根據(jù)委托代理理論,所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)分離會(huì)導(dǎo)致經(jīng)營(yíng)者為追求自身利益的最大化而犧牲所有者權(quán)益,從而呈現(xiàn)機(jī)會(huì)主義的行為傾向(詹森,梅克林,1976)。而這種機(jī)會(huì)主義行為給管理者提供了操縱公司財(cái)政信息的機(jī)會(huì),由此謀取個(gè)人利益。為了保護(hù)利益相關(guān)者的權(quán)益,建立能夠有效控制財(cái)務(wù)信息不對(duì)稱問(wèn)題的公司治理機(jī)制顯得至關(guān)重要。因此,國(guó)際上興起了建立與實(shí)施有效的公司治理機(jī)制的熱潮,以遏制管理者的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為,進(jìn)而完善財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告披露。本文以與英美國(guó)家制度、法律方面顯著不同的中國(guó)為研究對(duì)象,檢驗(yàn)深滬兩市上市公司的公司治理特征對(duì)盈余管理的抑制效果。通過(guò)廣泛的考察中國(guó)公司治理體系的制度、法律及法規(guī),有助于了解中國(guó)公司治理的發(fā)展進(jìn)程以及未來(lái)改革的主要目標(biāo)。中國(guó)有大量的文獻(xiàn)對(duì)公司治理在限制盈余管理方面體現(xiàn)的監(jiān)控作用進(jìn)行了研究,研究結(jié)論證實(shí)了中國(guó)確實(shí)存在嚴(yán)重的盈余管理(例如,阿哈龍尼等,2000；陳和袁,2004)。中國(guó)上市公司進(jìn)行盈余管理的主要目的是為了發(fā)行新股份或避免被摘牌。本文用異常的營(yíng)運(yùn)資金應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目作為盈余管理的代理變量,用修正的瓊斯模型來(lái)計(jì)算操控性應(yīng)計(jì),以2002-2006年4年間1009家上市公司為樣本進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究...

【文章頁(yè)數(shù)】：141 頁(yè)

【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士

【文章目錄】：
摘要
Abstract
Table of Contents
List of Tables
List of Figures
1 Introduction
    1.1 Motivation and Objectives of the study
    1.2 Findings of the Study
    1.3 Practical importance of the study
    1.4 Uniqueness of the study
    1.5 Structure of the dissertation
2 Review of Literature
    2.1 Earnings Management
    2.2 Corporate Governance
    2.3 Corporate Governance in China
        2.3.1 Introduction
        2.3.2 Agency problems in China
        2.3.3 Development Phases
        2.3.4 External Control Environment
        2.3.5 Internal Control Structure
    2.4 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management
        2.4.1 Board Composition
        2.4.2 CEO Duality
        2.4.3 Board Size
        2.4.4 Number of Board Meetings
        2.4.5 Managerial Share Ownership
        2.4.6 Gender-Based Difference
        2.4.7 Audit Committee
        2.4.8 Concentrated Ownership
3 Data, Variables and Research Methodology
    3.1 Data Description
    3.2 Research Questions
    3.3 Research Hypotheses
    3.4 Research Variable Conceptual and Operational Definitions
    3.5 Validity and Reliability
    3.6 Data Analysis Methodology
    3.7 Assumptions
    3.8 Limitations
4 Empirical Results
    4.1 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in All Chinese Listed Firms (Shanghai & Shenzhen stock exchange)
    4.2 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Shanghai Stock Exchange Listed Firms in China
    4.3 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Shenzhen Stock Exchange Listed Firms in China
    4.4 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in State Owned Enterprises in China
    4.5 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Private Enterprises in China
5 Discussion on Empirical Results
    5.1 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in All Chinese Listed Firms (Shanghai & Shenzhen stock exchange)
    5.2 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Shanghai Stock Exchange Listed Firms in China
    5.3 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Shenzhen Stock Exchange Listed Firms in China
    5.4 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in State Owned Enterprises in China
    5.5 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Private Enterprises in China
6 Summary and Conclusions
Acknowledgement
References
Publications



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