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  本文關鍵詞：董事多重職位與企業(yè)并購績效研究　出處：《廣東外語外貿(mào)大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關文章： 董事多重職位 兩職合一 連鎖董事 并購績效

【摘要】：在全球經(jīng)濟不景氣,國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟結構急需調(diào)整的大背景下,我國經(jīng)濟處于產(chǎn)業(yè)升級與轉(zhuǎn)型的關鍵時期。大多行業(yè)處于優(yōu)化資源配置階段,越來越多產(chǎn)業(yè)到了需要通過并購實現(xiàn)大規(guī)模整合的時候。2014年我國企業(yè)并購交易金額將近7 000億元,2015年并購交易金額則突破了10 000億元,2016年的并購交易規(guī)模再創(chuàng)新高,達到13 000億元。新型產(chǎn)業(yè),如互聯(lián)網(wǎng)等,已經(jīng)開始通過并購的方式進行行業(yè)整合,如優(yōu)酷和土豆,滴滴出行和Uber等;傳統(tǒng)行業(yè)在近年來的供給側(cè)改革下,也帶來了一些并購整合機會,我國正處于重組并購和產(chǎn)業(yè)整合的新階段和黃金時期。并購活動作為實現(xiàn)優(yōu)化資源配置的一種方式,無論是對宏觀經(jīng)濟層面還是公司個體層面,都具有重要意義,其中并購績效尤其受到關注。而近年來,公司治理與并購績效的關系,引起了學術界的關注。本文的研究對象是董事多重職位與企業(yè)并購績效的關系。董事多重職位主要從兩方面進行衡量,一是董事長與總經(jīng)理兩職合一;二是連鎖董事,在兩個及兩個以上企業(yè)兼任董事即為連鎖董事。在以往的研究中,一般將兩職合一作為公司治理結構其中一個衡量變量進行研究。而連鎖董事則更多的是從連鎖董事形成的董事聯(lián)結,與企業(yè)行為或企業(yè)績效方面進行研究。本文從公司治理中董事在并購決策中擔任的角色出發(fā),研究兩者和企業(yè)并購績效的關系。本文通過選取2013-2015年滬深A股1096個并購事件為樣本,對董事多重職位與并購績效方面的關系進行了研究,構建了多元線性回歸模型,進行了實證檢驗。得出以下結論:(1)董事長與總經(jīng)理兩職合一與企業(yè)并購績效顯著正相關關系。(2)連鎖董事與公司并購績效呈負相關關系。說明連鎖董事的存在會減損企業(yè)并購績效。(3)董事長與總經(jīng)理兩職合一與連鎖董事對企業(yè)并購績效的聯(lián)合作用為負。(4)存在兩職合一的企業(yè),在并購中,公司治理水平較高的企業(yè)比公司治理水平較低的企業(yè)獲得了更高的超額累積收益率。擁有連鎖董事關系的并購企業(yè),公司治理水平的提高對其產(chǎn)生的代理問題沒有顯著緩解作用。同時存在兩職合一和連鎖董事的企業(yè),公司治理水平對企業(yè)并購績效有正面影響,有顯著。基于上述研究發(fā)現(xiàn),本文提出如下建議:(1)企業(yè)在進行并購時,應繼續(xù)保持謹慎態(tài)度,勿降低并購過程中的盡調(diào)要求。(2)完善公司治理機制,給予董事合適的激勵,以此緩解代理沖突。(3)提高公司治理水平,提高公司運營效率。
[Abstract]:Under the background of the global economic depression and the urgent need to adjust the domestic economic structure, China's economy is in the critical period of industrial upgrading and transformation, and most industries are in the phase of optimizing the allocation of resources. More and more industries need to achieve large-scale integration through mergers and acquisitions. In 2014, the amount of M & A transactions in China was nearly 700 billion yuan. In 2015, the amount of M & A transactions exceeded 1 tillion yuan, and in 2016, the scale of M & A transactions reached a new high of 1.3 tillion yuan. New industries, such as the Internet, etc. Has begun to merge through mergers and acquisitions, such as Youku and Tudou, DiDi and Uber, and so on; Under the supply-side reform in recent years, the traditional industry has also brought some opportunities for merger and acquisition integration. China is in the new and golden stage of restructuring and industrial integration. M & A activities as a way to optimize the allocation of resources, whether on the macroeconomic level or individual level of the company. In recent years, the relationship between corporate governance and M & A performance is very important. The research object of this paper is the relationship between the multiple positions of directors and the performance of corporate mergers and acquisitions. The multiple positions of directors are mainly measured from two aspects: the first is the integration of the positions of chairman and general manager; Second, chain directors, in two or more enterprises concurrently as directors of the chain directors. In previous studies. Generally, the combination of two positions is considered as one of the measurement variables of corporate governance structure, while the chain director is more likely to form a board connection from the chain director. This paper starts from the role of directors in M & A decision in corporate governance. This paper studies the relationship between the two and corporate M & A performance. This paper selects 1096 A-share M & A events from 2013 to 2015 as samples. The relationship between multiple positions of directors and M & A performance is studied, and a multivariate linear regression model is constructed. An empirical test is carried out. The following conclusions are drawn: (1) there is a significant positive correlation between the integration of chairman and general manager and corporate M & A performance. There is a negative correlation between chain directors and M & A performance, which indicates that the existence of chain directors will detract from M & A performance. The combined effect of chairman and general manager and chain director on M & A performance is negative. In M & A, the higher corporate governance level than the lower corporate governance level of enterprises to obtain a higher excess cumulative return. The improvement of corporate governance level has no significant role to alleviate the agency problem. At the same time, there are two positions and chain directors of the enterprises, corporate governance level has a positive impact on corporate M & A performance. Based on the findings of the above research, this paper proposes the following suggestions: 1) Enterprises should continue to be cautious in their M & A, not to reduce the requirement of full regulation in the process of M & A, and to improve the corporate governance mechanism. Give the appropriate incentive to the director, so as to alleviate the agency conflict. 3) improve the level of corporate governance, improve the efficiency of the company operation.
【學位授予單位】：廣東外語外貿(mào)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F271;F271;F832.51

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本文編號：1413623