本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 創(chuàng)業(yè)板��； 參考：《山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一種長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)機(jī)制，能夠有效解決現(xiàn)代公司制企業(yè)中的委托代理問(wèn)題，在西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家被廣泛應(yīng)用。我國(guó)由于資本市場(chǎng)起步較晚、發(fā)展不完善，股權(quán)激勵(lì)進(jìn)程相對(duì)緩慢。股權(quán)分置改革的進(jìn)行與基本完成以及此后國(guó)家相關(guān)法規(guī)的不斷出臺(tái)，為我國(guó)上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)提供了良好的制度環(huán)境。 2009年10月30日，我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板正式開(kāi)市交易，表現(xiàn)活躍，備受關(guān)注。眾多的具有一定創(chuàng)新能力和高成長(zhǎng)性的中小民營(yíng)企業(yè)紛紛在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市。為了有效解決其委托代理問(wèn)題，在激烈的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中留住人才資源，實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)期穩(wěn)定發(fā)展，越來(lái)越多的創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司開(kāi)始實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)。那么，我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施現(xiàn)狀如何，面臨著怎樣的問(wèn)題，應(yīng)如何完善我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制？本文正是帶著這些問(wèn)題，對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)問(wèn)題進(jìn)行研究。 本文首先對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的研究進(jìn)行了梳理，對(duì)相關(guān)概念進(jìn)行界定，并從理論角度闡述了我國(guó)上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的必要性與重要性。然后結(jié)合我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的制度環(huán)境與其自身實(shí)際情況，對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)的發(fā)展歷程和方案現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析，從公司內(nèi)外部環(huán)境和方案設(shè)計(jì)方面發(fā)現(xiàn)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司在股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施過(guò)程中面臨的問(wèn)題。接著，，有針對(duì)性地提出相應(yīng)的建議，以期為完善我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)發(fā)揮一定的作用。最后，以SZ公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施情況為例論證本文的研究。
[Abstract]:As a long-term incentive mechanism, equity incentive can effectively solve the principal-agent problem in modern corporate enterprises and is widely used in western developed countries. Because the capital market starts late, the development is not perfect, the equity incentive process is relatively slow. The implementation and completion of the reform of split share structure, as well as the continuous introduction of relevant national laws and regulations, provide a good institutional environment for the implementation of equity incentives for listed companies in China. On October 30, 2009, the gem of our country officially opened the market transaction, the performance is active, receives the attention. Many small and medium-sized private enterprises with certain innovation ability and high growth have been listed on the gem. In order to effectively solve the principal-agent problem, retain talent resources in the fierce market competition, and achieve the long-term stable development of enterprises, more and more gem listed companies began to implement equity incentives. So, what is the status quo of the implementation of equity incentive for gem listed companies in China, what kind of problems we are facing, and how to improve the equity incentive mechanism of listed companies in gem? With these problems, this paper studies the equity incentive of gem listed companies. In this paper, first of all, the domestic and foreign scholars on the research of equity incentive are combed, the related concepts are defined, and from the theoretical point of view, the necessity and importance of the implementation of equity incentive of listed companies in China are expounded. Then according to the institutional environment of implementing equity incentive of gem listed companies and its own actual situation, this paper analyzes the development course and current situation of equity incentive schemes of gem listed companies. From the aspects of internal and external environment and scheme design, the problems faced by gem listed companies in the process of equity incentive implementation are found. Then, the corresponding suggestions are put forward in order to play a certain role in perfecting the equity incentive of listed companies in gem. Finally, SZ company's stock right incentive implementation is taken as an example to demonstrate the research of this paper.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.51

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