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  本文關鍵詞：中國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)業(yè)績關系研究　出處：《財政部財政科學研究所》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關文章： 創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司 高管薪酬 企業(yè)業(yè)績

【摘要】：創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司2009年上市以來,短短三年時間內已在中國資本市場占據了重要地位,具有高成長、高風險、高波動特點的創(chuàng)業(yè)板對于我國還是一個新興的板塊,與主板上市公司區(qū)別較大,而目前我國研究多針對于主板市場,對創(chuàng)業(yè)板的相關研究較少,研究深度及廣度不夠,對其研究的重要性日益凸顯,因此需要加強對創(chuàng)業(yè)板的研究。近些年,我國上市公司的高管薪酬逐年增長,但公司的業(yè)績卻有盈有虧,高管薪酬與公司業(yè)績之間的關系并不明顯,似乎有脫鉤跡象。本文通過研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)業(yè)績的關系,提供一些有助于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司提高經營業(yè)績的建議。 本文采用理論分析和實證分析相結合的方法,以委托代理理論、激勵理論、人力資本理論分析為基礎,具體研究了影響高管薪酬的幾大因素,采用創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司2011年數據,以高管薪酬為因變量,業(yè)績指標為自變量,構建高管薪酬與企業(yè)績效相關性的基本模型,設置公司經營特征、股權特征、治理特征等控制變量,通過分析創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)業(yè)績的關系,尋求解決創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司委托代理問題的辦法,優(yōu)化創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司機制。 通過實證分析本文得出以下結論：第一,從公司的業(yè)績特征來看,高管薪酬與企業(yè)業(yè)績具有顯著的正相關關系；第二,從公司經營特征來看,高管薪酬與企業(yè)規(guī)模具有較強的相關性,高管薪酬與公司風險僅存在微弱的負相關關系；第三,從公司股權特征來看,高管薪酬與公司股權集中度存在顯著的負相關關系,高管薪酬與公司股權制衡度呈現不顯著正相關性；第四,從公司治理特征來看,高管薪酬與兩職合一具有不顯著的負相關性,高管薪酬與獨立董事比例具有微弱的正相關關系,高管薪酬與監(jiān)事會規(guī)模成不顯著的負相關關系。 基于實證研究結論,建議創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司完善薪酬激勵機制,注重激勵效果以及長短期激勵方式的結合；進一步完善公司治理與監(jiān)督機制,發(fā)揮獨立董事、監(jiān)事會等應有的監(jiān)督管理職能；在合理的范圍內適當增加高管人員的薪酬差距,帶動高管群內部的創(chuàng)優(yōu)爭先；最終強調要提高信息披露的透明度,從根本上消除所有者與經營者之間的信息不對稱。
[Abstract]:Since 2009, gem listed companies have occupied an important position in Chinese capital market in a short period of three years, with high growth and high risk. The gem with high volatility is still a new plate in our country, which is different from the listed companies in the main board. But at present, most of the research in our country is aimed at the main board market, but there is little research on the gem. The depth and breadth of the research is not enough, the importance of its research is becoming increasingly prominent, so we need to strengthen the research on the gem. In recent years, the executive compensation of listed companies in China has increased year by year, but the performance of the company has earnings and losses. The relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance is not obvious and seems to be decoupled. This paper studies the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in gem listed companies. To provide some help gem listed companies to improve business performance recommendations. Based on the principal-agent theory, incentive theory and human capital theory, this paper studies several factors that affect executive compensation. With the 2011 data of gem listed companies, taking executive compensation as dependent variable and performance index as independent variable, this paper constructs the basic model of the correlation between executive compensation and enterprise performance, and sets up the characteristics of company management and equity. By analyzing the relationship between executive compensation and enterprise performance of gem listed companies, we seek to solve the problem of entrustment and agency of gem listed companies, and optimize the mechanism of gem listed companies. Through the empirical analysis of the following conclusions: first, from the company's performance characteristics, executive compensation and corporate performance has a significant positive correlation; Second, according to the characteristics of company management, executive compensation has a strong correlation with the scale of the enterprise, and there is only a weak negative correlation between executive compensation and corporate risk. Thirdly, there is a significant negative correlation between executive compensation and equity concentration, and there is no significant positive correlation between executive compensation and equity balance. 4th, from the corporate governance characteristics, executive compensation and the integration of two positions have no significant negative correlation, executive compensation and the proportion of independent directors have a weak positive correlation. There is no significant negative correlation between executive compensation and the scale of supervisory board. Based on the conclusion of empirical research, it is suggested that the listed companies of gem should improve the compensation incentive mechanism, pay attention to the combination of incentive effect and short-term and long-term incentives; Further improve the corporate governance and supervision mechanism, give play to the independent director, board of supervisors and other due supervision and management functions; In a reasonable range, appropriately increase the pay gap of senior executives, driving the internal top management group to create excellence; Finally, the transparency of information disclosure should be improved, and the information asymmetry between owner and operator should be eliminated fundamentally.
【學位授予單位】：財政部財政科學研究所
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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