【摘要】：改革開放以來，中國社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)高速發(fā)展的同時(shí)，礦難也受到了普遍關(guān)注，，礦難已然成為中國久治不愈的百年沉珂。煤礦安全事故的發(fā)生與煤礦安全治理息息相關(guān)，改革開放以來，我國經(jīng)歷了由計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)向市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的變遷，經(jīng)濟(jì)體制的變革同時(shí)也深深地影響著我國的煤礦安全治理。伴隨著鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)煤礦的興起，計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)期傳統(tǒng)的單向行政命令式的煤礦安全治理已經(jīng)無法適應(yīng)新的形勢(shì)，煤炭產(chǎn)量大幅增長的同時(shí)，礦難也頻繁發(fā)生。這對(duì)我國的煤礦安全治理提出了新的要求。煤礦安全問題制約著我國煤炭工業(yè)的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展，煤礦安全治理是當(dāng)前我國經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)的一項(xiàng)重要內(nèi)容，本文從新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的角度系統(tǒng)分析了我國改革開放以后煤礦安全治理各項(xiàng)措施的演進(jìn)過程，具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 改革開放后煤礦安全治理涉及的主體由原先的政府與煤礦企業(yè)擴(kuò)展到中央政府、地方政府、煤礦企業(yè)，礦工及第三方力量，它們圍繞煤礦安全問題展開了新的利益博弈，從而形成了一系列旨在規(guī)范他們之間關(guān)系的煤礦安全治理措施。本文運(yùn)用制度變遷理論、產(chǎn)權(quán)理論、委托代理理論對(duì)煤礦安全的準(zhǔn)入治理、產(chǎn)權(quán)治理、監(jiān)察治理及行政問責(zé)治理進(jìn)行了分析，并運(yùn)用博弈模型對(duì)委托代理問題進(jìn)行了深入探討，旨在揭示這一制度演進(jìn)的內(nèi)在邏輯及有效運(yùn)行的社會(huì)機(jī)理，以期對(duì)改善我國的煤礦安全治理有所啟發(fā)。 本文的基本結(jié)論為：第一，我國的煤礦安全準(zhǔn)入治理并不是簡單地向減少審批的方向發(fā)展，而是根據(jù)不同的歷史背景由制度供給者與制度需求者的成本收益等多種綜合因素決定的，煤礦安全的準(zhǔn)入治理中還存在著審批者與煤礦企業(yè)信息不對(duì)稱、審批者缺乏有效監(jiān)督等問題。第二，煤礦安全產(chǎn)權(quán)治理的演進(jìn)體現(xiàn)為采礦權(quán)取得制度從無償?shù)接袃數(shù)霓D(zhuǎn)變，通過對(duì)相關(guān)主體激勵(lì)約束的改變逐步改善了我國的煤礦安全狀況。現(xiàn)階段的產(chǎn)權(quán)治理中還存在著采礦權(quán)取得制度亟待完善，國有礦的產(chǎn)權(quán)改革迫在眉睫等問題。第三，煤礦安全監(jiān)察治理從以管代監(jiān)模式向監(jiān)管分離模式的演進(jìn)，主要是通過提高代理人的獨(dú)立性使煤礦安全狀況發(fā)生了好轉(zhuǎn)。現(xiàn)階段煤礦安全監(jiān)察治理中存在著煤礦安全監(jiān)察主體單一、獨(dú)立性不強(qiáng)等問題。第四，煤礦安全行政問責(zé)治理通過提高代理人的違約成本，減少了煤礦安全事故的發(fā)生。目前的行政問責(zé)制中還存在問責(zé)主體單一、缺乏有關(guān)問責(zé)的專門法律等問題。最后，筆者針對(duì)這些問題提出了相應(yīng)的政策建議。 本文的創(chuàng)新之處在于本文認(rèn)為煤礦安全治理是一個(gè)動(dòng)態(tài)的演進(jìn)過程，通過系統(tǒng)地梳理煤礦安全的治理措施，將其分為煤礦安全的準(zhǔn)入治理、產(chǎn)權(quán)治理、監(jiān)察治理及行政問責(zé)治理四個(gè)方面，選取了新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的研究視角，運(yùn)用制度變遷理論、產(chǎn)權(quán)理論與委托代理理論對(duì)這四項(xiàng)措施的演變過程進(jìn)行了分析。但是，本文存在著在一定程度上忽略了科學(xué)技術(shù)對(duì)煤礦安全的影響以及對(duì)法律治理方面的分析不足等問題。四項(xiàng)治理措施之間的相互影響也是我們需要進(jìn)一步研究的問題。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up and the rapid development of China's social and economic development, the mining disaster has also received widespread attention. The mine disaster has become a long lasting century Ceekay in China. The occurrence of coal mine safety accidents is closely related to the management of coal mine safety. Since the reform and opening up, China has experienced the change from the planning economy to the market economy and the reform of the economic system. At the same time, it has a deep influence on the management of coal mine safety in China. With the rise of the township coal mine, the traditional one-way administrative command type coal mine safety management in the planned economy period has been unable to adapt to the new situation, while the coal production has increased greatly, the mine disaster also frequently occurs. This has put forward new requirements for the safety management of the coal mine in our country. The coal mine safety problem restricts the further development of China's coal industry. The coal mine safety management is an important part of the current economic construction in our country. This paper systematically analyzes the evolution process of various measures of the coal mine safety management after the reform and opening up in China, which has important theoretical and practical significance.
After the reform and opening up, the main body of the coal mine safety management is extended from the original government and coal mine enterprises to the central government, the local government, the coal mine enterprises, the miners and the three party forces, which have launched a new benefit game around the coal mine safety problems, thus forming a series of measures to regulate the relationship between them. This paper uses the theory of institutional change, property right theory and principal-agent theory to analyze the admittance management of coal mine safety, property right governance, supervisory governance and administrative accountability management, and makes an in-depth discussion on the principal-agent problem by using the game model, aiming at revealing the internal logic of the system and the effective operation of the social mechanism. It has some inspiration to improve the management of coal mine safety in China.
The basic conclusions of this paper are as follows: first, the management of coal mine safety access in China is not simply developed to reduce the direction of examination and approval, but is determined by a variety of comprehensive factors, such as the cost and benefit of the institutional suppliers and the system needs, according to the different historical background. The information asymmetry, the examiner lacks the effective supervision and so on. Second, the evolution of the coal mine safety property management embodies the transformation of the mining right acquisition system from free to paid, and gradually improves the state of coal mine safety in China through the change of the related subject incentive and constraint. To be perfect, the property rights reform of state-owned mines is imminent. Third, the evolution of coal mine safety supervision and management from the mode of supervision to supervision separation is mainly through the improvement of the independence of the agent to improve the safety of coal mine. Fourth, coal mine safety administrative accountability governance through improving the agent's cost of breach of contract, reduce the occurrence of coal mine safety accidents. The current administrative accountability system still exists a single accountability subject, the lack of specific legal issues related to accountability. Finally, the author put forward the corresponding policy suggestions on these issues.
The innovation of this article lies in the view that the coal mine safety management is a dynamic evolution process. Through systematically combing the management measures of coal mine safety, it divides it into four aspects: the admittance management of the coal mine safety, the property right governance, the supervisory governance and the administrative accountability governance, and selects the research perspective of the new institutional economics and uses the institutional change. Theory, property right theory and principal-agent theory are used to analyze the evolution process of these four measures. However, this paper ignores the impact of science and technology on coal mine safety and the lack of analysis on legal governance to a certain extent. The mutual influence between the four measures is also needed to be further studied. The problem.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：D922.1;F426.21

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