政策執(zhí)行中鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府的自主性研究
[Abstract]:With the reform of the administrative decentralization system and the fiscal and taxation system, the power of the local government to manage the public affairs of the society is also gradually expanded, and the autonomous space of the local government is also expanding. On the one hand, the expansion of local government's autonomy can fully stimulate the initiative and initiative of local governments, and promote the development of local economic growth and local other affairs; on the other hand, the expansion of local government ownership has made local government develop into the main body of interest with independent will, It is easy to dissimilate to the power of harm to the public interest. The activities of the local government, in particular the government's activities, are focused on the implementation of the public policy. The government is at the end of the public policy implementation chain, and has little power to make policy decisions. However, the policy implementation chain is a long-term policy delivery problem. The perfect realization of the policy objective depends to some extent on the effectiveness and responsiveness of the implementation of the government's policy. Therefore, the problem of the government in the implementation of the policy is the restraint and incentive problem of its autonomy. What is the problem of the government's autonomy in the process of specific policy implementation? What is the restraint mechanism and the incentive mechanism, that is, what kind of restraint measures and incentive measures are taken by the higher-level government to the government's autonomy? What causes such restraint mechanisms and incentives? Where can I improve it? On the basis of examining the relevant research literature of policy enforcement and local government autonomy, this paper, from the point of view of the policy implementer, is of the opinion that the policy implementation includes at least three aspects: the first, the unforeseeable circumstances and the honest implementation of the policy; and secondly, In addition to the unforeseen circumstances, the author of the problem is transformed into a problem and the problem is defined and the problem is solved; and thirdly, when the policy executor lacks the necessary knowledge and capability, the "information up" is ensured to flow. The local government's autonomy is defined as the "Local governments with relatively independent interests, self-designed, self-managing, self-developed, and their activities in accordance with their will" and has the dual characteristics of the "independence" and the "innovativeness". The third part of the article, through the analysis of the human nature, points out that the local government's autonomy has the "good" and the "evil" duality, and the main problem in the implementation of the policy is the restraint and the incentive problem of its autonomy, and the conclusion is drawn: The independent logic of the government's autonomy in the implementation of the policy is the strong restriction and strong incentive, that is, the strong restraint can effectively restrain the one side of the autonomous "evil" of the government, and the strong incentive can effectively publicize the one side of the autonomous "good" of the government. The combination of strong and strong incentive can promote the effective realization of policy objectives. The fourth part of the article, taking the construction of the new village infrastructure as an example, analyzes the restraint mechanism and the incentive mechanism of the government's autonomy in the implementation of the policy. The lateral restraint mechanism includes the holding of the villagers' congress, the establishment of the supervision committee and the implementation of the public announcement system. The mechanism of the longitudinal restraint includes the financial limitation, the clear completion time limit and the task index, the examination and acceptance of the three aspects, and the incentive mechanism to the system mainly includes the commitment of the award and the fund distribution, and the recognition of the two aspects. In general, there are the "The constraints are diverse, and the constraint effect is not strong." and the "less incentive means and poor incentive effect" of the restraint mechanism and the incentive mechanism of the government's autonomy. The fifth part, based on the analysis of the present state of government autonomy in the implementation of the policy, puts forward relevant suggestions. in that constraint mechanism, the first, base on the commonness of the region, reduce the autonomous space of the main body of the policy as much as possible, establish a three-in-one constraint mechanism of the mandatory provision of the principle of principle, and the second, from the time of policy execution, establish a pre-implementation plan review and a medium-term check, The third part, on the content of the policy implementation, establishes the constraint mechanism of the financial control and the execution quality of the transaction. On the incentive mechanism, the first is to set up the incentive concept for the implementation of the specific policies and to improve the incentive mechanism for the individual members; secondly, on the political incentive, the mechanism of post promotion and the level flow mechanism of the professionals should be established; and thirdly, on the economic incentive, the enterprise incentive means can be introduced. A certain material stimulus is given.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類號】:D63
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