本文選題：證券市場 + 上市公司　； 參考：《南京理工大學》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：我國上市公司一方面熱衷于股權融資卻不知給投資者回報；另一方面會計信息嚴重失真。這一千夫所指的現(xiàn)象與會計尋租緊密相關。本文系統(tǒng)地研究了我國上市公司在股權融資過程中的會計尋租行為,期望能為我國股票發(fā)行制度改革與會計制度創(chuàng)新,以及會計尋租理論體系的建立提供有價值的研究成果。 論文運用尋租理論和證券市場股權融資與會計的關系理論,并采用規(guī)范研究和實證研究相結合的方法展開研究。 首先,基于現(xiàn)有會計尋租理論很不成熟的現(xiàn)實,按照尋租理論的核心思想,結合會計實務特點,清晰地界定了會計尋租的內(nèi)涵及研究范疇,提出了會計尋租理論體系的基本結構和會計尋租研究四要素,構建了會計尋租的分析框架。 其次,探討了股權融資會計尋租的性質(zhì)。主要包括二個方面：一是構建了股權融資會計尋租租金的計量模型；二是構建相關計量模型,分析了股權融資會計尋租的社會成本構成和福利效應。認為政府退出股權融資環(huán)節(jié),股權融資市場化,是我國證券市場改革的必然趨勢。 第三,分析了股權融資會計尋租的主體及其協(xié)同效應。股權融資會計尋租的主體由控股股東、公司高管、相關中介機構和政府有關部門組成。上市公司的控制權是股權融資尋租主體協(xié)同尋租的基礎。如果是在制度范圍內(nèi)尋租,由于不至于遭到刑事處罰,尋租主體很容易協(xié)同；如果要進行違規(guī)性尋租,尋租主體是否協(xié)同則取決于處罰制度的嚴厲程度。完善上市公司和中介機構的內(nèi)部控制是遏制協(xié)同尋租的關鍵。 第四,分析了會計尋租的制度機制。從我國股權融資有關的會計制度產(chǎn)生、發(fā)展的歷史過程來看,政府整體上表現(xiàn)出“從有意創(chuàng)租到無意創(chuàng)租”的規(guī)律。在會計制度制定民主化、會計信息使用市場化、司法救濟等方面還要深化改革。 第五,研究了股權融資會計尋租方法及其基本特征。在股權分置改革以前,上市公司存在一條“大股東向上市公司進行利益輸送——上市公司股權融資——上市公司向大股東進行利益輸送”的可以重復尋租的無法律風險通道。在股權分置改革時,案例分析顯示,從最終租金獲取程度來看,擁有信息優(yōu)勢的非流通股股東是最大的贏家,禁售股解禁會導致非流通股股東延伸會計尋租。股權分置改革后,上市公司的股權整體上處于全流通狀態(tài),實證研究表明：盡管股權融資制度環(huán)境有了質(zhì)的變化,但股權融資會計尋租仍在進行,操縱往來賬是主要手段(雖然不是唯一手段),且更加隱蔽；全流通時代機構投資者有與大股東一同尋租的動力；配股有消退的跡象；獨立董事對于抑制尋租作用不大。因此完善關聯(lián)交易制度,揭露關聯(lián)交易非關聯(lián)化,提高獨立董事比例,實行優(yōu)先股制度等措施有利于抑制上市公司會計尋租。根據(jù)會計的基本原理,基于對會計實務的研究,從凈利潤、凈資產(chǎn)、凈現(xiàn)金流和會計信息披露四個方面總結了股權融資違規(guī)性會計尋租的一般規(guī)律和15種比較隱秘的違規(guī)性尋租手段。具體的案例分析表明,違規(guī)性尋租上市采取的手段符合上述規(guī)律,且其社會成本巨大。因此,實行舞弊導向?qū)徲?或鑒證)模式,并加大上市公司高管和中介責任,完善退市制度,實行嚴刑峻法,才可有效遏制這種惡意尋租行為。
[Abstract]:China ' s listed companies are keen on equity financing but do not know the return of investors ;
On the other hand , accounting information is seriously distorted . This phenomenon is closely related to accounting rent - seeking . This paper systematically studies the accounting rent - seeking behavior of listed companies in the course of equity financing , and expects to provide valuable research results for China ' s stock issuance system reform and accounting system innovation , as well as the establishment of accounting rent seeking theory system .

The paper uses the theory of rent - seeking theory and the relation theory of equity financing and accounting in stock market , and adopts the method of normative research and empirical research to carry out the research .

First , based on the reality that the existing accounting rent seeking theory is very immature , according to the core idea of the rent seeking theory and the characteristics of the accounting practice , the connotation and the research scope of the accounting rent seeking are clearly defined , the basic structure of the accounting rent seeking theory system and the four elements of the accounting rent seeking research are put forward , and the analysis framework of the accounting rent seeking is constructed .

Secondly , the nature of the rent - seeking of equity financing is discussed , which mainly includes two aspects : one is the model of the rent - seeking rent of equity financing ;
The second is to build the relevant measurement model , and analyze the social cost composition and welfare effect of the equity financing accounting rent seeking . It is considered that the government exits the equity financing link , and the equity financing is the inevitable trend of the reform of the securities market in China .

Thirdly , the main body of the equity financing accounting rent - seeking is analyzed . The main body of the equity financing accounting rent - seeking is composed of the controlling shareholder , the executive branch of the company , the relevant intermediary and the relevant government departments . The control right of the listed company is the basis of the cooperative rent - seeking of the equity financing rent - seeking main body .
If the rent - seeking is to be carried out , whether the rent - seeking main body is in coordination depends on the severity of the penalty system , and the internal control of the listed company and the intermediary institution is the key to curb the cooperative rent - seeking .

Fourth , the system mechanism of accounting rent seeking is analyzed . From the historical process of the development of accounting system related to equity financing in our country , the government has shown the law of " deliberately creating the rent from intention to create the rent " . In the accounting system , democratization , the use of accounting information and the judicial relief should be further reformed .

Fifth , the method and basic characteristics of equity financing accounting rent - seeking are studied . Before the reform of stock rights , the listed company has a non - legal risk channel which can repeat the rent - seeking for the interest delivery of listed companies to listed companies . In the case analysis , the stock rights of listed companies are the biggest winners . After the reform of stock rights , the stock rights of listed companies are in the whole circulation state .
The institutional investors in the all - circulation era have the power to rent the rent with the big shareholders ;
There are signs of regression of the shares ;
According to the basic principle of accounting , this paper sums up the general rule of accounting rent - seeking and 15 kinds of illegal rent - seeking methods . According to the basic principle of accounting , this paper sums up the general rule of the non - compliance accounting rent - seeking and the 15 kinds of comparative hidden rent - seeking methods .
【學位授予單位】：南京理工大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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