發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-20 11:46

  本文選題：不當(dāng)解雇賠償　切入點(diǎn)：合作博弈　出處：《中國(guó)人力資源開發(fā)》2017年03期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：在中國(guó),不當(dāng)解雇引起的賠償金爭(zhēng)議日益增多。本文首先對(duì)美、英、法、德四國(guó)相關(guān)規(guī)制進(jìn)行比較研究,分析并總結(jié)出不當(dāng)解雇賠償需經(jīng)勞雇雙方博弈來(lái)確定賠償責(zé)任和賠償標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的內(nèi)在運(yùn)行機(jī)制。以諾基亞(蘇州)不當(dāng)解雇賠償案例為引導(dǎo),基于一個(gè)合作博弈分析,得出賠償金數(shù)額的大小受勞雇雙方賠償金談判的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好影響等結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:In China, disputes over compensation caused by improper dismissal are increasing day by day. This paper first makes a comparative study of the relevant regulations of the United States, Britain, France and Germany. This paper analyzes and summarizes the inherent operating mechanism of the compensation for improper dismissal based on the game between labor and employee. Based on the analysis of a cooperative game, this paper takes the case of improper dismissal compensation in Suzhou as the guide. It is concluded that the amount of compensation is influenced by the risk preference in the negotiation of compensation.
【作者單位】： 北京物資學(xué)院勞動(dòng)科學(xué)與法律學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】：D922.52
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本文編號(hào)：1638939