本文選題：會計準(zhǔn)則變革 + 企業(yè)非效率投資　； 參考：《審計與經(jīng)濟研究》2017年03期

【摘要】：外部資本定價扭曲與監(jiān)督不足是導(dǎo)致企業(yè)非效率投資的誘因,我國會計準(zhǔn)則的國際趨同能否通過信息環(huán)境的改善實現(xiàn)對企業(yè)非效率投資的治理是亟待研究的重要課題。選取2003—2011年我國上市公司數(shù)據(jù),通過Richardson模型和FHP模型的綜合使用,將樣本分成"逆向選擇和投資不足"以及"道德風(fēng)險和投資過度"兩種情況,觀察我國會計準(zhǔn)則國際趨同對兩種企業(yè)非效率投資的治理效果。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)我國上市公司同時存在投資不足與投資過度現(xiàn)象且兩種現(xiàn)象下均存在投資現(xiàn)金流敏感性,會計準(zhǔn)則趨同后投資現(xiàn)金流敏感性顯著下降。研究證實會計準(zhǔn)則變革可以通過改善定價扭曲和逆向選擇來緩解投資不足,通過改善監(jiān)督不足和道德風(fēng)險來抑制投資過度。
[Abstract]:The distortion of external capital pricing and insufficient supervision are the inducements for enterprises to invest inefficiently. Whether the international convergence of accounting standards of our country can realize the governance of enterprises' inefficient investment through the improvement of information environment is an important subject to be studied urgently. According to the data of China's listed companies from 2003 to 2011, through the comprehensive use of Richardson model and FHP model, the samples are divided into two cases: "adverse selection and underinvestment" and "moral hazard and overinvestment". To observe the governance effect of the international convergence of accounting standards on the inefficient investment of two kinds of enterprises. It is found that there are both underinvestment and overinvestment in listed companies in China, and under both phenomena, there is a sensitivity to cash flow of investment, and the sensitivity of cash flow of investment decreases significantly after the convergence of accounting standards. The research proves that accounting standard reform can alleviate underinvestment by improving pricing distortion and adverse selection, and restrain overinvestment by improving supervision and moral hazard.
【作者單位】： 東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)會計學(xué)院;大連交通大學(xué)經(jīng)管學(xué)院;江蘇大學(xué)財經(jīng)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然基金面上項目(71372068) 教育部人文社會科學(xué)項目(13YJA790151) 遼寧省教育廳人文科學(xué)項目(W2013074) 江蘇省高校哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)基金(2014SJD501) 江蘇大學(xué)高層次人才基金(16JDG001)
【分類號】：F233

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