【摘要】： 隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的持續(xù)高速增長,企業(yè)廣告投入逐年上升。但是,由于企業(yè)在進(jìn)行廣告決策時(shí)僅從企業(yè)自身角度出發(fā),使得廣告促銷往往不能達(dá)到預(yù)期的效果。因此,企業(yè)制定廣告策略時(shí)應(yīng)該在充分認(rèn)識(shí)廣告對(duì)產(chǎn)品銷售額影響的基本規(guī)律的基礎(chǔ)上,考慮其它市場力量對(duì)實(shí)現(xiàn)本企業(yè)廣告目標(biāo)的影響�；パa(bǔ)品企業(yè)便是一個(gè)影響企業(yè)廣告決策的重要市場力量。由于互補(bǔ)品之間存在的互補(bǔ)性需求關(guān)系使得互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)間的廣告促銷存在一定的溢出效應(yīng),會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)雙方的廣告決策以及廣告促銷投入的預(yù)期收益造成一定的影響,因此,如何在廣告促銷決策中充分考慮互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)間廣告促銷存在的溢出效應(yīng),從而保證企業(yè)的廣告促銷投入能夠有效地增加產(chǎn)品銷量、發(fā)現(xiàn)潛在顧客,進(jìn)一步使企業(yè)在當(dāng)前激烈的競爭環(huán)境中獲得競爭優(yōu)勢,是一個(gè)具有重要理論意義及現(xiàn)實(shí)意義的研究問題。 在國內(nèi)外研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,本文綜合運(yùn)用博弈論和信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等理論對(duì)互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)的廣告決策問題進(jìn)行深入地研究。 首先,針對(duì)企業(yè)為了降低廣告促銷費(fèi)用及風(fēng)險(xiǎn),選擇“搭便車”的方式,利用廣告溢出效應(yīng)從其互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)的廣告促銷中獲得促銷成果,從而損害了企業(yè)廣告投入積極性的現(xiàn)象,研究了互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)間廣告投入決策和價(jià)格決策完全非合作、部分合作和完全合作方式下企業(yè)雙方的最優(yōu)決策,并且考察了不同合作情形下廣告溢出效應(yīng)對(duì)企業(yè)雙方的廣告促銷投入和收益的影響作用,對(duì)企業(yè)通過廣告促銷獲得的收益進(jìn)行了對(duì)比分析,并在上述研究基礎(chǔ)上,提出了互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)合作廣告的實(shí)施策略。 其次,針對(duì)互補(bǔ)品需求關(guān)聯(lián)性造成互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)廣告促銷存在溢出效應(yīng)的現(xiàn)象,構(gòu)建了基于廣告分擔(dān)率的互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)合作廣告博弈模型,研究了斯坦克爾伯格博弈和納什合作博弈兩種合作情形下互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)雙方的最優(yōu)廣告決策、最優(yōu)廣告分擔(dān)率、最優(yōu)收益以及互補(bǔ)品銷售系統(tǒng)的最優(yōu)收益,對(duì)比分析了不同合作形式下的均衡結(jié)果,進(jìn)一步論證了納什合作博弈均衡具有帕累托優(yōu)勢,并在此基礎(chǔ)上利用魯賓斯坦恩——斯塔爾討價(jià)還價(jià)模型對(duì)增加的收益進(jìn)行了分配,得到了一種帕累托最優(yōu)合作廣告方案,實(shí)現(xiàn)了互補(bǔ)品銷售系統(tǒng)的協(xié)調(diào)。 再次,考慮到不對(duì)稱信息下具有需求信息優(yōu)勢的企業(yè)利用擁有的信息優(yōu)勢,將廣告投入作為市場需求的信號(hào),有選擇地向其互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)傳遞需求信息,以刺激其互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)增加廣告投入的問題,建立了考慮溢出效應(yīng)的互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)廣告決策的信號(hào)博弈模型,得到了分離均衡和混同均衡的存在條件,并對(duì)不同均衡狀態(tài)下企業(yè)雙方的最優(yōu)廣告決策和最優(yōu)收益進(jìn)行了分析。在此基礎(chǔ)上,進(jìn)一步討論了互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)雙方的廣告策略選擇問題。 最后,針對(duì)不對(duì)稱信息下互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)合作廣告中具有信息優(yōu)勢的企業(yè)的理性背叛行為,分析了互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)基于廣告分擔(dān)率的合作廣告關(guān)系中逆向選擇的發(fā)生條件;從互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)中不具有需求信息優(yōu)勢企業(yè)的視角,采用機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論和顯示原理構(gòu)建了該企業(yè)如何誘導(dǎo)其互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)報(bào)告自己真實(shí)需求信息的逆向選擇模型,設(shè)計(jì)了逆向選擇條件下考慮溢出效應(yīng)的互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)最優(yōu)合作廣告合約。結(jié)果表明,該合約能夠達(dá)到誘導(dǎo)具有信息優(yōu)勢的企業(yè)講真話的目的,由此保證互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)基于廣告分擔(dān)率的合作廣告關(guān)系的建立,解決互補(bǔ)品企業(yè)合作廣告中產(chǎn)生的逆向選擇問題。
[Abstract]:With the sustained high-speed growth of economy, the enterprise advertisement investment rises year by year. However, because the enterprise only starts from the enterprise's own perspective when making the advertisement decision, the advertisement promotion can not achieve the expected effect. Therefore, when the enterprise formulates the advertising strategy, it should take into account the influence of other market forces on the realization of the advertising target of the enterprise on the basis of fully understanding the basic law of the impact of the advertisement on the sales of the product. Complementary enterprise is an important market force that affects enterprise advertisement decision-making. Due to the complementary demand relationship between complementary products, the advertisement promotion among complementary products has a certain spillover effect, which has a certain influence on the advertisement decision of both parties and the expected income of advertisement promotion input, therefore, How to take full consideration of the spillover effect of advertisement promotion among complementary enterprises in the decision of advertisement promotion, so as to ensure that the advertisement promotion input of the enterprise can effectively increase the sales of the products, find the potential customers, and further enable enterprises to gain the competitive advantage in the current fierce competition environment, It is a research problem with important theoretical significance and practical significance. Based on the research results at home and abroad, this paper applies the theory of game theory and information economics to deeply analyze the advertising decision-making problems of complementary enterprises. Firstly, in order to reduce the cost and risk of advertising, select the mode of 鈥渉itchhiker鈥，

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