發(fā)布時(shí)間：2016-05-11 06:39

1.到目前為止，在前面的章節(jié)中我已經(jīng)討論了在南海地區(qū)的沖突的性質(zhì)與程度，以及多種多樣索賠的條件。本章的重點(diǎn)是講中國在南海地區(qū)政策的轉(zhuǎn)變，以及分析導(dǎo)致發(fā)生這些變化的原因。

2.許多學(xué)者和分析師認(rèn)為，中國在20世紀(jì)90年代初與所有的索償國轉(zhuǎn)向多邊主義以及出現(xiàn)軍事行動(dòng)導(dǎo)致在南海地區(qū)沖突的性質(zhì)轉(zhuǎn)變。有的人認(rèn)為這是中國外交政策的變化和冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束的結(jié)果。其他人認(rèn)為是東盟之間不斷加強(qiáng)的政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)影響力，以及東南亞的相互依存關(guān)系的加強(qiáng)，并且引入東盟內(nèi)部以及東盟與中國之間的多邊會(huì)談的結(jié)果。許多學(xué)者認(rèn)為，非正式會(huì)談和談判的“東盟方式”一直是變革的催化劑。 [1]

中國在南海政策上的最新變化包括進(jìn)攻性軍事行動(dòng)的減少，，并且增加使用外交政策，中國在該地區(qū)與南海周邊國家的多邊合作。

1. So far in previous chapters I have discussed the nature & extent of conflict in SCS region and claims laid by various claimants. The focus in this chapter will be on the shift in China's policies in SCS region and analyse the issues which led to these changes taking place.

2. Many scholars and analysts see the shift to multilateralism and check on military actions by all the claimant nations with China in particuar in the early 1990s as a transformation in the nature of the conflict in SCS region. Some chalk it up as a result of changes in China's foreign policies in the region and the end of the Cold War. Others attribute the transformation to the increasing political and economic influence of ASEAN, increasing interdependence in Southeast Asia, or to the very introduction of multilateral talks within ASEAN and between ASEAN and China. A number of scholars claim that the "ASEAN Way" of slow, informal talks and negotiations has been the catalyst for change. [1] 

3. Recent shifts in China's SCS policy include a decrease in offensive military action, an increase in its use of diplomacy in the region &China's engagement into multilateral cooperation with its neighboring states in SCS. These unexpected moves by China in her foreign policy affairs have been very contemporary issue and raise several doubts/apprehensions. This chapter briefly mentions these shifts in China's policies. Also this chapter examines various factors that had led to this perceptible shift in China's SCS policies with special emphasis on the adoption of functions of multilaterism in SCS.

Shift in China's SCS Policies
4. In this section of the chapter I will discuss the various evidences & actions of China which indicate towards shift in China's policies with regard to her territorial disputes from use of force/military, assertiveness or preference for bilaterism to multilaterism.

5. China specialists have noted trends in PRC behavior, both in general and towards the SCS territorial disputes specifically .One clearly demonstrated trend is the virtual absence of Chinese military actions, blatant or covert, to acquire new territories in the SCS region since its occupation of Philippine claimed Mischief Reef in 1995. In the late 1990s, Beijing significantly increased its engagement with international institutions and diplomacy. Both these aspects are explained in the succeeding paras.

6. Decrease in China's Military Actions in SCS Region. China's last offensive actions in SCS were the seizing territory in Pracel islands claimed by Vietnam in 1992 & construction of military out posts in Mischief reef in 1995. Since then in last

two decades there are no actions which point towards the offensive/military/aggressive intent of PRC in the SCS region. The likely reasons for the same are given as under:-

(a) Diminishing PLA's Influence. The one of the major reason which can be attributed to the non-occurrence of any military action by China in SCS region in last two decades can be attributed to the depoliticizing of PLA and also decrease in PLA's influence & domination on foreign policy affairs of PRC.

(b) Military Actions & Trade. Many promoters of economic interdependence claim that Beijing adjusted its SCS policy away from military coercion in favor of peaceful diplomacy tomaintain its international trade in general and trade with Southeast Asia specifically. As per the analysis, it is evident that during the incidents of Tinamen Square in 1989 the Chinese trade with ASEAN, the USA & EU countries dropped to half & the similar trend was observed in 1996 after the incidents of occupation of Mischief Reef &the missile exercises in the TaiwanStraits.

(c) No Scope for Occupation of Any Island Territory in SCS.Virtually every island and reef in the SCS capable of supporting some kind of military presence had been occupied by littoral states in the late 1990s . Thus the scope for any further attempt by China or another littoral state to seize an unoccupied island worth holding has simply disappeared. In many ways SCS disputes had de-escalated and reached a stalemate at the end of the 1990s. [2] 

7. Increased Participation in International Organisation & Enhanced Diplomatic Efforts.
Contrary to China's policies of bilaterism when it comes to the dealings with her SE Asian neighbours on the issues of SCS, there has been a sudden shift in China's involvement & participation in international organization since the 1990s. To support the same statistically as mentioned by Alastair Iain Johnston in his article "Is China a Status Quo Power?," that during the eight-year period from 1989 to 1997, the number of Chinese international organizational memberships nearly doubled from just over 30 to over 50 & examined that the increase in China's membership in international organizations is related to a nation's state of development. [3] 

China's Inclination to Functions of Multilaterism or Soft Power Diplomacy. Although the Chinese have always maintained a cautious stance towards multilateralism, however offlate they have seen the potential benefits for participating in multilateral cooperation. This remarkable change of attitude took place in the 1990s. Premier Li Peng's visit in Singapore in August 1990 has indicated China's willingness to seek a peaceful settlement of the disputes in SCS region multilaterally. During his trip, Li announced that China was prepared to set aside the territorial disputes in the SCS and pursue cooperation with the other claimants to explore the region collectively. Chinese Foreign Minister QianQichen stated during his trip to Singapore in 1993 that, "as for security cooperation, in our view, we may start off with bilateral and regional security dialogues of various forms, at different levels and through various channels in response to the diversity of the region. China will actively participate in these dialogues and consultations". Almost at the same time, China's officials

and experts, who attended in a "private capacity", began to talk with their Southeast Asian counterparts on the SCS issue at multilateral conferences and workshops.

(c) Signing the Multination Code of Conduct. A watershed event leading to this perception of a more diplomatically mature China was its acceptance of ASEAN's demand formultilateral negotiations, specifically when dealing with the SCS territorial disputes. On 4 November 2002, China signed a multilateral

"Declaration on the Conductof Parties in the SCS" with ASEAN, breaking Beijing's long-standingdemand to limit territorial disputes to bilateral talks. [4] The declaration is the first multilateral agreement signed by China prohibiting the seizure of additional territories in the SCS& states that the signatories,"Undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes bypeaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, throughfriendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directlyconcerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles ofinternational lawa

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