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集團(tuán)公司共享庫(kù)存系統(tǒng)的設(shè)計(jì)與優(yōu)化

發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-02-25 05:23

  本文關(guān)鍵詞: 集中庫(kù)存 共享庫(kù)存 轉(zhuǎn)移定價(jià) Stackelberg博弈 出處:《南京大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文 論文類(lèi)型:學(xué)位論文


【摘要】:在任何一種商業(yè)組織中,庫(kù)存管理都是一項(xiàng)極為重要的運(yùn)營(yíng)管理活動(dòng)。商業(yè)組織持有一定數(shù)量存貨,其主要目的是保證生產(chǎn)與銷(xiāo)售的連續(xù)性,降低因缺貨造成的"停滯"風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這對(duì)及時(shí)滿足客戶需求,保持客戶忠誠(chéng)度具有重要意義。另一方面,持有存貨意味著占用組織大量的資源,產(chǎn)生各種相關(guān)的成本。"庫(kù)存既是天使又是魔鬼",因此不斷改進(jìn)和優(yōu)化庫(kù)存管理始終是一個(gè)熱點(diǎn)的研究課題。本文考慮到集團(tuán)公司的協(xié)同效應(yīng)與規(guī)模效應(yīng),選擇集團(tuán)公司作為庫(kù)存管理的研究背景,在回顧歷史文獻(xiàn)與相關(guān)理論的基礎(chǔ)上運(yùn)用了共享庫(kù)存的相關(guān)理論,設(shè)計(jì)了一個(gè)兩層次的集團(tuán)公司共享庫(kù)存系統(tǒng),即結(jié)合了母公司的集中庫(kù)存管理與子公司的共享庫(kù)存管理。本文首先運(yùn)用了數(shù)理分析的方法,比較了分散庫(kù)存管理與集中庫(kù)存管理模式下的安全庫(kù)存,研究發(fā)現(xiàn)只要不同庫(kù)存單元的客戶需求不是完全的正相關(guān),那么集中庫(kù)存管理就能降低安全庫(kù)存,從而降低庫(kù)存成本。集中庫(kù)存管理雖然能夠降低安全庫(kù)存,但也存在一些副作用,其主要缺點(diǎn)是延長(zhǎng)了客戶獲得商品和服務(wù)的等待時(shí)間,從而影響客戶服務(wù)水平。在此基礎(chǔ)上本文討論了適合于采用集中庫(kù)存管理的存貨類(lèi)型并給出了一些管理建議。本文重點(diǎn)研究了子公司共享庫(kù)存交易機(jī)制,首先討論了子公司共享庫(kù)存所涉及的轉(zhuǎn)移定價(jià)制度,詳細(xì)分析了各種轉(zhuǎn)移定價(jià)制度的適用范圍及其優(yōu)缺點(diǎn)。接著本文運(yùn)用了博弈論的有關(guān)理論,建立了一個(gè)關(guān)于子公司共享庫(kù)存交易行為的Stackelberg博弈模型。利用二層規(guī)劃方法的研究思路,通過(guò)混沌搜索優(yōu)化算法分別求其在合作博弈與非合作博弈下均衡解。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)在子公司選擇合作策略的情況下相比子公司選擇非合作策略的情況,集團(tuán)整體可以獲得更多的利潤(rùn)。但在沒(méi)有外部干預(yù)的情況下子公司會(huì)因?yàn)樽非笞陨砝嫒狈x擇合作策略的動(dòng)力。因此,母公司應(yīng)該積極引導(dǎo)子公司的共享庫(kù)存交易行為,制定適當(dāng)?shù)慕灰诇?zhǔn)則和必要的獎(jiǎng)懲措施,以提高集團(tuán)整體利益。在多角度研究本文設(shè)計(jì)的集團(tuán)公司共享庫(kù)存系統(tǒng)的基礎(chǔ)上,本文給出了一些建立集團(tuán)公司共享庫(kù)存系統(tǒng)的管理建議,包括集中采購(gòu)、運(yùn)輸網(wǎng)絡(luò)、財(cái)務(wù)制度、庫(kù)存管理信息共享系統(tǒng)以及組織架構(gòu)設(shè)計(jì)等內(nèi)容。最后總結(jié)說(shuō)明了本文的研究結(jié)論與創(chuàng)新性,研究局限與未來(lái)的研究方向。
[Abstract]:In any commercial organization, inventory management is an extremely important operational management activity. Commercial organizations hold a certain amount of inventory, the main purpose of which is to ensure the continuity of production and sales. Reduce the risk of "stagnation" due to stock-outs. This is important for meeting customer needs and maintaining customer loyalty in a timely manner. On the other hand, holding inventories means taking up a lot of the organization's resources, Inventory is both an angel and a devil, so it is always a hot research topic to improve and optimize inventory management. Select group company as the research background of inventory management, apply the theory of shared inventory on the basis of reviewing historical documents and related theories, and design a two-level shared inventory system of group company. That is, combining the centralized inventory management of the parent company with the shared inventory management of the subsidiary company. Firstly, this paper uses the mathematical analysis method to compare the safety inventory under the decentralized inventory management and the centralized inventory management mode. The study found that as long as customer demand of different inventory units is not completely positive correlation, centralized inventory management can reduce the safety inventory and thus reduce the inventory cost. But there are also some side effects, the main drawback of which is the longer waiting time for customers to obtain goods and services. On the basis of this, this paper discusses the inventory types suitable for centralized inventory management and gives some management suggestions. First of all, the transfer pricing system involved in the shared inventory of subsidiaries is discussed, and the applicable scope, advantages and disadvantages of various transfer pricing systems are analyzed in detail, and then the relevant theories of game theory are used in this paper. In this paper, a Stackelberg game model about the trading behavior of subsidiaries' shared inventory is established. The chaotic search optimization algorithm is used to find the equilibrium solution under cooperative game and non-cooperative game respectively. It is found that when the subsidiary chooses the cooperative strategy compared with the subsidiary choosing the non-cooperative strategy. The group as a whole can make more profits. But without external interference, the subsidiary will lack the incentive to choose the cooperation strategy because of pursuing its own interests. Therefore, the parent company should actively guide the share inventory trading behavior of the subsidiary. To develop appropriate transaction guidelines and necessary incentives and penalties to improve the overall interests of the group. On the basis of the multi-angle study of the shared inventory system of the group company designed in this paper, This paper gives some management suggestions for establishing shared inventory system for group companies, including centralized purchasing, transportation network, financial system, etc. Inventory management information sharing system and organizational structure design. Finally, the conclusion and innovation of this paper, research limitations and future research direction are summarized.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】:O227;F274
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本文編號(hào):1533175

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