發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-25 01:29

  本文選題：舊城再生 + 伙伴關(guān)系　； 參考：《重慶大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：房地產(chǎn)導(dǎo)向的傳統(tǒng)舊城改造雖然對于重塑城市空間、改善硬件設(shè)施、提高土地利用率等方面效果顯著，而且從某種程度上也能促進(jìn)舊城的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長和競爭力提升。但與此同時(shí)，也造成對城市原有文脈、社會網(wǎng)絡(luò)和經(jīng)濟(jì)多樣性的破壞，使處于弱勢的居民從地理、社會心理和利益分享上均遭到排斥和隔離，從而使得舊城改造成為現(xiàn)階段各種社會矛盾的交匯點(diǎn)。對我國舊城改造現(xiàn)狀的剖析，尋找更加合理和可持續(xù)的舊城改造機(jī)制成為一個迫切的問題。 舊城改造是一個復(fù)雜大系統(tǒng)。通過西方國家與我國舊城改造歷程的對比研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，模式改進(jìn)和制度建設(shè)是一個相互作用和不斷修正的過程，應(yīng)綜合考慮二者以構(gòu)建一種新的機(jī)制來解決我國的舊城改造問題。因此，基于多元民主、公共選擇、新公共服務(wù)、治理和機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)等理論基礎(chǔ)和我國舊城改造的現(xiàn)實(shí)需求，本文一方面構(gòu)建了多主體伙伴治理的舊城再生理論框架，利用合作博弈理論對伙伴關(guān)系的合作形成機(jī)理進(jìn)行了探討，設(shè)計(jì)了舊城再生綜合評價(jià)ANP模型以解決項(xiàng)目方案的評價(jià)決策；另一方面，提出了多主體伙伴治理舊城再生的內(nèi)部實(shí)現(xiàn)機(jī)制、多主體參與的制度保障和構(gòu)建服務(wù)型政府等相關(guān)制度建議。 研究的主要創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)如下： ①提出了多主體伙伴治理的舊城再生理論框架。在對其利益相關(guān)者的利益訴求和角色定位剖析的基礎(chǔ)上，對其必要性、本質(zhì)和特點(diǎn)進(jìn)行了深入探討，提出了其組織實(shí)施的關(guān)鍵要素、組織架構(gòu)和治理流程。 ②建立了多主體伙伴治理舊城再生的合作博弈模型以分析伙伴關(guān)系的合作形成機(jī)理。談判集解分析認(rèn)為談判能力越強(qiáng)獲利會越多，而獲利越多則越有維持伙伴合作關(guān)系的動力，因此提出社區(qū)需要以組織而不是個人的形式參與舊城再生；應(yīng)該有專業(yè)的非政府組織加入伙伴關(guān)系以幫助社區(qū)組織和協(xié)調(diào)各參與主體之間的關(guān)系；處于談判強(qiáng)勢的地方政府和開發(fā)商應(yīng)該更加關(guān)注伙伴合作的維護(hù)，并付出一定的代價(jià)用于這種合作維護(hù)，以保障自身長遠(yuǎn)利益的獲取；以及再生方案所體現(xiàn)出的潛在收益是促成各方合作的關(guān)鍵等四個合作形成條件。通過Shapley值分析，提出了理論利益分配模式，指出了現(xiàn)實(shí)利益分配的不合理之處，并對利益分配進(jìn)行了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)修正。通過合作博弈的效用轉(zhuǎn)移分析，，指出在利益分配中應(yīng)遵循從合作中獲益較多的一方應(yīng)對在合作中獲益較少的一方給予一定補(bǔ)償?shù)脑瓌t，以建立一個為各方所接受的利益平衡機(jī)制，從而促成參與各方的伙伴合作。 ③建立了舊城再生綜合評價(jià)ANP模型，將可持續(xù)性、競爭力和文化傳承作為三大準(zhǔn)則納入同一個評價(jià)體系之下，利用非線性規(guī)劃、PS和DEMATEL法對傳統(tǒng)的ANP法進(jìn)行改進(jìn)，并通過算例分析驗(yàn)證了方法的可行性。對比傳統(tǒng)的以投資收益為首要決策因素的項(xiàng)目決策，可發(fā)現(xiàn)本模型具有以下優(yōu)點(diǎn)：克服了單一決策指標(biāo)的不足，使得優(yōu)選的項(xiàng)目方案更能體現(xiàn)社會公平，有利于城市的可持續(xù)發(fā)展；模型考慮了舊城再生所包含要素之間的相互影響關(guān)系，使其更貼近現(xiàn)實(shí)；通過對傳統(tǒng)ANP方法的改進(jìn)，使模型更加科學(xué)合理，在操作上更為簡便和條理清晰。
[Abstract]:The real estate oriented traditional old city reconstruction has a significant effect on the reconstruction of the urban space, the improvement of the hardware facilities and the increase of the land use rate. In some degree, it can also promote the economic growth and competitiveness of the old city. At the same time, it also causes the destruction of the original city's context, social network and economic diversity. The disadvantaged residents have been excluded and isolated from geography, social psychology and benefit sharing, which makes the old city transformation the intersection of various social contradictions at the present stage. It is an urgent problem to find a more reasonable and sustainable old city transformation mechanism to analyze the present situation of the old city transformation in China.
The reconstruction of the old city is a complex and large system. Through the comparative study of the history of the old city transformation between the western countries and our country, it is found that the model improvement and the system construction are a process of interaction and constant revision. The two should be taken into consideration to build a new mechanism to solve the problem of the old city transformation in our country. Therefore, the public selection is based on the pluralistic democracy. Selection, new public service, governance and mechanism design and other theoretical foundations and the actual needs of the old city transformation in China. On the one hand, this paper constructs a theoretical framework for the regeneration of the old city by the multi-agent management, discusses the cooperative formation mechanism of the partnership with the cooperative game theory, and sets up a comprehensive evaluation of the old city regeneration ANP model to solve the project. On the other hand, it puts forward the internal realization mechanism of the multi-agent partners to regenerate the old city, the system guarantee of multi subject participation and the construction of service type government.
The main innovations in the study are as follows:
On the basis of the analysis of the interest demands and role orientation of the stakeholders, the necessity, the essence and the characteristics of its stakeholders are deeply discussed, and the key elements, the organization structure and the management process of the organization are put forward.
Secondly, a cooperative game model of multi-agent partners to regenerate the old city regeneration is set up to analyze the cooperative formation mechanism of the partnership. The negotiation analysis shows that the stronger the negotiation ability is, the more profit will be, and the more profit is the motivation to maintain the partnership relationship. Therefore, it is proposed that the community need to participate in the old city in the form of organization, not individual. Students should have professional non-governmental organizations to join the partnership to help the community organize and coordinate the relationships among the participants; the local governments and developers who are in a strong negotiation should pay more attention to the maintenance of partnership cooperation and pay a certain price to safeguard their long-term interests; and The potential income of the regenerative scheme is the four forming conditions for the cooperation between the parties. Through the Shapley value analysis, the distribution model of theoretical interests is put forward, the irrational distribution of the real interests is pointed out, and the risk correction is corrected. The benefit score is pointed out through the utility transfer analysis of the combined game game. The party should follow the principle that a party benefiting more from the cooperation should give a certain compensation principle to a party who has less benefit in the cooperation in order to establish a mechanism of interest balance accepted by all parties, thus contributing to the partnership of the parties involved.
Thirdly, the ANP model of the comprehensive evaluation of the old city regeneration is set up. Under the same evaluation system, the three main criteria are sustainable, competitive and cultural inheritance, the traditional ANP method is improved by using nonlinear programming, PS and DEMATEL method, and the feasibility of the method is verified by an example analysis. It can be found that this model has the following advantages: overcoming the shortcomings of the single decision index, making the preferred project more able to reflect the social fairness and the sustainable development of the city. The model takes into account the interaction between the elements contained in the old city regeneration, and makes it closer to the reality; through the traditional A The improvement of NP method makes the model more scientific and reasonable, and is more simple and clear in operation.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：TU984.114

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