發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-31 19:09

  本文選題：戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè) + 股權(quán)激勵(lì)　； 參考：《中南民族大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)代表著一個(gè)國(guó)家的綜合實(shí)力,戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展在促進(jìn)我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展中起著關(guān)鍵作用,因此,我國(guó)戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展受到廣泛關(guān)注。近些年來,為了促進(jìn)戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展,我國(guó)中央政府制定和提出了一系列戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展規(guī)劃,并將戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)劃分為七大領(lǐng)域。戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)在有關(guān)政策的扶持下,也得到了蓬勃發(fā)展。股權(quán)激勵(lì)的產(chǎn)生,源于委托代理問題。早在上個(gè)世紀(jì)50年代底,股權(quán)激勵(lì)這一長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)機(jī)制就在美國(guó)誕生了,股權(quán)激勵(lì)措施的實(shí)施確實(shí)也為企業(yè)帶來了收益,隨后也有很多國(guó)家效仿美國(guó)卷入股權(quán)激勵(lì)浪潮中,但這一激勵(lì)機(jī)制在我國(guó)的發(fā)展卻相對(duì)緩慢。近些年來,隨著我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的完善,越來越多的上市公司開始嘗試股權(quán)激勵(lì)。在這樣一個(gè)背景下,研究戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)公司績(jī)效與股權(quán)激勵(lì)關(guān)系就很有必要。本文首先對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施前后公司的績(jī)效進(jìn)行對(duì)比,衡量公司績(jī)效的指標(biāo),考慮到我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的不完全,并沒有采用國(guó)外經(jīng)常使用的托賓Q值等指標(biāo),而是采用凈資產(chǎn)收益率和每股收益這兩項(xiàng)財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo),對(duì)比結(jié)果顯示,實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施后公司績(jī)效較股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施前公司績(jī)效有顯著提高,這說明股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施有助于公司績(jī)效的提高,對(duì)回歸方程進(jìn)行回歸,結(jié)果顯示,股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司績(jī)效之間呈非線性關(guān)系。其次,本文研究了不同激勵(lì)比例對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響。本文將樣本公司以激勵(lì)比例的大小分為兩個(gè)樣本,激勵(lì)比例小于3%的公司為樣本一、激勵(lì)比例大于3%的公司為樣本二,對(duì)這兩個(gè)樣本的回歸方程進(jìn)行回歸,回歸結(jié)果顯示,當(dāng)股權(quán)激勵(lì)小于3%時(shí),公司績(jī)效隨著股權(quán)激勵(lì)比例的增加而成顯著正相關(guān),當(dāng)股權(quán)激勵(lì)比例超過3%時(shí),公司績(jī)效隨著股權(quán)激勵(lì)比例的增加呈現(xiàn)不顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,這說明,股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施效果跟激勵(lì)比例之間有著重要關(guān)系,企業(yè)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)時(shí),應(yīng)充分考慮股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施比例,優(yōu)化股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果。最后,本文研究了不同股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響。將樣本公司以股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式的不同分為兩個(gè)樣本,采取股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)模式的公司為樣本一,采取限制性股票激勵(lì)模式的公司為樣本二,對(duì)比分析兩種激勵(lì)模式的激勵(lì)效果。結(jié)果表明,限制性股票激勵(lì)模式的股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果要優(yōu)于股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)模式。
[Abstract]:Strategic emerging industries represent the comprehensive strength of a country, and the development of strategic emerging industries plays a key role in promoting the economic development of our country. Therefore, the development of strategic emerging industries in China has received extensive attention. In recent years, in order to promote the development of strategic emerging industries, China's central government has formulated and proposed a series of strategic emerging industries development plan, and divided strategic emerging industries into seven major areas. Strategic emerging industries in the support of relevant policies, has also been vigorous development. The emergence of equity incentive originates from the principal-agent problem. As early as the late 1950s, the long-term incentive mechanism of equity incentive was born in the United States, the implementation of equity incentive measures did bring benefits to enterprises, and then many countries followed the example of the United States involved in the wave of equity incentives. However, the development of this incentive mechanism in China is relatively slow. In recent years, with the perfection of China's capital market, more and more listed companies begin to try equity incentive. Under such a background, it is necessary to study the relationship between performance and equity incentive of strategic emerging industry companies. Firstly, this paper compares the performance of companies before and after the implementation of equity incentives, measures the performance of the company, considering the incomplete capital market in China, does not use the Tobin Q value, which is often used by foreign countries, and so on. The comparative results show that the performance of the company after the implementation of equity incentive is significantly higher than that before the implementation of equity incentive. This shows that the implementation of equity incentive is conducive to the improvement of corporate performance. The regression equation is regressed. The results show that there is a nonlinear relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance. Secondly, this paper studies the effect of different incentive ratio on corporate performance. In this paper, the sample company is divided into two samples according to the size of incentive ratio, the company with incentive ratio less than 3% as sample one and the company with incentive ratio more than 3% as sample two. The regression equation of these two samples is regressed, and the regression results show that, When the equity incentive is less than 3, the corporate performance is positively correlated with the increase of the share incentive ratio, and when the equity incentive ratio exceeds 3, the corporate performance shows no significant negative correlation with the increase of the equity incentive ratio. There is an important relationship between the effect of equity incentive and the proportion of incentive. When enterprises implement equity incentive, the proportion of equity incentive should be fully considered to optimize the effect of equity incentive. Finally, this paper studies the impact of different equity incentive models on corporate performance. The sample companies are divided into two samples according to the different equity incentive models. The companies with stock option incentive model are sample one and those with restrictive stock incentive mode are sample two. The incentive effects of the two incentive modes are analyzed comparatively. The results show that the equity incentive effect of restrictive stock incentive mode is better than that of stock option incentive mode.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中南民族大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F276.44;F272.92

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