發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-06-22 15:36

  本文選題：董事會(huì)治理 + 企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)　； 參考：《暨南大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：董事會(huì)是企業(yè)最重要的決策機(jī)構(gòu)和管理機(jī)構(gòu)，是公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的核心。提高董事會(huì)治理水平有助于增強(qiáng)企業(yè)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)能力，實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)價(jià)值最大化。本文以1998-2009年在我國(guó)滬深兩市上市的企業(yè)為研究對(duì)象，，運(yùn)用OLS回歸模型和固定效應(yīng)平行面板數(shù)據(jù)模型，對(duì)企業(yè)董事會(huì)特征與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)行為之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了研究并發(fā)現(xiàn)： （1）企業(yè)董事會(huì)規(guī)模與企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)呈顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，獨(dú)立董事比例和董事會(huì)持股比例與企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)呈顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系，而董事會(huì)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)關(guān)系不顯著。 （2）本文充分考慮到我國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)期特殊制度背景下的股權(quán)約束特征對(duì)以上結(jié)論的影響，通過對(duì)企業(yè)終極控制權(quán)性質(zhì)進(jìn)行控制、以及對(duì)股權(quán)分置改革這一事件進(jìn)行研究，得出了一系列新的發(fā)現(xiàn)。通過對(duì)企業(yè)終極控制權(quán)性質(zhì)進(jìn)行控制，發(fā)現(xiàn)國(guó)有控股企業(yè)的董事會(huì)規(guī)模與企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系要明顯顯著于民營(yíng)控股企業(yè)，而民營(yíng)控股企業(yè)獨(dú)立董事比例和董事會(huì)持股比例與企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的正相關(guān)關(guān)系要比國(guó)有控股企業(yè)顯著。 本文的研究是對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)體系的有益補(bǔ)充，對(duì)于我國(guó)上市企業(yè)的董事會(huì)治理、企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制以及股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整等均具有一定的政策導(dǎo)向性作用，為其他針對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家的研究提供了重要的比較和借鑒依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:The board of directors is the most important decision-making and management organization, and the core of the internal corporate governance structure. Improving the governance level of the board of directors is helpful to enhance the risk bearing ability of the enterprise and to maximize the value of the enterprise. In this paper, OLS regression model and fixed effect parallel panel data model are used to study the enterprises listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China from 1998 to 2009. The relationship between the characteristics of the corporate board of directors and risk-bearing behavior is studied and found: (1) there is a significant negative correlation between the size of the board of directors and the risk bearing of the enterprise. There is a significant positive correlation between the proportion of independent directors and the proportion of holding shares of the board of directors and the risk-taking of enterprises. However, the relationship between the leadership structure of the board of directors and the risk bearing of the enterprise is not significant. (2) this paper fully takes into account the influence of the characteristics of equity restraint on the above conclusions under the background of the special system in the transitional economic period of our country. By controlling the nature of the ultimate control of the enterprise and studying the reform of the split share structure, a series of new discoveries are made. By controlling the nature of the ultimate control of the enterprise, it is found that the negative correlation between the size of the board of directors of the state-owned holding enterprise and the risk assumption of the enterprise is significantly higher than that of the private holding enterprise. The proportion of independent directors and the proportion of board of directors holding shares in private holding enterprises have significant positive correlation with the risk assumption of enterprises compared with state-owned holding enterprises. The research in this paper is a useful supplement to the existing literature system in China, and has a certain policy-oriented effect on the governance of the board of directors, the risk control of enterprises and the adjustment of equity structure of listed enterprises in China. It provides an important basis for comparison and reference for other research on developing countries.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：暨南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F224;F832.51;F276.6

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