發(fā)布時間：2017-12-31 21:25

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：上市公司股東利益沖突和行為監(jiān)督博弈分析　出處：《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 股權(quán)集中度 混合策略均衡 比較靜態(tài)分析 股權(quán)分置

【摘要】：在高度集中的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下，大股東代表全體股東掌握公司的控制權(quán)，擔(dān)當(dāng)起搜集信息、監(jiān)督經(jīng)理人以及做出重大決策的責(zé)任�？毓晒蓶|為追求私人利益侵害公司和其他股東的利益。 本文首先建立股東利益沖突成因的博弈模型，分析大小股東間監(jiān)督經(jīng)理人的博弈，得到博弈均衡結(jié)果：大股東選擇監(jiān)督經(jīng)理人，小股東選擇搭便車不監(jiān)督經(jīng)理人，小股東由此放棄了公司的控制權(quán)。然后分別在同股同價以及股權(quán)分置假設(shè)下建立股東利益侵害模型，分析大股東侵害小股東利益的額外收益、付出損失以及何種條件下大股東會選擇侵害小股東，得到博弈結(jié)果：同股同價下公司經(jīng)營不善時大股東會選擇侵害小股東；股權(quán)分制下高股價（流通價）的公司大股東會選擇侵害小股東。再而建立股東行為監(jiān)督博弈模型，分析有外部監(jiān)管使大股東侵占行為受到懲罰時，大小股東間侵害與被侵害、監(jiān)督與被監(jiān)督的混合博弈均衡。并做比較靜態(tài)分析，得到對大股東的懲罰力度、小股東的監(jiān)督成本、企業(yè)規(guī)模、流通股與非流通股股價差異、股價隨供求變動情況、公司長期發(fā)展態(tài)勢以及公司獲利能力等因素對大股東侵占行為的影響。 最后通過分析和綜合博弈結(jié)果，最終從健全經(jīng)理人市場，合理緩解發(fā)行市場和流通市場間的股價失衡，加大對控股股東侵占小股東行為的處罰力度，加強上市公司的信息披露，加強對大規(guī)模企業(yè)的監(jiān)管力度，，健全保護(hù)中小投資者的法律制度，提高小股東自身素質(zhì)等七個方面給出可行建議。
[Abstract]:Under the highly centralized ownership structure, the majority shareholders hold the control of the company on behalf of all the shareholders and play the role of collecting information. Supervision of managers and responsibility for making major decisions. Controlling shareholders violate the interests of the company and other shareholders in pursuit of private interests. This paper first establishes the game model of the causes of shareholders' conflict of interest, analyzes the game of supervisory managers between large and small shareholders, and obtains the game equilibrium result: the majority shareholders choose the supervisory managers. The minority shareholders choose to hitchhike without supervising managers, so the minority shareholders give up the control rights of the company. Then, under the assumption of the same share price and the split share structure, the model of shareholders' interests infringement is established. This paper analyzes the additional benefits of the large shareholders against the interests of the minority shareholders, the loss and the conditions under which the large shareholders will choose to infringe on the minority shareholders. The result of the game is as follows: under the same share and same price, when the company is mismanaged, the large shareholders will choose to infringe on the minority shareholders; Large shareholders of companies with high share price (current price) under the split share system will choose to infringe on minority shareholders. Then the game model of shareholder behavior supervision is established to analyze the penalty of the behavior of large shareholders encroaching on by external supervision. Large and small shareholders are infringed and infringed, supervision and supervision of the mixed game equilibrium. And compared with static analysis, get the punishment of large shareholders, the supervision cost of small shareholders, the size of the enterprise. The difference between tradable and non-tradable shares, the influence of the stock price with the change of supply and demand, the long-term development situation of the company and the profitability of the company on the behavior of major shareholders' encroachment. Finally through the analysis and the synthesis game result, finally from the sound manager market, reasonably alleviates the stock price imbalance between the issuing market and the circulation market, increases to the controlling shareholder encroach the minority shareholder behavior punishment dynamics. Seven feasible suggestions are put forward, such as strengthening the information disclosure of listed companies, strengthening the supervision of large-scale enterprises, perfecting the legal system to protect the small and medium-sized investors, and improving the quality of the minority shareholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F224.32;F832.51

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 劉浩;李增泉;孫錚;;控股股東的產(chǎn)權(quán)收益實現(xiàn)方式與利益輸送轉(zhuǎn)向——兼論中國的股權(quán)分置改革[J];財經(jīng)研究;2010年04期

2 何威風(fēng);吳水蘭;;資本結(jié)構(gòu)與代理問題研究綜述[J];財會通訊;2009年12期

3 聶晶;;經(jīng)營者代理問題與控股股東代理問題的比較[J];財政監(jiān)督;2011年23期

4 宋小保;劉星;陳其安;;控股股東代理的激勵與侵占效應(yīng)分析[J];管理工程學(xué)報;2009年01期

5 楊忠海;周曉蘇;;制度環(huán)境、控股股東行為與財務(wù)報告透明度[J];公司治理評論;2010年03期

6 桂彬;;淺析中小股東權(quán)益的保護(hù)[J];法制博覽(中旬刊);2013年02期

7 牛文浩;;我國上市公司非公平關(guān)聯(lián)交易的經(jīng)濟(jì)倫理學(xué)研究[J];廣東廣播電視大學(xué)學(xué)報;2012年06期

8 葉樹生;;控股股東與中小股東代理問題探析——一種文獻(xiàn)回顧[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì);2011年05期

9 郝瑞;張勇;王歡;;控股股東與小股東代理問題研究[J];合作經(jīng)濟(jì)與科技;2009年10期

10 褚曉琳;王文舉;;基于內(nèi)部人控制的股權(quán)融資偏好博弈分析[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理研究;2010年12期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 李曉娣;基于博弈分析的企業(yè)集團(tuán)公司治理模式研究[D];哈爾濱工程大學(xué);2006年

本文編號：1361551