發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-21 03:30

  本文選題：中日韓自貿(mào)區(qū)談判　切入點(diǎn)：協(xié)調(diào)博弈　出處：《吉林大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：2012年11月20日，中日韓三國(guó)經(jīng)貿(mào)部長(zhǎng)于東亞領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人系列會(huì)議期間舉行會(huì)晤，宣布正式啟動(dòng)三國(guó)自貿(mào)區(qū)談判。在中日、韓日政治關(guān)系陷入僵局的背景下，三國(guó)自貿(mào)區(qū)談判的正式啟動(dòng)具有重大戰(zhàn)略意義，也令各界對(duì)談判進(jìn)程的推進(jìn)十分期待。然而，進(jìn)入到具體協(xié)議談判階段的中日韓自貿(mào)區(qū)建設(shè)并不順利。長(zhǎng)期以來，政治關(guān)系并不穩(wěn)定的中日韓三國(guó)在彼此間合作問題上一直堅(jiān)持“政經(jīng)分離，以經(jīng)促政”的外交邏輯，但這種具有慣性的合作邏輯在自貿(mào)區(qū)談判進(jìn)程始終難以推進(jìn)的現(xiàn)實(shí)面前陷入了嚴(yán)重的解釋困境。 由此產(chǎn)生了關(guān)于中日韓自貿(mào)區(qū)談判的兩個(gè)相互聯(lián)系的重要問題：第一，為什么中日韓自貿(mào)區(qū)談判能夠在嚴(yán)峻的政治環(huán)境下如期啟動(dòng)，但進(jìn)入具體談判階段卻難以取得實(shí)質(zhì)性成果？第二，未來中日韓自貿(mào)區(qū)談判的核心問題及談判推進(jìn)的可能路徑分別是什么？從而，本文以協(xié)調(diào)博弈模型為分析框架，，結(jié)合國(guó)際關(guān)系中絕對(duì)獲益和相對(duì)獲益的理論，把握中日韓自貿(mào)區(qū)談判的博弈邏輯，試圖解釋三國(guó)在自貿(mào)區(qū)談判的兩個(gè)不同階段表現(xiàn)出不同態(tài)度、做出不同戰(zhàn)略選擇的原因，探討推動(dòng)三國(guó)自貿(mào)區(qū)談判的可能路徑。除緒論和結(jié)論外，正文共分為四個(gè)部分： 第一部分，協(xié)調(diào)博弈模型特點(diǎn)與中日韓自貿(mào)區(qū)談判的博弈邏輯。存在多個(gè)對(duì)于整體而言最優(yōu)的納什均衡結(jié)果，參與博弈的各行為主體對(duì)這些結(jié)果有不同的偏好，但合作的結(jié)果總要好于背叛，這是協(xié)調(diào)博弈的突出特點(diǎn)。由內(nèi)生性動(dòng)力和外部壓力共同塑造的合作性預(yù)期和因產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)差異造成的收益分配問題二者并存，構(gòu)成中日韓自貿(mào)區(qū)談判的協(xié)調(diào)博弈邏輯�；�于此，中日韓自貿(mào)區(qū)談判可以被高度抽象為一種協(xié)調(diào)博弈。 第二部分，協(xié)調(diào)博弈中的絕對(duì)獲益與相對(duì)獲益問題。在協(xié)調(diào)博弈中，參與博弈的行為主體既面臨絕對(duì)獲益問題，也面臨相對(duì)獲益問題。對(duì)絕對(duì)獲益的關(guān)注是合作出現(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)，對(duì)收益分配的關(guān)注程度則是合作能否實(shí)現(xiàn)的關(guān)鍵。參與博弈的行為主體對(duì)收益分配的關(guān)注程度并不是先驗(yàn)的，它受事務(wù)領(lǐng)域、行為體數(shù)量、國(guó)家間實(shí)力對(duì)比關(guān)系和國(guó)家間政治關(guān)系等因素的影響。 第三部分，中日韓自貿(mào)區(qū)談判的協(xié)調(diào)博弈分析。運(yùn)用協(xié)調(diào)博弈模型分析，可以看到，在中日韓自貿(mào)區(qū)啟動(dòng)階段，三國(guó)主要關(guān)注絕對(duì)獲益的問題，因此，建立自貿(mào)區(qū)是三方共贏的最優(yōu)戰(zhàn)略。然而，進(jìn)入到具體協(xié)議談判階段，三國(guó)對(duì)相對(duì)獲益的關(guān)注成為重點(diǎn)，日本與中、韓兩國(guó)政治關(guān)系的惡化加強(qiáng)了三國(guó)對(duì)相對(duì)獲益的關(guān)注，使自貿(mào)區(qū)談判難以推進(jìn)。 第四部分，推動(dòng)中日韓自貿(mào)區(qū)談判的可能路徑。在理論上，計(jì)算合作性博弈均衡解，提供強(qiáng)制性領(lǐng)導(dǎo)或塑造非強(qiáng)制性領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力量都是解決協(xié)調(diào)博弈條件下收益分配問題的方案。但對(duì)中日韓自貿(mào)區(qū)談判這一特定問題而言，非強(qiáng)制性的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)均衡是可能的路徑。中日韓三國(guó)可以通過以非強(qiáng)制性領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力量擬定談判議程、塑造共同利益認(rèn)同的方式推動(dòng)三國(guó)自貿(mào)區(qū)談判進(jìn)程。
[Abstract]:In November 20, 2012, Japan and South Korea economic and trade ministers meeting in East Asian leaders during the meeting, announced the official launch of the FTA negotiation. In Japan, South Korea and Japan political relations under the background, it is of great strategic significance to formally start the FTA negotiations, to promote the negotiation process from all walks of life to look forward to. However, to the construction of CJK FTA the specific stage of negotiations is not smooth. For a long time, the political relationship is not stable trilateral cooperation with each other on the issue has been adhering to the "political and economic separation, in order to promote governance through diplomatic logic", before the logic of cooperation with inertia but this has always been difficult to advance in the FTA negotiation process into reality to explain serious difficulties.
The resulting two interrelated negotiations on important issues: first, why Japan and South Korea FTA to Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations on schedule to start in the severe political environment, but in the specific stage of negotiations is difficult to achieve substantive results? Second, what is likely the future path of core issue in Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations and negotiations to promote respectively. Thus, the coordination? Game model as the analytical framework, combined with the absolute benefit in international relations and the relative benefit theory, game logic grasp of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations, trying to explain the three in two different stages of the negotiations showed a different attitude, make strategic choice for different reasons, to explore the possible path to promote the FTA negotiation. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the text is divided into four parts:
The first part of the game logic coordination game model and characteristics of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations. There are many for the overall optimal Nash equilibrium, the subjects involved in the game have different preferences for these results, but the result of cooperation is better than total betrayal, this is a prominent feature of the game. Coordination molded by endogenous motivation and the external pressure of expectations and cooperation due to differences in industrial structure of the income distribution of the two co-exist, constitute the logic of coordination game to Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations. Based on this, Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations can be abstracted as a coordination game.
The second part, the coordination of absolute benefit and relative advantage in the game. In the coordination game, actors involved in the game are both absolute benefit, is also facing the problem of absolute benefit relative benefit. Attention is the basis for cooperation, the degree of concern on the distribution of income is the key to the realization of cooperation behavior participation. Game on the income distribution of the degree of concern is not a priori, it is affected by affairs, behavior body quantity, influence of national strength and national political relations and other factors.
The third part, coordination game analysis of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations. By analysis, the coordination game model can be seen, launched in Japan and South Korea FTA, three main concern of absolute benefit, therefore, the establishment of a free trade area is the best strategy to win three. However, in the specific stage of the negotiation, the relative benefit has become the focus of attention and in Japan, South Korea, the deterioration of political relations between the two countries to strengthen the three on the relative benefit of attention, make the FTA negotiations difficult to advance.
The fourth part, may promote the path of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations. In theory, calculation of cooperative game equilibrium solutions, provide mandatory leadership or leadership are shaping the non mandatory coordination game under the condition of income distribution problem. But the specific problem of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations, leading the equilibrium non mandatory is possible path Japan and South Korea. By non mandatory leadership development agenda, shaping the common interests of the identity of the three countries to promote FTA negotiation process.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F752.7

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