發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-06-18 13:56

  本文選題：上市銀行 + 董事會治理結(jié)構(gòu)　； 參考：《西北農(nóng)林科技大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：高管薪酬激勵作為公司治理的特殊而又重要的一個(gè)組成部分，一直都是社會各界關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。尤其是金融業(yè)的高管薪酬屢居各行業(yè)榜首，如深發(fā)展銀行董事長法蘭克紐曼于2007年獲得2285萬元的高薪，這種“天價(jià)薪酬”不僅引起了社會各界的熱切關(guān)注，更促使了專家學(xué)者開始對有關(guān)高管薪酬的問題進(jìn)行研究。但是專家學(xué)者們只是針對銀行的高管薪酬的影響因素和如何構(gòu)建科學(xué)合理的薪酬激勵制度進(jìn)行研究，對于高管薪酬的制定機(jī)構(gòu)——董事會的研究還比較少，而且研究結(jié)論也不相統(tǒng)一。所以本文將從董事會治理特征的角度出發(fā)，，從董事會規(guī)模、獨(dú)立董事所占比例和董事長與行長是否兩職兼任這三個(gè)方面分析董事會對高管薪酬及薪酬-績效敏感性的影響。 考慮到商業(yè)銀行的特殊性，本文首先根據(jù)商業(yè)銀行的盈利性、安全性、流動性和成長性這四個(gè)維度的財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)，采用熵權(quán)法構(gòu)建商業(yè)銀行綜合績效測算模型，并測算出各銀行的綜合得分值，以此作為銀行績效變量，取代了傳統(tǒng)的ROA或ROE指標(biāo)變量，這樣可以使分析出結(jié)果更加精確完善。最后，以高管薪酬作為因變量，以董事會規(guī)模、獨(dú)立董事比例和董事長與行長兩職分任作為自變量，以當(dāng)期銀行綜合績效、滯后一期銀行綜合績效、銀行規(guī)模和第一大股東所持比例作為控制變量，構(gòu)建回歸模型，對16家上市銀行2006年-2011年的面板數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行回歸分析。 實(shí)證結(jié)果表明：董事會的規(guī)模與高管薪酬水平呈顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系，與高管薪酬-績效敏感性呈弱負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；獨(dú)立董事所占比例與高管薪酬呈弱負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，與高管薪酬-績效敏感性呈顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系；董事長與行長兩職分任與高管薪酬呈顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系，與高管薪酬-績效敏感性呈弱正相關(guān)關(guān)系。針對以上分析結(jié)果，筆者最后提出了幾點(diǎn)參考建議。
[Abstract]:Executive compensation incentive, as a special and important part of corporate governance, has always been the focus of all circles of society. Especially, the executive pay of the financial industry has been ranked first in all industries, such as the high salary of 22 million 850 thousand yuan in 2007 by Frank Newman, the chairman of the deep Development Bank, which has not only caused the society. The enthusiastic attention of all walks of life has prompted experts and scholars to begin to study the issue of executive compensation. However, experts and scholars only study the influencing factors of executive compensation and how to build a scientific and reasonable salary incentive system, and the research on executive compensation institutions - the board of directors is still less. And the conclusion of the study is not uniform. So from the perspective of the governance characteristics of the board of directors, this paper will analyze the influence of the board of directors on the executive compensation and pay performance sensitivity from the three aspects of the scale of the board of directors, the proportion of the independent directors and the two posts of the president and the president.
Considering the particularity of commercial banks, this paper first constructs a comprehensive performance measurement model of commercial banks based on the four dimensions of profitability, security, liquidity and growth of commercial banks, and calculates the comprehensive score value of each bank as a variable of bank performance, replacing the traditional ROA or ROE index. In the end, the scale of the board of directors, the proportion of independent directors and the two posts of the chairman and the president of the chairman are taken as independent variables, and the comprehensive performance of the current bank, the comprehensive performance of the first phase of the bank, the scale of the bank and the proportion of the first large shareholders are taken as the control changes. The regression model was used to conduct regression analysis on the panel data of 16 listed banks in 2006 -2011.
The empirical results show that the scale of the board of directors has a significant positive correlation with the executive compensation level, and has a weak negative correlation with the executive compensation performance sensitivity; the proportion of the independent directors has a weak negative correlation with the executive compensation, and has a significant positive correlation with the executive compensation performance sensitivity; the chairman and the president are two posts and executives. There is a significant positive correlation between remuneration and a weak positive correlation with executive compensation performance sensitivity. In the end, the author puts forward some suggestions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北農(nóng)林科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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