本文選題：政府主導(dǎo) + 責(zé)任分擔(dān)��； 參考：《中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：全國多個地區(qū)霧霾天氣頻發(fā)，激起了人們對于自然環(huán)境污染日益嚴(yán)重的激烈討論，工業(yè)生產(chǎn)污染和重金屬污染是導(dǎo)致這一現(xiàn)象的重要原因之一，而廢舊電器電子產(chǎn)品的污染占據(jù)了其重要位置；近年來，，關(guān)于廢棄電器電子產(chǎn)品的回收與再制造問題受到了政府部門、環(huán)保主義者等的密切關(guān)注，因此優(yōu)化和調(diào)整我國現(xiàn)有不規(guī)范的廢舊電器電子產(chǎn)品回收再制造的方法與途徑的問題亟待解決。由此，研究的重點由傳統(tǒng)的正向供應(yīng)鏈演變?yōu)槟嫦蚬⿷?yīng)鏈或閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈，政府成為了閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的主導(dǎo)者，協(xié)調(diào)和發(fā)展閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的關(guān)鍵，其主導(dǎo)權(quán)決定了閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中其他成員的決策結(jié)果以及參與回收制造商的積極性。 本文運用運籌學(xué)、博弈論、最優(yōu)化等理論和方法等對獎懲機制下制造商主導(dǎo)或政府主導(dǎo)的廢棄電器電子產(chǎn)品閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的決策進行了研究。依據(jù)市場中制造商的個數(shù)，分別以價格決策和產(chǎn)量決策構(gòu)建模型。本文建立了制造商主導(dǎo)和政府主導(dǎo)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈時制造商雙寡頭競爭模型、政府主導(dǎo)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈時有無責(zé)任分擔(dān)的n個制造商競爭模型，其中政府主導(dǎo)雙寡頭競爭的模型考慮了環(huán)境效益型、企業(yè)收益型和全社會利益型三種政府收益函數(shù)組成方式。通過對4個模型的求解和比較分析得到如下結(jié)論：獎懲機制能夠有效的提高閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的回收率和其成員的收益值；在價格、回收率和收益值方面，政府主導(dǎo)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的形式優(yōu)于制造商主導(dǎo)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的形式，全社會利益型政府收益函數(shù)的組成形式優(yōu)于環(huán)境效益型和企業(yè)收益型；責(zé)任分擔(dān)系數(shù)和市場中同質(zhì)制造商的個數(shù)對于政府是否實施制造商和零售商共同承擔(dān)獎懲值具有決定性的影響；獎懲機制對于市場主導(dǎo)者的制造商、零售商和第三方回收商具有保護性，而對于市場追隨者的制造商的保護則是具有條件性的。
[Abstract]:The frequent occurrence of haze weather in many regions of the country has aroused a heated discussion on the increasingly serious pollution of the natural environment. Industrial production pollution and heavy metal pollution are one of the important reasons leading to this phenomenon. The pollution of waste electrical and electronic products occupies an important position. In recent years, the issue of recycling and remanufacturing of waste electrical and electronic products has received close attention from government departments, environmentalists, etc. Therefore, the problem of how to optimize and adjust the methods and approaches of recycling and remanufacturing of non-standard waste electrical and electronic products in our country is urgently needed to be solved. Therefore, the focus of the research has changed from the traditional forward supply chain to the reverse supply chain or closed-loop supply chain, and the government has become the leader of the closed-loop supply chain, and the key to coordinate and develop the closed-loop supply chain is to coordinate and develop the closed-loop supply chain. Its leading power determines the decision result of other members in the closed-loop supply chain and the enthusiasm of participating in the recycling manufacturer. Based on the theories and methods of operational research, game theory and optimization, this paper studies the decision of closed-loop supply chain of waste electrical and electronic products under the mechanism of reward and punishment. According to the number of manufacturers in the market, the model is constructed by price decision and output decision respectively. In this paper, a manufacturer duopoly competition model is established when the manufacturer leads the closed-loop supply chain and the government leads the closed-loop supply chain. When the government leads the closed-loop supply chain, there are n manufacturers' competition models with or without responsibility sharing. The model of government-led duopoly competition includes three kinds of government revenue function: environmental benefit model, enterprise income model and whole society benefit model. The conclusions are as follows: the mechanism of reward and punishment can effectively improve the recovery rate of the closed-loop supply chain and the income value of its members, in terms of price, recovery rate and income value, the mechanism of reward and punishment can effectively improve the recovery rate of the closed-loop supply chain and the income value of its members. The form of government-led closed-loop supply chain is better than that of manufacturer dominated closed-loop supply chain, and the composition of the whole social benefit government income function is superior to that of environmental benefit and enterprise income. The coefficient of responsibility sharing and the number of homogeneous manufacturers in the market have a decisive effect on whether the government implements the joint payment of rewards and penalties between the manufacturer and the retailer, and the mechanism of rewards and penalties for the manufacturers of the market leader. Retailers and third-party recyclers are protected, while manufacturers of market followers are protected conditionally.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F426.6;F713.2;F224

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