發(fā)布時間：2018-06-22 13:48

  本文選題：農(nóng)地金融制度 + 政策性擔(dān)保��； 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2016年博士論文

【摘要】：隨著我國城鎮(zhèn)化程度的不斷提高和農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營方式正在由家庭經(jīng)營向規(guī)模經(jīng)營轉(zhuǎn)變,迫切需要與之相適應(yīng)的農(nóng)村金融體系�，F(xiàn)行農(nóng)地金融制度在滿足規(guī)模經(jīng)營主體的融資需求方面,受到諸多條件的制約。近年來多地對利用政策性擔(dān)保措施促進(jìn)農(nóng)地經(jīng)營權(quán)抵押貸款進(jìn)行了探索,2015年農(nóng)業(yè)政策性信貸體系更被國家層面作為破解三農(nóng)發(fā)展中“融資難”問題的措施而提出。既有的相關(guān)研究對政策性擔(dān)保生效的具體機(jī)制研究尚不夠充分,本文重點(diǎn)研究了在我國特殊的農(nóng)地金融制度約束下政策性擔(dān)保機(jī)制如何生效這一問題,因此具有較強(qiáng)的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義和一定的理論價值。本文分析的理論基礎(chǔ)是融資能力理論。該理論的核心觀點(diǎn)是擔(dān)保合約通過影響信貸合約中借款人的激勵相容條件和貸款人的參與約束以提高借款人的融資能力。該能力通過擔(dān)保合約達(dá)成時借款人需要滿足的最低擔(dān)保品要求來衡量。文章以最低擔(dān)保品決定的“金融機(jī)構(gòu)-企業(yè)”兩部門分析框架為基礎(chǔ)開展理論分析。本文分析的現(xiàn)實(shí)基礎(chǔ)是我國特殊的農(nóng)地金融制度。文章歸納出政策性擔(dān)保機(jī)制面臨的三個主要約束：擔(dān)保品價值約束、交易成本約束和政府干預(yù)約束。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文重點(diǎn)分析了農(nóng)地金融制度中的政策性擔(dān)保增信激勵機(jī)制和風(fēng)險分擔(dān)機(jī)制。理論分析層面,以兩部門模型為基礎(chǔ),引入政策性擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu),創(chuàng)新性地構(gòu)建了包含“金融機(jī)構(gòu)-企業(yè)-政府”的最低擔(dān)保品決定三部門模型。同時結(jié)合現(xiàn)實(shí)基礎(chǔ),將擔(dān)保品處置成本作為假設(shè)條件納入模型框架。實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)層面,選取國內(nèi)較為典型的山東棗莊農(nóng)地金融改革案例進(jìn)行了案例分析和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),以期與理論分析結(jié)論互相驗(yàn)證。具體內(nèi)容包括：政策性擔(dān)保增信激勵機(jī)制的分析。該機(jī)制是指政策性擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)通過補(bǔ)充借款人擔(dān)保品價值和降低貸款人擔(dān)保品處置成本途徑來實(shí)現(xiàn)增信目標(biāo)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),政策性擔(dān)�？梢越档唾J款人參與約束進(jìn)而提高借款人融資能力。擔(dān)保品處置成本越高(變現(xiàn)率越低),政策性擔(dān)保的增信效果越強(qiáng),而借款人意愿接受的擔(dān)保費(fèi)率越低。政策性擔(dān)保風(fēng)險分擔(dān)機(jī)制的分析。該機(jī)制是指政策性擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)通過分擔(dān)借貸雙方的項(xiàng)目失敗風(fēng)險和擔(dān)保品處置風(fēng)險來實(shí)現(xiàn)其政策目標(biāo)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),政策性擔(dān)�？梢蕴岣哔J款人在項(xiàng)目失敗時的收入并降低其擔(dān)保品處置風(fēng)險,從而降低貸款人在信貸活動中的風(fēng)險分擔(dān),激勵其發(fā)放貸款。但是借款人和政策性擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)的總風(fēng)險分擔(dān)較附加政策性擔(dān)保合約前有所增加。同時,政策性擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)的經(jīng)營目標(biāo)選擇對風(fēng)險分擔(dān)機(jī)制效果起到直接的影響。棗莊市農(nóng)地金融改革案例的分析。該案例是以政策性擔(dān)保機(jī)制促進(jìn)農(nóng)地經(jīng)營權(quán)抵押貸款發(fā)放的典型案例。案例分析發(fā)現(xiàn),政策性擔(dān)保措施是增加農(nóng)地抵押貸款供給的一個重要途徑,可使獲得擔(dān)保的借款人融資能力得到顯著提高,貸款人的貸款意愿也因風(fēng)險分擔(dān)程度降低而提高。以棗莊市230家申請政策性擔(dān)保的農(nóng)地規(guī)模經(jīng)營合作社為樣本,進(jìn)行Logit檢驗(yàn)的結(jié)果亦支持了理論分析的結(jié)論。在上述研究的基礎(chǔ)上,得出全文結(jié)論：在我國農(nóng)地金融制度框架內(nèi),政策性擔(dān)保機(jī)制確有存在和發(fā)展的必要；政策性擔(dān)保機(jī)制從多個途徑影響政策性目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn),應(yīng)綜合考慮其政策效果；政策性擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)的經(jīng)營目標(biāo)對于政策性目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn)起著重要的作用。據(jù)此提出了積極發(fā)揮政策性擔(dān)保的增信激勵作用、合理確定政策性擔(dān)保在農(nóng)地金融活動中的風(fēng)險分擔(dān)、科學(xué)設(shè)定政策性擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)經(jīng)營目標(biāo)等政策建議。本文創(chuàng)新性地構(gòu)建了政策性擔(dān)保的“金融機(jī)構(gòu)-企業(yè)-政府”三部門分析框架,結(jié)合我國特殊國情系統(tǒng)分析了政策性擔(dān)保的增信激勵和風(fēng)險分擔(dān)機(jī)制的作用途徑,有助于更深入理解不同條件下政策性擔(dān)保的有效性及作用機(jī)制,從而為優(yōu)化政策性擔(dān)保支農(nóng)政策提供借鑒。受限于知識和資料的不足,分析對象局限于1984年確立農(nóng)地國家和集體所有制之后,未能從更遠(yuǎn)的歷史角度進(jìn)行分析；受限于農(nóng)地金融改革的區(qū)域分割現(xiàn)象,實(shí)證研究僅采用東部地級市棗莊市的案例及數(shù)據(jù),未能以多個試點(diǎn)區(qū)域資料相互印證。后續(xù)的研究工作中將嘗試對上述問題進(jìn)行深入的探討。
[Abstract]:With the continuous improvement of urbanization and the development of rural economy in China, the mode of agricultural production and management is changing from family management to scale management. It is urgently needed to adapt to the rural financial system. The current agricultural land financial system has been restricted by many conditions in meeting the financing needs of the main body of scale management. This paper probes into the use of policy guarantee measures to promote the mortgage of farmland management rights. In 2015, the agricultural policy credit system was put forward by the national level as a measure to solve the "financing difficulty" in the development of the three rural areas. The research on the specific mechanism of the effective policy guarantee is not sufficient. It is of great practical significance and a certain theoretical value that the policy guarantee mechanism is effective under the restriction of the special agricultural land financial system in China. Therefore, the theoretical basis of this paper is the theory of financing ability. The core point of this theory is that the guarantee contract can affect the incentive compatibility conditions of the borrowers in the credit contract. And the borrower's participation constraints to improve the borrower's financing capacity. This ability is measured by the minimum guarantee requirements that the borrower needs to meet when the guarantee contract is reached. The article is based on the theoretical analysis based on the "financial institutions - enterprise" two sector analysis framework determined by the minimum collateral. There are three main constraints in the policy guarantee mechanism: the value constraint of the guaranty, the transaction cost constraint and the government intervention. On this basis, this paper focuses on the analysis of the incentive mechanism and risk sharing mechanism of policy guarantee in the agricultural land financial system. The theoretical analysis level is two parts. On the basis of the door model, the policy guarantee institution is introduced, and the three sector model of the minimum guarantee, which includes "financial institutions - the government", is innovatively constructed. At the same time, combining the realistic basis, the cost of the guarantee is taken as a hypothesis to be incorporated into the model framework. The empirical test layer is used to select the typical Shandong Zaozhuang agricultural land gold. The case analysis and empirical test are carried out in order to verify each other with the theoretical analysis. The specific content includes: the analysis of the incentive mechanism of policy guarantee. This mechanism refers to the goal of increasing credit by the policy guarantee institution by supplementing the value of the borrower's guarantee and reducing the cost way of the lender's guarantee. It is found that the policy guarantee can reduce the loan ginseng and the constraint to improve the borrower's financing ability. The higher the cost of the guarantee (the lower the rate of cash), the stronger the effect of the policy guarantee, the lower the guarantee rate accepted by the borrower. The analysis of the risk sharing mechanism of the policy guarantee. This mechanism refers to the policy guarantee institution. It is found that policy guarantee can improve the borrower's income in the event of failure and reduce the risk of disposing of its collateral, thus reducing the lender's risk sharing in the credit activities and encouraging the loan. The total risk sharing of the policy guarantee institution has increased before the additional policy guarantee contract. At the same time, the choice of the operating target of the policy guarantee institution has a direct effect on the effect of the risk sharing mechanism. The case of the rural land financial reform in Zaozhuang. The case analysis shows that the policy guarantee measures are an important way to increase the supply of rural land mortgage loans, which can improve the financing ability of the borrowers who are secured, and the lender's loan intention is also improved because of the reduction of the risk sharing degree. The scale management of the farmland in Zaozhuang is 230 applications for policy guarantee. As a sample, the results of the Logit test also support the conclusion of the theoretical analysis. On the basis of the above study, the conclusion is drawn: in the framework of the agricultural land financial system in China, the policy guarantee mechanism does exist and develop, and the policy guarantee mechanism should take a comprehensive examination of the realization of the policy target from many ways. Considering the effect of its policy, the management target of the policy guarantee institution plays an important role in the realization of the policy goal. Accordingly, it puts forward the incentive effect of increasing the credit of policy guarantee, rationally determining the risk sharing of the policy guarantee in the agricultural and financial activities, and setting up the policy of the policy oriented guarantee institution to establish the policy. This paper constructs the three sector analysis framework of "financial institutions - the government - government" of policy guarantee, and analyzes the ways of the incentive and risk sharing mechanism of policy guarantee in combination with China's special national conditions system, which will help to understand the effectiveness and mechanism of the policy guarantee under different conditions, so as to further understand the effectiveness and mechanism of the policy guarantee under different conditions. In order to optimize the policy of policy guarantee supporting agriculture, it is limited to the shortage of knowledge and information. The analysis object is limited to the establishment of land state and collective ownership in 1984, and can not be analyzed from a further historical point of view. Limited to the regional segmentation phenomenon of agricultural and land financial reform, the empirical study only adopts the case of Zaozhuang in the eastern prefecture level city. Examples and data failed to confirm each other in multiple pilot areas. Further studies will be conducted to explore these issues.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F832.4

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