發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-04 11:34

  本文選題：政黨政治　切入點(diǎn)：庇護(hù)主義　出處：《武漢大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：印度被稱為世界上最大的民主國(guó)家,選民的投票熱情甚至超過發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家。然而,庇護(hù)主義、腐敗與族群沖突讓這場(chǎng)"最大規(guī)模的民主行動(dòng)"掛上混亂的惡名。競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性的民主制度并沒有真正改善印度選民的生活狀態(tài),貧富差距依舊很大。庇護(hù)主義幫助解釋印度高昂的投票熱情與不斷加劇的社會(huì)不平等之間的悖論。印度選舉政治經(jīng)歷了 70年,從國(guó)大黨體制向多黨競(jìng)爭(zhēng)過渡,庇護(hù)主義仍然存在甚至根深蒂固。激烈的政黨競(jìng)爭(zhēng)如何影響庇護(hù)主義,政黨政治與庇護(hù)主義的關(guān)系是什么?這是作者試圖解釋的問題。本文的觀點(diǎn)是,第一,印度政黨依靠庇護(hù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)展開政治動(dòng)員,政黨競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度的變化改變了印度庇護(hù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)結(jié)構(gòu),庇護(hù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)重心下沉,最終導(dǎo)致庇護(hù)主義進(jìn)一步滲透。第二,政黨為了緩解庇護(hù)資源的分配壓力,他們通過情感動(dòng)員的方式加強(qiáng)庇護(hù)紐帶的韌性,最終導(dǎo)致族群民主主義的興起,并加劇政黨競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的激化,推動(dòng)第二輪庇護(hù)主義的滲透,形成閉合的自我循環(huán)圈。本文試圖從國(guó)家-社會(huì)視角解釋政黨競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與庇護(hù)主義的關(guān)系。國(guó)家制度框架上,印度中央集權(quán)的聯(lián)邦制和潘查雅特的設(shè)立為印度庇護(hù)主義的滲透提供了制度空間。社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)上,異質(zhì)多元的印度社會(huì)為政黨政治的變化提供了可能性。同時(shí),作者再現(xiàn)了宗主-掮客-侍從的庇護(hù)金字塔,探析庇護(hù)紐帶的物質(zhì)與情感屬性,了解政黨競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下庇護(hù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)的動(dòng)力變化。作者將印度政黨競(jìng)爭(zhēng)作為自變量,將庇護(hù)主義及其庇護(hù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)作為因變量。我們對(duì)比了國(guó)大黨體制時(shí)期與多黨競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)期的庇護(hù)網(wǎng)絡(luò),分析庇護(hù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)構(gòu)成與交換方式的變化。英迪拉時(shí)期,為了彌補(bǔ)尼赫魯去世造成的黨內(nèi)權(quán)威下降,英迪拉通過民粹主義的方式建立從總理-選民的庇護(hù)機(jī)器,繞開了國(guó)大黨傳統(tǒng)的庇護(hù)網(wǎng)絡(luò),最終削弱了國(guó)大黨的選民基礎(chǔ),庇護(hù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)的重心下沉至各邦。多黨競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)期,印度聯(lián)邦政治地方化,地方性政黨對(duì)全國(guó)資源分配具有杠桿作用,低級(jí)種姓與經(jīng)濟(jì)能人開始建立自己的庇護(hù)網(wǎng)絡(luò),取代傳統(tǒng)高級(jí)種姓的支配地位。潘查雅特制度的設(shè)立,讓地方性政黨的庇護(hù)交換滲透到村一級(jí),庇護(hù)主義更有生命力。最后本文預(yù)測(cè),印度庇護(hù)型民主存在結(jié)構(gòu)性衰朽,即依靠物質(zhì)激勵(lì)展開政治動(dòng)員,政府將面臨滾雪球式的分配壓力,權(quán)力尋租和腐敗現(xiàn)象難以杜絕。任何結(jié)構(gòu)性的調(diào)整將削弱政黨的選民基礎(chǔ),只能通過財(cái)政透支的方式暫緩印度民主的通脹現(xiàn)象。
[Abstract]:India is known as the world's largest democracy, with voters voting even more enthusiastically than developed countries. Corruption and ethnic conflict have given this "biggest democratic act" a reputation for chaos. Competitive democracy has not really improved the lives of Indian voters. The gap between the rich and the poor is still wide. Asylum doctrine helps explain the paradox between India's high voting enthusiasm and rising social inequality. After 70 years of electoral politics, India's transition from the Congress party system to multiparty competition. Asylum still exists or even deep-rooted. How does fierce party competition affect asylum, and what is the relationship between party politics and asylum? This is the question the author is trying to explain. First, the political parties in India rely on the asylum network for political mobilization. The change in the intensity of political party competition has changed the structure of Indian asylum network, and the center of gravity of the asylum network has sunk. This eventually led to the further infiltration of asylum doctrine. Second, in order to ease the pressure on the distribution of asylum resources, political parties strengthened the resilience of asylum ties through emotional mobilization, and eventually led to the rise of ethnic democracy. This paper tries to explain the relationship between political party competition and asylum from the perspective of state and society, in the framework of national system, and promote the penetration of the second round of asylum doctrine, and form a closed circle of self-circulation, which intensifies the aggravation of the competition of political parties, and promotes the infiltration of the second round of asylum doctrine. The centralized federal system in India and the establishment of Panchayat provide institutional space for the penetration of asylum in India. In terms of social structure, the heterogeneous and pluralistic Indian society provides the possibility for the change of party politics. The author reproduces the asylum pyramid of the patriarchs, brokers and attendants, explores the material and emotional attributes of the sheltered ties, and understands the dynamic changes of the sheltered network under the competition of political parties. The author regards the competition of Indian political parties as an independent variable. Taking asylum doctrine and its sheltered network as dependent variables, we compare the asylum network between the Congress Party system and the multi-party competition period, and analyze the changes in the composition and exchange mode of the asylum network. To compensate for the decline in party authority caused by Nehru's death, Indira built a populist asylum machine from the prime minister to voters, bypassing the party's traditional asylum network and ultimately weakening the party's voter base. The center of gravity of the asylum network sank to the states. During the period of multi-party competition, the localization of federal politics in India, the local political parties leveraged the distribution of resources throughout the country, the lower castes and the economically able began to build their own sheltered networks. Instead of the dominant position of the traditional high caste, the establishment of the Panchayat system allowed the exchange of asylum among local political parties to permeate the village level, and asylum doctrine became more alive. Finally, this paper predicts that there is a structural decay in asylum democracy in India. That is, relying on material incentives for political mobilization, the government will face snowball pressure on distribution, power rent-seeking and corruption will be hard to eliminate. Any structural adjustment will weaken the party's voter base. India's democratic inflation can only be put on hold by fiscal overdraft.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D735.1

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