本文選題：管理層激勵(lì) + 股利政策��； 參考：《大連理工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文以上市公司的股利政策決策為落腳點(diǎn),從提高公司治理效率,減少代理成本的角度,依據(jù)已有的委托代理理論、剩余控制權(quán)理論等,考察管理層激勵(lì)對(duì)上市公司股利政策的影響,從而為規(guī)范上市公司的股利發(fā)放提供理論參考。 本文通過把內(nèi)部激勵(lì)和外部激勵(lì)納入到管理層激勵(lì)分析框架內(nèi),對(duì)管理層內(nèi)部激勵(lì)和外部激勵(lì)影響上市公司股利政策的機(jī)理進(jìn)行分析,并提出研究假設(shè)；然后,以2006-2011年間中國制造業(yè)上市公司為樣本,從股利支付意愿、總體股利支付水平及現(xiàn)金股利支付水平三個(gè)方面分別考察了管理層內(nèi)部激勵(lì)和外部激勵(lì)對(duì)中國上市公司股利政策的影響,并比較了二者關(guān)系的行業(yè)差異。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)管理層內(nèi)部激勵(lì)中,薪酬激勵(lì)的作用較小,股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)股利政策的正向影響最為顯著,控制權(quán)激勵(lì)中董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理兩職合一和董事長(zhǎng)的更替往往有利于中國上市公司的股利發(fā)放；(2)管理層外部激勵(lì)中,來自資本市場(chǎng)的壓力對(duì)上市公司的股利政策產(chǎn)生積極的影響,而來自產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)的壓力則呈現(xiàn)負(fù)面效應(yīng)或效果不顯著。(3)管理層內(nèi)部激勵(lì)和外部激勵(lì)對(duì)上市公司股利政策的影響效果存在行業(yè)差異。高技術(shù)行業(yè)中,內(nèi)部激勵(lì)和外部激勵(lì)都存在影響,且外部激勵(lì)的影響效果較為顯著；而低技術(shù)行業(yè)中,主要是內(nèi)部激勵(lì)發(fā)揮作用。在此基礎(chǔ)上提出了完善中國上市公司股利政策的建議。
[Abstract]:This article takes the dividend policy decision of listed company as the foothold, from the angle of improving the efficiency of corporate governance and reducing agency cost, according to the existing principal-agent theory, residual control theory, etc. This paper investigates the influence of management incentive on dividend policy of listed companies and provides a theoretical reference for regulating dividend payment of listed companies. In this paper, the internal and external incentives are incorporated into the framework of management incentive analysis, and the mechanism of internal and external incentives affecting dividend policy of listed companies is analyzed, and the research hypotheses are put forward. Taking the listed manufacturing companies in China from 2006-2011 as a sample, the willingness to pay dividends from dividends, The overall dividend payment level and the cash dividend payment level respectively examined the impact of internal and external incentives on the dividend policy of listed companies in China and compared the industry differences between the two. The results show that: (1) in the internal incentive of management, the role of compensation incentive is relatively small, and the positive impact of equity incentive on dividend policy is the most significant. In the incentive of control right, the combination of chairman and general manager and the replacement of chairman are often beneficial to the dividend payment of listed companies in China; (2) in the external incentive of management, The pressure from the capital market has a positive impact on the dividend policy of listed companies. But the pressure from the product market shows negative effect or the effect is not significant. (3) there are industry differences in the effect of internal incentive and external incentive on dividend policy of listed companies. In the high-tech industry, both internal and external incentives are affected, and the effects of external incentives are significant, while in low-technology industries, internal incentives mainly play a role. On this basis, the paper puts forward some suggestions to perfect the dividend policy of listed companies in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：大連理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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本文編號(hào)：2075553