社會養(yǎng)老保險的道德風(fēng)險及規(guī)避研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-28 12:21
【摘要】：社會養(yǎng)老保險是世界各國社會保障體系的核心內(nèi)容，往往決定著一國社會保障體系建設(shè)的成敗。根據(jù)人力資源和社會保障部統(tǒng)計的數(shù)據(jù)，截至2011年底，我國城鎮(zhèn)職工基本養(yǎng)老保險、新型農(nóng)村社會養(yǎng)老保險、城鎮(zhèn)居民社會養(yǎng)老保險參保人數(shù)共計6.473億人，基金收入18005億元，社會養(yǎng)老保險范圍迅速擴(kuò)大，待遇水平進(jìn)一步提高�？梢娊�(jīng)過20多年的改革，我國社會養(yǎng)老保險改革與制度建設(shè)取得了很大成就，，現(xiàn)行制度惠及越來越多的勞動者與退休人員。但社會養(yǎng)老保險的道德風(fēng)險隨之產(chǎn)生，并伴隨著社會養(yǎng)老保險事業(yè)的發(fā)展而不斷加重、蔓延，其多重破壞性極大地影響了社會養(yǎng)老保險制度的正常運(yùn)作。能否有效規(guī)避社會養(yǎng)老保險領(lǐng)域的道德風(fēng)險，將直接影響我國社會保障事業(yè)的發(fā)展與成敗。 本文從社會養(yǎng)老保險道德風(fēng)險的表現(xiàn)及影響、誘因等角度出發(fā)，理論與實際相結(jié)合，對社會養(yǎng)老保險的道德風(fēng)險及規(guī)避進(jìn)行了研究。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，我國社會養(yǎng)老保險道德風(fēng)險主要體現(xiàn)在相關(guān)利益主體及養(yǎng)老保險金的管理過程中。被保險人、企業(yè)、政府以及代理人的道德風(fēng)險嚴(yán)重侵占了社會養(yǎng)老保險基金，加重了國家的財政負(fù)擔(dān)，違背了誠信原則，破壞了社會公平。通過對社會養(yǎng)老保險道德風(fēng)險表現(xiàn)的分析，可以看出是信息不對稱、人的機(jī)會主義傾向以及社會養(yǎng)老保險體系的不健全導(dǎo)致了社會養(yǎng)老保險道德風(fēng)險。綜合分析社會養(yǎng)老保險道德風(fēng)險的表現(xiàn)及誘因后，易得出規(guī)避道德風(fēng)險的途徑，即建立信息公開化、透明化的社會養(yǎng)老保險運(yùn)行機(jī)制，建立利益激勵和約束機(jī)制，完善社會養(yǎng)老保險體系。規(guī)避、遏制社會養(yǎng)老保險道德風(fēng)險有力地保障了我國社會養(yǎng)老保險基金的安全，減輕了國家的財政負(fù)擔(dān)，有助于促進(jìn)社會公平和諧發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Social old-age insurance is the core content of the social security system in the world, which often determines the success or failure of the construction of a country's social security system. According to statistics from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, by the end of 2011, the total number of urban workers' basic old-age insurance, new rural social old-age insurance and urban residents' social old-age insurance was 647.3 million, and the income of the fund was 1.8005 trillion yuan. The scope of social endowment insurance has expanded rapidly and the level of treatment has been further improved. It can be seen that after more than 20 years of reform, great achievements have been made in the reform and system construction of social old-age insurance in China, and the current system has benefited more and more workers and retirees. However, the moral hazard of the social endowment insurance is produced, and with the development of the social endowment insurance, it is aggravated and spread, which has greatly affected the normal operation of the social pension insurance system. Whether we can effectively avoid the moral hazard in the field of social endowment insurance will directly affect the development and success of social security in China. This paper studies the moral hazard and circumvention of social endowment insurance from the angle of expression and influence of moral hazard and inducement of social endowment insurance, combining theory with practice. It is found that the moral hazard of social endowment insurance in China is mainly reflected in the management process of the relevant stakeholders and pension insurance funds. The moral hazard of the insured, enterprise, government and agent has seriously encroached on the social endowment insurance fund, increased the financial burden of the country, violated the principle of good faith and destroyed the social equity. Through the analysis of the moral hazard of social endowment insurance, we can see that the information asymmetry, the opportunism tendency of human and the unsound social endowment insurance system lead to the moral risk of social endowment insurance. After synthetically analyzing the expression and inducement of moral hazard of social endowment insurance, it is easy to find out the way to avoid moral hazard, that is, to establish the operation mechanism of social endowment insurance with open information, transparent social pension insurance, and interest incentive and restriction mechanism. We will improve the social endowment insurance system. Circumventing and containing the moral hazard of social endowment insurance can ensure the security of social endowment insurance fund, lighten the financial burden of the country, and help to promote the fair and harmonious development of the society.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F842.67
本文編號：2209382
[Abstract]:Social old-age insurance is the core content of the social security system in the world, which often determines the success or failure of the construction of a country's social security system. According to statistics from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, by the end of 2011, the total number of urban workers' basic old-age insurance, new rural social old-age insurance and urban residents' social old-age insurance was 647.3 million, and the income of the fund was 1.8005 trillion yuan. The scope of social endowment insurance has expanded rapidly and the level of treatment has been further improved. It can be seen that after more than 20 years of reform, great achievements have been made in the reform and system construction of social old-age insurance in China, and the current system has benefited more and more workers and retirees. However, the moral hazard of the social endowment insurance is produced, and with the development of the social endowment insurance, it is aggravated and spread, which has greatly affected the normal operation of the social pension insurance system. Whether we can effectively avoid the moral hazard in the field of social endowment insurance will directly affect the development and success of social security in China. This paper studies the moral hazard and circumvention of social endowment insurance from the angle of expression and influence of moral hazard and inducement of social endowment insurance, combining theory with practice. It is found that the moral hazard of social endowment insurance in China is mainly reflected in the management process of the relevant stakeholders and pension insurance funds. The moral hazard of the insured, enterprise, government and agent has seriously encroached on the social endowment insurance fund, increased the financial burden of the country, violated the principle of good faith and destroyed the social equity. Through the analysis of the moral hazard of social endowment insurance, we can see that the information asymmetry, the opportunism tendency of human and the unsound social endowment insurance system lead to the moral risk of social endowment insurance. After synthetically analyzing the expression and inducement of moral hazard of social endowment insurance, it is easy to find out the way to avoid moral hazard, that is, to establish the operation mechanism of social endowment insurance with open information, transparent social pension insurance, and interest incentive and restriction mechanism. We will improve the social endowment insurance system. Circumventing and containing the moral hazard of social endowment insurance can ensure the security of social endowment insurance fund, lighten the financial burden of the country, and help to promote the fair and harmonious development of the society.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F842.67
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前2條
1 鄭功成;;《社會保險法》:我國社會保障法制建設(shè)的里程碑[J];中國勞動;2011年01期
2 郝文清;;道德風(fēng)險的防范與化解[J];社會科學(xué)家;2011年05期
本文編號：2209382
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