發(fā)布時間：2018-03-21 03:30

  本文選題：中日韓自貿區(qū)談判　切入點：協調博弈　出處：《吉林大學》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：2012年11月20日，中日韓三國經貿部長于東亞領導人系列會議期間舉行會晤，宣布正式啟動三國自貿區(qū)談判。在中日、韓日政治關系陷入僵局的背景下，三國自貿區(qū)談判的正式啟動具有重大戰(zhàn)略意義，也令各界對談判進程的推進十分期待。然而，進入到具體協議談判階段的中日韓自貿區(qū)建設并不順利。長期以來，政治關系并不穩(wěn)定的中日韓三國在彼此間合作問題上一直堅持“政經分離，以經促政”的外交邏輯，但這種具有慣性的合作邏輯在自貿區(qū)談判進程始終難以推進的現實面前陷入了嚴重的解釋困境。 由此產生了關于中日韓自貿區(qū)談判的兩個相互聯系的重要問題：第一，為什么中日韓自貿區(qū)談判能夠在嚴峻的政治環(huán)境下如期啟動，但進入具體談判階段卻難以取得實質性成果？第二，未來中日韓自貿區(qū)談判的核心問題及談判推進的可能路徑分別是什么？從而，本文以協調博弈模型為分析框架，，結合國際關系中絕對獲益和相對獲益的理論，把握中日韓自貿區(qū)談判的博弈邏輯，試圖解釋三國在自貿區(qū)談判的兩個不同階段表現出不同態(tài)度、做出不同戰(zhàn)略選擇的原因，探討推動三國自貿區(qū)談判的可能路徑。除緒論和結論外，正文共分為四個部分： 第一部分，協調博弈模型特點與中日韓自貿區(qū)談判的博弈邏輯。存在多個對于整體而言最優(yōu)的納什均衡結果，參與博弈的各行為主體對這些結果有不同的偏好，但合作的結果總要好于背叛，這是協調博弈的突出特點。由內生性動力和外部壓力共同塑造的合作性預期和因產業(yè)結構差異造成的收益分配問題二者并存，構成中日韓自貿區(qū)談判的協調博弈邏輯�；�于此，中日韓自貿區(qū)談判可以被高度抽象為一種協調博弈。 第二部分，協調博弈中的絕對獲益與相對獲益問題。在協調博弈中，參與博弈的行為主體既面臨絕對獲益問題，也面臨相對獲益問題。對絕對獲益的關注是合作出現的基礎，對收益分配的關注程度則是合作能否實現的關鍵。參與博弈的行為主體對收益分配的關注程度并不是先驗的，它受事務領域、行為體數量、國家間實力對比關系和國家間政治關系等因素的影響。 第三部分，中日韓自貿區(qū)談判的協調博弈分析。運用協調博弈模型分析，可以看到，在中日韓自貿區(qū)啟動階段，三國主要關注絕對獲益的問題，因此，建立自貿區(qū)是三方共贏的最優(yōu)戰(zhàn)略。然而，進入到具體協議談判階段，三國對相對獲益的關注成為重點，日本與中、韓兩國政治關系的惡化加強了三國對相對獲益的關注，使自貿區(qū)談判難以推進。 第四部分，推動中日韓自貿區(qū)談判的可能路徑。在理論上，計算合作性博弈均衡解，提供強制性領導或塑造非強制性領導力量都是解決協調博弈條件下收益分配問題的方案。但對中日韓自貿區(qū)談判這一特定問題而言，非強制性的領導均衡是可能的路徑。中日韓三國可以通過以非強制性領導力量擬定談判議程、塑造共同利益認同的方式推動三國自貿區(qū)談判進程。
[Abstract]:In November 20, 2012, Japan and South Korea economic and trade ministers meeting in East Asian leaders during the meeting, announced the official launch of the FTA negotiation. In Japan, South Korea and Japan political relations under the background, it is of great strategic significance to formally start the FTA negotiations, to promote the negotiation process from all walks of life to look forward to. However, to the construction of CJK FTA the specific stage of negotiations is not smooth. For a long time, the political relationship is not stable trilateral cooperation with each other on the issue has been adhering to the "political and economic separation, in order to promote governance through diplomatic logic", before the logic of cooperation with inertia but this has always been difficult to advance in the FTA negotiation process into reality to explain serious difficulties.
The resulting two interrelated negotiations on important issues: first, why Japan and South Korea FTA to Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations on schedule to start in the severe political environment, but in the specific stage of negotiations is difficult to achieve substantive results? Second, what is likely the future path of core issue in Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations and negotiations to promote respectively. Thus, the coordination? Game model as the analytical framework, combined with the absolute benefit in international relations and the relative benefit theory, game logic grasp of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations, trying to explain the three in two different stages of the negotiations showed a different attitude, make strategic choice for different reasons, to explore the possible path to promote the FTA negotiation. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the text is divided into four parts:
The first part of the game logic coordination game model and characteristics of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations. There are many for the overall optimal Nash equilibrium, the subjects involved in the game have different preferences for these results, but the result of cooperation is better than total betrayal, this is a prominent feature of the game. Coordination molded by endogenous motivation and the external pressure of expectations and cooperation due to differences in industrial structure of the income distribution of the two co-exist, constitute the logic of coordination game to Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations. Based on this, Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations can be abstracted as a coordination game.
The second part, the coordination of absolute benefit and relative advantage in the game. In the coordination game, actors involved in the game are both absolute benefit, is also facing the problem of absolute benefit relative benefit. Attention is the basis for cooperation, the degree of concern on the distribution of income is the key to the realization of cooperation behavior participation. Game on the income distribution of the degree of concern is not a priori, it is affected by affairs, behavior body quantity, influence of national strength and national political relations and other factors.
The third part, coordination game analysis of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations. By analysis, the coordination game model can be seen, launched in Japan and South Korea FTA, three main concern of absolute benefit, therefore, the establishment of a free trade area is the best strategy to win three. However, in the specific stage of the negotiation, the relative benefit has become the focus of attention and in Japan, South Korea, the deterioration of political relations between the two countries to strengthen the three on the relative benefit of attention, make the FTA negotiations difficult to advance.
The fourth part, may promote the path of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations. In theory, calculation of cooperative game equilibrium solutions, provide mandatory leadership or leadership are shaping the non mandatory coordination game under the condition of income distribution problem. But the specific problem of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations, leading the equilibrium non mandatory is possible path Japan and South Korea. By non mandatory leadership development agenda, shaping the common interests of the identity of the three countries to promote FTA negotiation process.

【學位授予單位】：吉林大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F752.7

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 趙長峰;相對獲益與國際合作[J];長白學刊;2004年03期

2 宮占奎;;中日韓自由貿易區(qū)發(fā)展進程分析[J];創(chuàng)新;2011年06期

3 韓彩珍;東北亞合作機制的微觀解釋——從博弈論的角度[J];東北亞論壇;2004年01期

4 李明權;韓春花;;韓國已簽署FTA中的農產品貿易規(guī)則分析[J];東北亞論壇;2010年04期

5 沈銘輝;;中日韓自由貿易區(qū)的經濟學分析[J];國際經濟合作;2011年03期

6 張小濟;區(qū)域經濟一體化的核心——中日韓之間貿易和投資關系[J];國際貿易;2003年01期

7 張建清;熊靈;;中美經貿關系的政治經濟分析[J];國外社會科學;2007年06期

8 于海洋;;自貿區(qū)與政治一體化——中日韓自貿區(qū)的戰(zhàn)略設計及實施[J];東北亞論壇;2011年06期

9 張建肖;;中日韓自貿區(qū)談判的困難與應對[J];國際經濟合作;2013年04期

10 張征;;中日韓經濟合作:TPP既是挑戰(zhàn)也是動力[J];東北亞論壇;2014年02期

本文編號：1642063