發(fā)布時間：2018-06-21 22:42

  本文選題：高送轉(zhuǎn) + 時機選擇��； 參考：《上海交通大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：高送轉(zhuǎn)是我國A股市場的獨有現(xiàn)象。本文就該現(xiàn)象研究中國A股高送轉(zhuǎn)的時機選擇的決定因素。本文首先以1999年到2012年的所有A股為樣本研究市場驅(qū)動假設(shè)。通過Probit回歸得出市場條件并不能對上市公司的高送轉(zhuǎn)決策產(chǎn)生影響，并推出我國上市公司實行高送轉(zhuǎn)的主要目的并非是為了獲取更多的超額收益。本文繼而研究了事件驅(qū)動假設(shè)，發(fā)現(xiàn)高送轉(zhuǎn)在時間上與限售股解禁相近，并且通過Probit模型驗證了限售股解禁日接近送轉(zhuǎn)政策宣告日的A股更容易推行高送轉(zhuǎn)，繼而推出上市公司管理者通過實施高送轉(zhuǎn)拉高股價，以迎合限售股股東套現(xiàn)的假設(shè)。本文用盈余管理指標(biāo)代表管理者操縱股價的動機，發(fā)現(xiàn)盈余操縱越嚴(yán)重的公司，，越容易實施高送轉(zhuǎn)，并且實施了高送轉(zhuǎn)的解禁股的長期收益少于未實施了高送轉(zhuǎn)的解禁股。這些印證了高送轉(zhuǎn)作為管理者的操縱股價的工具來迎合限售股股東的假設(shè)，也就是事件驅(qū)動假設(shè)。本文在高送轉(zhuǎn)的時機研究中作出了貢獻(xiàn)，并提醒中小投資者注意管理者的操縱行為以保護(hù)自己的利益，同時建議監(jiān)管者對公司管理者的操縱行為進(jìn)行監(jiān)管。
[Abstract]:High send turn is the unique phenomenon of A-share market in China. This paper studies the determinants of the timing of A-share turnover in China. In this paper, we first take all A shares from 1999 to 2012 as samples to study market driven hypothesis. Through probit regression, it is concluded that market conditions can not affect the decision of high transmission of listed companies, and the main purpose of implementing high transmission of listed companies in China is not to obtain more excess returns. This paper then studies the event-driven hypothesis, and finds that the transfer of high transmission is close to the release of restricted shares in time, and the probit model verifies that A shares whose release date is close to the date of announcement of the transfer policy are easier to carry out high transfer. Then introduce the listed company managers through the implementation of high transfer to raise the share price, in order to meet the restriction of shareholders to cash hypothesis. In this paper, the earnings management index is used to represent the motives of managers manipulating stock prices. It is found that the more serious the earnings manipulation is, the easier it is to carry out a high turnover. These confirmed that the transfer as a manager's tool to manipulate the stock price to cater to the restricted stock shareholders hypothesis, or event-driven hypothesis. This paper makes a contribution to the research on the timing of high turnover, and reminds the small and medium-sized investors to pay attention to the manipulation of managers to protect their own interests, and suggests that the regulators should supervise the manipulation of corporate managers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.51

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