. China's bilateral consultation in dispute settlement is the basis, WT
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D996.1
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，本文編號(hào)：2449320
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