發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-06-05 11:56

  本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 績(jī)效考核　； 參考：《江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：關(guān)于人力資源管理方面,公司面臨的問(wèn)題是如何吸引優(yōu)秀的人才,如何讓股東和經(jīng)理?yè)碛泄餐�的利益。一個(gè)持久并且有效的激勵(lì)方式可以建立健全公司的激勵(lì)機(jī)制。股權(quán)激勵(lì)在公司中非常普及是因?yàn)樗�在留住人才以及�?shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)價(jià)值最大化方面有著非常重要的作用。美國(guó)的輝瑞制藥公司最早采取這種激勵(lì)方式。輝瑞制藥讓管理人享有公司權(quán)益份額,這樣公司的利益就與他們個(gè)人的利益一致,降低了他們?cè)诠ぷ髦凶龀鰧?duì)公司不利選擇的幾率。公司采取股權(quán)激勵(lì)的方式可以使被激勵(lì)者成為公司的所有者之一。被授予公司股份的管理人員持有公司的股份越多,他們與公司的利益相關(guān)度就越高,那么因此而承擔(dān)的責(zé)任也是越大的。企業(yè)人力資源部門(mén)最大的問(wèn)題就是如何在穩(wěn)定企業(yè)優(yōu)秀員工的同時(shí)又能招攬人才。如果公司能讓優(yōu)秀的員工持有股份,同時(shí)建立一個(gè)比較科學(xué)、完善的績(jī)效考核體系,那么員工為了個(gè)人的利益也會(huì)奮發(fā)向上。員工努力工作的同時(shí),也有助于實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)價(jià)值最大化。一個(gè)科學(xué)的績(jī)效考核體系會(huì)形成優(yōu)勝劣汰的局面,這樣既能解決代理成本問(wèn)題,又能解決人才流失的問(wèn)題。我國(guó)公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃仍處于發(fā)展階段。本文介紹了上海家化在不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)背景下的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃。相比之下,產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)變更之后的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案更加科學(xué),但是也有不足之處。針對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃存在的不足,本文分析了原因并提出建議。本文采用了文獻(xiàn)研究法、案例研究法、比較分析法和財(cái)務(wù)分析法。全文被分為六個(gè)部分。第一部分是引言,該部分闡述了研究背景和意義,對(duì)文獻(xiàn)做了總結(jié)和歸納,并論述了本文的研究思路以及主要采用的研究方法。第二部分是股權(quán)激勵(lì)的理論概述,該部分陳述了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的概念并總結(jié)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的意義、主要模式和理論基礎(chǔ)。第三部分對(duì)上海家化聯(lián)合股份有限公司(以下簡(jiǎn)稱“上海家化”)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案做了具體介紹并且將四次股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案進(jìn)行對(duì)比,然后分析了股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的實(shí)施效果。雖然相比以前,股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案更加科學(xué),但是還存在一些問(wèn)題,所以本文的第四部分闡述了上海家化股權(quán)激勵(lì)的具體問(wèn)題,進(jìn)而分析這些問(wèn)題存在的原因。對(duì)此,本文有針對(duì)性地提出了解決方案,針對(duì)上海家化股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案出現(xiàn)的問(wèn)題提出了一些建議。第六部分是結(jié)束語(yǔ),主要內(nèi)容就是對(duì)本文的總結(jié)�？偠�言之,股權(quán)激勵(lì)在不同產(chǎn)權(quán)背景下都會(huì)產(chǎn)生問(wèn)題,并不是說(shuō)由國(guó)企變更為民企之后,上海家化的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案就是完美無(wú)缺的。公司需要有一個(gè)完善的治理體系。監(jiān)管部門(mén)也應(yīng)該區(qū)別對(duì)待國(guó)企和民企。
[Abstract]:As for human resource management, the problems faced by companies are how to attract talented people and how to make shareholders and managers share common interests. A lasting and effective incentive mechanism can be established for a sound company. Equity incentive is very popular in companies because it plays a very important role in retaining talents and maximizing enterprise value. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals in the United States was the first to adopt this incentive. Pfizer gives managers a share of the company's equity, so the company's interests are aligned with their personal interests, reducing their chances of making bad choices at work. Companies can use equity incentives to make the motivated person one of the owners of the company. The more managers who are granted shares in the company, the more relevant they are to the interests of the company, and the greater the liability. The biggest problem of human resources department is how to attract talents while stabilizing outstanding employees. If the company can let the outstanding employees hold shares and establish a more scientific and perfect performance appraisal system, then the employees will also work hard for their personal interests. While employees work hard, it also helps to maximize the value of the enterprise. A scientific performance appraisal system will form the situation of survival of the fittest, which can not only solve the problem of agency cost, but also solve the problem of brain drain. The stock right incentive plan of our country company is still in the development stage. This paper introduces the equity incentive plan of Shanghai Jiahua under the background of different property rights. In contrast, the equity incentive scheme after the change of property rights is more scientific, but also has shortcomings. In view of the deficiency of equity incentive plan, this paper analyzes the reasons and puts forward some suggestions. This article adopts the literature research method, the case study method, the comparative analysis method and the financial analysis method. The full text is divided into six parts. The first part is the introduction, which describes the background and significance of the research, summarizes and summarizes the literature, and discusses the research ideas and main research methods adopted in this paper. The second part is an overview of the theory of equity incentive, which describes the concept of equity incentive and summarizes the significance, main mode and theoretical basis of equity incentive. The third part introduces the equity incentive scheme of Shanghai Jiahua United Co., Ltd (hereinafter referred to as "Shanghai Jiahua") and compares the four equity incentive schemes, and then analyzes the implementation effect of the equity incentive scheme. Although the equity incentive scheme is more scientific than before, there are still some problems, so the fourth part of this paper expounds the specific problems of Shanghai Jiahua equity incentive, and then analyzes the reasons for these problems. In this paper, the author puts forward some solutions, and puts forward some suggestions on the problems of Shanghai Jiahua's equity incentive scheme. The sixth part is the conclusion, the main content is the summary of this paper. In a word, the equity incentive will cause problems under different property rights background. It is not to say that after the change from state-owned enterprises to private enterprises, Shanghai Jiahua's equity incentive scheme is perfect. The company needs a perfect governance system. Regulators should also treat state-owned and private-owned enterprises differently.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F426.72

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