發(fā)布時間：2018-06-01 06:26

  本文選題：股權(quán)激勵 + 解鎖條件�。� 參考：《湘潭大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵自90年代進入我國至今,掀起了幾次股權(quán)激勵浪潮,2011年開始我國股權(quán)激勵的公司增多,到2015年噴井式爆發(fā),再度掀起一股股權(quán)激勵熱潮。股權(quán)激勵以委托代理理論為基礎(chǔ),實行的是一種長期激勵模式,它通過向激勵者分配公司業(yè)績增長所帶來的紅利分配給激勵對象,以解決公司所有者與經(jīng)營者由于利益不一致所產(chǎn)生的委托代理成本問題,所以被認為能有效的吸引和留住人才。鑒于股權(quán)激勵在高新企業(yè)的作用更為凸顯,因此文章選取信息服務業(yè)中的新大陸電腦有限公司(簡稱“新大陸”)的股權(quán)激勵作為研究的對象,介紹了股權(quán)激勵的方案,通過與信息技術(shù)行業(yè)的平均值進行橫向比較,同時選取與新大陸股權(quán)激勵時間相近,企業(yè)性質(zhì)相似的企業(yè)如大華股權(quán)等公司的數(shù)據(jù)縱向比較。具體的方法是以新大陸開始實施股權(quán)激勵年份為分界線,比較實施股權(quán)激勵前三年以及實施股權(quán)激勵后的數(shù)據(jù),研究新大陸方案設(shè)計中的關(guān)于股權(quán)激勵五大要素,以此考察新大陸股權(quán)激勵計劃是否合理。文章發(fā)現(xiàn)進行股權(quán)激勵后,新大陸的經(jīng)營業(yè)績持續(xù)增長,但新大陸股權(quán)激勵方案中仍存在著設(shè)置業(yè)績指標單一,解鎖條件過低,授予股票數(shù)量較少,其股權(quán)激勵模式以及授予價格設(shè)置不合理等問題。文章針對股權(quán)激勵中存在的問題提出相應的調(diào)整建議,為新大陸及其他上市公司股權(quán)激勵方案提供借鑒意義。股權(quán)激勵研究多數(shù)從其績效出發(fā),研究其股權(quán)激勵效果。文章在一定程度上提供了一條思路,即研究股權(quán)激勵可以從股權(quán)激勵各要素切入,在充分考察公司所處發(fā)展階段以及員工結(jié)構(gòu)的基礎(chǔ)的之下研究新大陸的股權(quán)激勵計劃。公司可以從股權(quán)激勵的五大要素入手,制定合理的股權(quán)激勵計劃以便讓高新技術(shù)企業(yè)更為有效的保留住人才以及發(fā)揮出其應有的作用,完善公司股權(quán)激勵計劃,而不是為圖方便跟隨行業(yè)內(nèi)“潮流”,套用其他公司的股權(quán)激勵計劃。
[Abstract]:Since the entry of equity incentive into our country in the 1990s, there have been several waves of equity incentive. In 2011, the number of companies with equity incentive has increased, and in 2015, a new wave of equity incentive has been set off. The equity incentive is based on the principal-agent theory and implements a long-term incentive model, which distributes the dividend brought by the increase of the company's performance to the incentive object. In order to solve the problem of principal-agent cost caused by the inconsistency of interests between the owner and the operator, it is considered that it can attract and retain talents effectively. In view of the more prominent role of equity incentive in high-tech enterprises, this paper selects the stock right incentive of New World computer Co., Ltd ("New World") as the object of study, and introduces the scheme of equity incentive. Through the horizontal comparison with the average value of the information technology industry, the longitudinal comparison of the data of the enterprises such as Dahua stock right and other companies with similar nature and similar time of equity incentive to the New World is carried out at the same time. The specific method is to take the year of equity incentive as the dividing line, compare the data of the first three years before and after the implementation of equity incentive, and study the five elements of equity incentive in the plan design of New World. This is to see if the New World equity incentive plan is reasonable. It is found that the operating performance of the New World continues to grow after equity incentive, but there are still a single performance index set in the New World equity incentive scheme, the unlocking conditions are too low, and the number of stocks granted is relatively small. The equity incentive mode and the unreasonable setting of the grant price are also discussed. Aiming at the problems existing in equity incentive, this paper puts forward corresponding adjustment suggestions, which can be used as a reference for stock incentive schemes in New World and other listed companies. Most of the research on equity incentive is based on its performance and the effect of equity incentive. To a certain extent, this paper provides a way to study the equity incentive plan in the new world under the condition of studying the development stage of the company and the basis of the staff structure. The company can start with the five elements of equity incentive, formulate reasonable equity incentive plan in order to enable high-tech enterprises to retain resident talent more effectively and give play to its due role, and perfect the company's equity incentive plan. Instead of following industry trends for convenience, apply equity incentives from other companies.
【學位授予單位】：湘潭大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F426.6;F272.92

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本文編號：1963187