發(fā)布時(shí)間：2017-12-31 14:33

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)與產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)契約理論研究　出處：《燕山大學(xué)》2012年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 契約理論 委托代理 代理成本 資本結(jié)構(gòu) 產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng) 互動(dòng)關(guān)系

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代契約理論，以新古典契約理論與現(xiàn)實(shí)不一致的假設(shè)條件入手，通過(guò)引入信息不對(duì)稱、有限理性和不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)假設(shè)，由外生轉(zhuǎn)向內(nèi)生性研究范式。在此背景下的資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論，也由注重稅收、破產(chǎn)因素的現(xiàn)代資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論體系，發(fā)展為以公司契約締結(jié)體中股東、經(jīng)理及債權(quán)人之間代理沖突為核心的新資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論體系。 資本結(jié)構(gòu)的產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理論，作為新體系的一個(gè)重要分支，以公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)決策與公司產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)決策的互動(dòng)關(guān)系為主線，將資本結(jié)構(gòu)的代理沖突問(wèn)題反映到產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)，開辟資本結(jié)構(gòu)影響企業(yè)價(jià)值的新渠道，成為資本結(jié)構(gòu)契約理論的前沿領(lǐng)域。但目前對(duì)該領(lǐng)域的研究，尚需理論基礎(chǔ)的分析和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)的豐富。有鑒于此，本文致力于這一互動(dòng)關(guān)系的實(shí)質(zhì)，通過(guò)理論模型構(gòu)建及相應(yīng)的實(shí)證分析，試圖對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司的實(shí)際，做出合理的解釋，提供理論指導(dǎo)。 在文獻(xiàn)研究的基礎(chǔ)上，本文指出資本結(jié)構(gòu)與產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)產(chǎn)生聯(lián)系的契約理論基礎(chǔ)，即以企業(yè)契約屬性為基礎(chǔ)，以股東價(jià)值最大化為目標(biāo)，反映現(xiàn)代契約理論的委托代理和控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移思想，是資本結(jié)構(gòu)代理成本理論在企業(yè)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)的延伸。 本文分別從產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、資本結(jié)構(gòu)以及代理沖突三個(gè)角度考察資本結(jié)構(gòu)與產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的互動(dòng)關(guān)系。首先，建立資本結(jié)構(gòu)決策彈性期權(quán)模型，新“優(yōu)序”融資理論合理解釋了我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)融資偏好行為，線性固定效應(yīng)回歸結(jié)果支持了模型結(jié)論，非線性回歸結(jié)果則進(jìn)一步表明，不同行業(yè)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)因素對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)決策的作用程度不同，是融資彈性和融資成本權(quán)衡的結(jié)果；其次，延伸產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論的B-L經(jīng)典模型，建立長(zhǎng)期負(fù)債需求不確定條件聯(lián)立方程，相應(yīng)的實(shí)證結(jié)果表明，長(zhǎng)期負(fù)債融資能夠強(qiáng)化上市公司價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)能力，并通過(guò)價(jià)格與產(chǎn)量間的正向傳遞關(guān)系，同時(shí)強(qiáng)化其產(chǎn)量競(jìng)爭(zhēng)能力，從而成為緩解煤炭行業(yè)過(guò)度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)問(wèn)題的新思路；最后，兼顧公司股東與債權(quán)人以及公司股東與經(jīng)理間兩類沖突，，建立資本結(jié)構(gòu)雙重效應(yīng)模型，引入交叉項(xiàng)的實(shí)證研究表明，資本結(jié)構(gòu)與產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)及其互動(dòng)關(guān)系都對(duì)公司代理成本具有重要影響，互動(dòng)關(guān)系中，公司股權(quán)集中度越高，產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的激勵(lì)效果越弱，產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與股權(quán)代理成本互補(bǔ)而與負(fù)債代理成本替代，結(jié)論對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司治理改革的實(shí)踐具有重要理論指導(dǎo)作用。 資本結(jié)構(gòu)與產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)聯(lián)系的實(shí)質(zhì)是代理沖突，契約沖突理論與轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟(jì)制度背景下的我國(guó)上市公司實(shí)際相聯(lián)系，對(duì)企業(yè)行為、行業(yè)及公司治理問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了深刻剖析，給出了增加企業(yè)價(jià)值及深化市場(chǎng)體制改革的理論指導(dǎo)和政策建議，豐富了資本結(jié)構(gòu)與產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)領(lǐng)域的研究。
[Abstract]:The modern contract theory starts with the assumption that the neoclassical contract theory is inconsistent with the reality, and introduces the hypothesis of information asymmetry, limited rationality and incomplete competition. From exogenous to endogenous research paradigm, the capital structure theory under this background has also developed from the modern capital structure theory system, which focuses on taxation and bankruptcy factors, to shareholders in the conclusion of corporate contract. The new capital structure theory system with agency conflict between manager and creditor as the core. As an important branch of the new system, the theory of product market competition of capital structure is based on the interactive relationship between corporate capital structure decision and product market competition decision. The agency conflict of capital structure is reflected in the product market, and the new channel of capital structure affecting the value of enterprise is opened up, which becomes the frontier field of capital structure contract theory. In view of this, this article devotes to the essence of this interactive relationship, through the theoretical model construction and the corresponding empirical analysis, attempts to our country listed company's reality. Make reasonable explanation and provide theoretical guidance. On the basis of literature research, this paper points out that capital structure and product market competition produce the contract theory basis, that is, based on the enterprise contract attributes, with shareholder value maximization as the goal. The principal-agent theory and the transfer of control rights, which reflect the modern contract theory, are the extension of the capital structure agency cost theory in the enterprise product market. This paper examines the interaction between capital structure and product market competition from the perspectives of product market competition, capital structure and agency conflict. Firstly, a capital structure decision elastic option model is established. The new "superior order" financing theory reasonably explains the stock financing preference behavior of listed companies in China. The linear fixed effect regression results support the conclusion of the model, and the nonlinear regression results further show that. The competition factors of product market in different industries play a different role in capital structure decision, which is the result of financing elasticity and financing cost tradeoff. Secondly, the B-L classical model of competitive capital structure theory in product market is extended to establish the simultaneous equation of uncertain conditions of long-term debt demand, and the corresponding empirical results show that. Long-term debt financing can strengthen the price competitiveness of listed companies, and through the positive transfer relationship between price and output, at the same time, strengthen their production competitiveness. Therefore, it becomes a new way to alleviate the excessive competition in coal industry. Finally, considering the conflicts between shareholders and creditors, and between shareholders and managers, a dual effect model of capital structure is established. Capital structure and product market competition as well as their interaction have an important impact on the agency cost. In the interactive relationship, the higher the concentration of corporate equity, the weaker the incentive effect of product market competition. The product market competition and equity agency cost complement each other and replace the debt agency cost. The conclusion has an important theoretical guidance function to the practice of listed company governance reform in our country. The essence of the relationship between capital structure and product market competition is agency conflict. The theory of contract conflict is related to the actual situation of listed companies in China under the background of transitional economic system. The problems of industry and corporate governance are deeply analyzed, and the theoretical guidance and policy suggestions for increasing the value of enterprises and deepening the reform of market system are given, which enriches the research on the field of capital structure and product market competition.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：燕山大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F224

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