本文關(guān)鍵詞： 閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈 政府約束 委托—代理 道德風險 激勵機制　出處：《浙江工業(yè)大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：近年來,我國鋼鐵產(chǎn)業(yè)高速發(fā)展,作為資源高消耗型的鋼鐵生產(chǎn)企業(yè),降低成本、保護環(huán)境、提高資源利用率和市場競爭力,實現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟的良性循環(huán)已經(jīng)成為急需解決的問題。另外,相比國際平均水平和發(fā)達國家,中國的廢鋼再生產(chǎn)比率有較大的差距,政府應(yīng)該激勵鋼鐵企業(yè)進行廢鋼回收再生產(chǎn),節(jié)約能耗,提高環(huán)保,加快社會可持續(xù)發(fā)展進程。因此,研究廢鋼回收再生產(chǎn)的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈模型及激勵機制問題,對改善我國鋼鐵產(chǎn)業(yè)現(xiàn)狀和深化可持續(xù)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略都具有非常重要的理論價值和實際意義。本文研究了政府、鋼鐵生產(chǎn)商、銷售商和第三方回收商之間的決策制定、廢鋼回收渠道選擇以及生產(chǎn)商和銷售商的委托—代理激勵機制問題。主要的研究內(nèi)容有：政府宏觀約束情況下基于廢鋼回收再生產(chǎn)的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈決策問題。設(shè)計了政府對生產(chǎn)商獎懲函數(shù),同時考慮了生產(chǎn)商內(nèi)部回收生產(chǎn)廢鋼和廢鋼回收方的回收努力,分別建立了基于生產(chǎn)商外部回收、銷售商回收和第三方回收商回收三種模式下的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈決策模型。通過比較三種回收模型的最優(yōu)策略中廢鋼回收率和參與成員收益,對廢鋼最優(yōu)回收渠道進行選擇,并分析了政府獎懲機制對回收率、收益和價格的影響。廢鋼回收再生產(chǎn)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中線性分成制激勵契約設(shè)計問題�？紤]生產(chǎn)商同時使用鐵礦石和廢鋼進行鋼鐵生產(chǎn)情況,在生產(chǎn)商和銷售商之間建立多任務(wù)委托—代理下的線性分成制激勵契約模型,比較分析信息對稱和信息不對稱兩種環(huán)境下相關(guān)參數(shù)對生產(chǎn)商激勵系數(shù)、生產(chǎn)商收益及代理成本的影響。本文主要運用了Stackelberg理論模型,委托—代理理論和運籌學線性規(guī)劃方法來研究決策模型和激勵機制。研究結(jié)果如下：當銷售商負責廢鋼回收時,廢鋼回收再生產(chǎn)率和生產(chǎn)商收益最大；生產(chǎn)商收益和廢鋼回收再生產(chǎn)率與生產(chǎn)商的總體單位節(jié)約成本、政府單位獎懲因子呈正相關(guān),與政府規(guī)定的廢鋼最低回收率呈負相關(guān)；進行含有道德風險的多任務(wù)委托—代理時,生產(chǎn)商期望收益和激勵系數(shù)分別和努力成本系數(shù)、市場的不確定因素、銷售商風險規(guī)避因子呈負相關(guān),代理成本則相反；一般情況下,隨銷售商風險規(guī)避因子增加,生產(chǎn)商應(yīng)提高鋼鐵銷售激勵系數(shù),降低廢鋼回收激勵系數(shù)；生產(chǎn)商對于努力成本系數(shù)和市場不確定性較小活動的激勵程度應(yīng)大于努力成本系數(shù)和市場不確定性較大的激勵程度�；�于實際,以上結(jié)論為我國廢鋼閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈管理的實施和改善提供參考建議。
[Abstract]:In recent years, China's iron and steel industry has developed at a high speed. As an iron and steel producer with high consumption of resources, it reduces costs, protects the environment, and improves the utilization of resources and market competitiveness. In addition, compared with the international average level and the developed countries, there is a big gap between China's scrap production rate, the government should encourage iron and steel enterprises to carry out scrap recycling and reproduction. Therefore, the closed-loop supply chain model and incentive mechanism for scrap recovery and reproduction are studied. It is of great theoretical value and practical significance to improve the present situation of China's iron and steel industry and to deepen the strategy of sustainable development. This paper studies the decision making between the government, the steel producer, the seller and the third party recycler. The selection of scrap recovery channels and the principal-agent incentive mechanism of producers and sellers. The main research contents are as follows: the closed-loop supply chain decision problem based on scrap recycling reproduction under the government macro constraints. The government rewards and punishes producers, At the same time, considering the recovery efforts of internal producers and scrap recyclers, respectively, based on the manufacturer's external recycling, The closed-loop supply chain decision-making model under the three models of vendor recovery and third-party recycler recovery. By comparing the scrap recovery rate and the income of the participating members in the optimal strategy of the three recovery models, the optimal recycling channel of scrap steel is selected. The effect of government reward and punishment mechanism on recovery rate, income and price, linear share incentive contract design in the closed-loop supply chain of scrap recovery reproduction is analyzed, and the production of iron and steel using iron ore and scrap steel is considered. A linear split incentive contract model based on multi-task principal-agent is established between the manufacturer and the seller, and the incentive coefficients of the manufacturer under the information symmetry and information asymmetry are compared and analyzed. This paper mainly uses Stackelberg model, principal-agent theory and operational research linear programming method to study the decision model and incentive mechanism. The results are as follows: when the seller is in charge of scrap recovery, The recovery and reproductivity of scrap steel and the profit of the producer are the biggest, and the profit of the producer and the recycling rate of scrap are positively correlated with the total cost saving per unit of the producer, and negatively correlated with the minimum recovery rate of scrap steel as stipulated by the government, and the reward and punishment factor of the government unit is positive correlation. When the multi-task principal-agent with moral hazard is carried out, the producer's expected income and incentive coefficient are negatively correlated with the effort cost coefficient, the uncertain factors of the market and the risk aversion factor of the seller, but the agency cost is opposite. In general, with the increase of risk aversion factor, the manufacturer should increase the incentive coefficient of steel sales and reduce the incentive coefficient of scrap recovery. The incentive degree of the manufacturer for the effort cost coefficient and the small market uncertainty should be greater than that for the effort cost coefficient and the market uncertainty. The above conclusions provide reference suggestions for the implementation and improvement of scrap closed-loop supply chain management in China.
【學位授予單位】：浙江工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F426.31;F274
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本文編號：1537471