本文選題：高管薪酬 + 產(chǎn)權(quán)基礎(chǔ)　； 參考：《重慶工商大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：高管薪酬是公司治理研究中的一個重要課題。高管薪酬問題的研究，有助于公司治理理論和實踐的完善。隨著現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的建立以及高管薪酬的披露，管理層薪酬一直是社會各方關(guān)注的話題，尤其近年來中國上市公司高管薪酬數(shù)字的不斷飆升，引發(fā)了社會各界的爭議。薪酬作為勞動報酬也是一種重要的激勵手段，特別是在兩權(quán)分離的情況下，薪酬的設(shè)置更是搭建了所有者與經(jīng)營者合作的橋梁。 從代理理論角度來看，對于作為委托人的公司股東而言，設(shè)計管理人員薪酬就是為了解決代理問題，，激勵管理者努力提高公司的績效和價值。高管薪酬一直以來被認(rèn)為是解決股東與管理層之間委托代理問題的關(guān)鍵。薪酬的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)設(shè)計的得當(dāng)，能夠降低股東與管理層之間的委托代理成本，高管也有動力通過努力提高公司的價值，增加股東的財富，若設(shè)計不當(dāng)，便會導(dǎo)致對高管的激勵作用失效，進(jìn)而引發(fā)高管只為追求個人利益而犧牲股東的利益。 合理的高管薪酬是建立有效的公司治理的核心內(nèi)容，也是我國企業(yè)改革和發(fā)展成敗的關(guān)鍵問題，因此高管薪酬的研究不僅具有理論意義也有很強(qiáng)的現(xiàn)實意義。目前對于高管層薪酬的研究主要存在的焦點問題主要有：薪酬水平和薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)。中國對于高管薪酬水平進(jìn)行了大量的研究，比如高管薪酬和公司業(yè)績的相關(guān)研究，高管層持股與公司績效的研究等等。并在此基礎(chǔ)上取得了一定的研究成果。但是對于另一個焦點問題——薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)研究的相對不是太多。高管薪酬的差距是高管人員薪酬設(shè)計中非常重要的部分，產(chǎn)權(quán)基礎(chǔ)不同、行業(yè)不同、區(qū)域不同等都會造成高管薪酬的巨大差距。因此結(jié)構(gòu)不同造成的差距有待于我們做更多的研究。 本文立足產(chǎn)權(quán)基礎(chǔ)不同這一研究視角把研究對象分為國有控股上市公司和非國有控股上市公司，研究其薪酬的差異性，為我國企業(yè)進(jìn)一步改革和健康發(fā)展做出貢獻(xiàn)，同時推動公司治理課題的研究，也為我們今后的薪酬制度改革朝著更加合理，更加公平的方向去發(fā)展提供可借鑒的思路。
[Abstract]:Executive compensation is an important subject in the study of corporate governance. The study of executive compensation is helpful to the perfection of corporate governance theory and practice. With the establishment of modern enterprise system and the disclosure of executive compensation, management compensation has always been a topic of concern, especially in recent years, the number of executive compensation of listed companies in China has been soaring, which has aroused controversy from all walks of life. Compensation is also an important incentive means as labor compensation, especially in the case of separation of the two rights, the establishment of compensation is to build a bridge between the owner and the operator. From the perspective of agency theory, for the shareholders of the company as the principal, the compensation of the design manager is to solve the agency problem and encourage managers to improve the performance and value of the company. Executive compensation has long been seen as the key to solving the problem of agency between shareholders and management. Pay standards are properly designed to reduce principal-agent costs between shareholders and management, and executives have the incentive to increase the value of the company and the wealth of shareholders, if not properly designed, This will lead to the failure of the incentive role of the executive, and then lead to the personal interests of the executive only to sacrifice the interests of shareholders. Reasonable executive compensation is the core content of establishing effective corporate governance, and is also the key issue of the success or failure of enterprise reform and development in China. Therefore, the study of executive compensation is not only of theoretical significance but also of great practical significance. At present, the main focus of the research on executive compensation are: salary level and salary structure. China has carried out a lot of research on executive compensation level, such as executive compensation and corporate performance related research, executive ownership and corporate performance research and so on. On this basis, some research results have been obtained. But for another focus-pay structure research is relatively not too much. Executive compensation gap is a very important part of executive compensation design. Different property rights, different industries, different regions will cause a huge gap in executive compensation. Therefore, the gap caused by different structures needs more research. From the perspective of different property right basis, this paper divides the research object into state-owned holding listed company and non-state-owned holding listed company, and studies the difference of their salary, and contributes to the further reform and healthy development of our country's enterprises. At the same time, to promote the research of the subject of corporate governance, it also provides us with a more reasonable and fair way to develop the salary system in the future.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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