發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-19 17:26

  本文選題：土地出讓市場(chǎng) + 博弈��； 參考：《陜西師范大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：土地出讓市場(chǎng)作為土地市場(chǎng)的源頭和國家經(jīng)濟(jì)體系的重要組成部分,其運(yùn)行狀況影響整個(gè)國民經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。隨著我國土地出讓制度改革的深入和土地管理體系的日漸完善,土地出讓市場(chǎng)的交易規(guī)則已在全國普遍建立。然而回顧我國土地出讓市場(chǎng)這二十多年的探索與實(shí)踐,制度的合理性一直存在異議。尤其是近幾年,土地出讓市場(chǎng)中各利益集團(tuán)的矛盾和不規(guī)范行為日益嚴(yán)重,當(dāng)國家加大對(duì)房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)宏觀調(diào)控的同時(shí),有關(guān)土地出讓市場(chǎng)的問題與矛盾也成了討論的焦點(diǎn)。因此,針對(duì)目前我國土地出讓市場(chǎng)存在的問題進(jìn)行分析,探討這些問題產(chǎn)生的根源并給出相關(guān)的政策建議,有利于推動(dòng)土地出讓市場(chǎng)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展,實(shí)現(xiàn)土地出讓行為的公平公正,優(yōu)化土地資源配置,最終促進(jìn)整個(gè)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康有序發(fā)展。 本文主要運(yùn)用博弈論分析土地出讓市場(chǎng)中房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商、地方政府和中央政府的行為策略,通過博弈論的應(yīng)用以及博弈模型的構(gòu)建,針對(duì)目前我國土地出讓市場(chǎng)中地價(jià)過高、尋租和串謀現(xiàn)象嚴(yán)重、土地過度開發(fā)利用、中央政府宏觀調(diào)控不利等問題進(jìn)行深入分析,并利用上述分析結(jié)果對(duì)完善我國的土地出讓制度、實(shí)現(xiàn)我國土地出讓市場(chǎng)的健康穩(wěn)定發(fā)展給出相應(yīng)的政策建議�？v觀全文,共包括五部分內(nèi)容： 第一部分,緒論,介紹了本文的研究背景與意義,國內(nèi)外的相關(guān)研究成果,并說明了本文的研究內(nèi)容與技術(shù)路線,研究方法及可能存在的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)。 第二部分,相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ),介紹了我國土地出讓市場(chǎng)的內(nèi)涵、特征以及歷史沿革；博弈論的基本概念及分類,以及運(yùn)用博弈論分析我國土地出讓市場(chǎng)的可行性,為之后的研究做了理論鋪墊。 第三部分,分析了土地出讓過程中地方政府和房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商之間的博弈,通過協(xié)議、招標(biāo)、掛牌、拍賣這四種不同土地出讓方式的博弈分析,得出了協(xié)議出讓方式下地方政府可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生尋租,而市場(chǎng)化手段出讓國有土地使用權(quán)又會(huì)導(dǎo)致房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商集體陷入囚徒困境因而選擇合作和串謀,并具體分析了串謀可以得逞的條件并為規(guī)避串謀行為給出政策建議。 第四部分,分析了政府之間的博弈,首先通過“公共地悲劇”模型的應(yīng)用說明了地方政府之間存在的非合作博弈導(dǎo)致我國土地資源的浪費(fèi)和過度開發(fā),其次分析了中央政府和地方政府的博弈,二者在土地出讓市場(chǎng)的博弈主要表現(xiàn)土地政策調(diào)控和規(guī)避尋租行為兩方面,通分別構(gòu)建非合作博弈模型試圖得出博弈的均衡解以給出相關(guān)政策建議。 第五部分,結(jié)論與展望,通過對(duì)土地出讓市場(chǎng)中各參與者的博弈行為加以總結(jié),給出相關(guān)的政策建議,并對(duì)本文的研究前景進(jìn)行展望。
[Abstract]:As the source of the land market and an important part of the national economic system, the land transfer market affects the development of the whole national economy.With the deepening of the reform of the land transfer system and the improvement of the land management system, the transaction rules of the land transfer market have been established in the whole country.However, after more than 20 years of exploration and practice, the rationality of the system has always been disputed.Especially in recent years, the contradiction and nonstandard behavior of various interest groups in the land transfer market is becoming more and more serious. When the state strengthens the macro regulation and control of the real estate market, the problems and contradictions concerning the land transfer market have also become the focus of discussion.Therefore, in view of the problems existing in the land transfer market of our country at present, the root causes of these problems are discussed and relevant policy suggestions are given, which will help to promote the sustainable development of the land transfer market.To realize the fairness and justice of land transfer, to optimize the allocation of land resources, and finally to promote the healthy and orderly development of the whole society and economy.This paper mainly uses game theory to analyze the behavior strategies of real estate developers, local governments and central government in the land transfer market. Through the application of the game theory and the construction of the game model, the paper aims at the excessive land price in the land transfer market of our country.The phenomenon of rent-seeking and collusion is serious, the land is overdeveloped and utilized, and the central government's macro-control is unfavorable, and the above analysis results are used to perfect the land transfer system of our country.To realize the healthy and stable development of the land transfer market in China, the corresponding policy suggestions are given.Throughout the paper, there are five parts:The first part, introduction, introduces the research background and significance of this paper, the related research results at home and abroad, and explains the research content, technical route, research methods and possible innovation points of this paper.The second part, the related theoretical basis, introduces the connotation, characteristics and historical evolution of China's land transfer market, the basic concept and classification of game theory, and the feasibility of using game theory to analyze the land transfer market in China.For the subsequent research to do the theoretical groundwork.The third part analyzes the game between local governments and real estate developers in the process of land transfer.It is concluded that the local government may generate rent-seeking under the mode of agreement transfer, and the market-oriented means of transferring the right to use state-owned land will lead the real estate developers to fall into the prisoner's dilemma, so they choose to cooperate and collude.The conditions under which collusion can be obtained are analyzed in detail, and some policy suggestions are given for circumventing collusion.In the fourth part, the game between governments is analyzed. Firstly, through the application of the "tragedy of public land" model, the author explains that the non-cooperative game between local governments leads to the waste and over-exploitation of land resources in China.Secondly, the game between central government and local government is analyzed. The game between central government and local government mainly shows land policy regulation and rent-seeking behavior.The non-cooperative game model is constructed separately to obtain the equilibrium solution of the game and give some policy suggestions.The fifth part, conclusions and prospects, through the land transfer market participants in the game behavior to sum up, give the relevant policy recommendations, and the prospect of this paper is prospected.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：陜西師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F301.3;F224.32

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本文編號(hào)：1774030