【摘要】：股票期權(quán)激勵往往被上市公司管理層利用,作為向管理層輸送利益的工具,這反映了資本市場和公司治理的不足。更為重要的,股票期權(quán)激勵本身就帶有福利性特征,這一特征在不完善的資本市場可能被放大。本文提出股票期權(quán)"福利化"概念,并對股票期權(quán)"福利化"進行了分類界定,且在此基礎(chǔ)上指出了股票期權(quán)激勵在行權(quán)價格和業(yè)績標準方面存在"理想狀態(tài)",這是界定股票期權(quán)激勵性質(zhì)的關(guān)鍵。
[Abstract]:Stock option incentive is often used by the management of listed companies as a tool to convey benefits to the management, which reflects the lack of capital market and corporate governance. More importantly, stock option incentive itself has welfare characteristics, which may be magnified in imperfect capital markets. This paper puts forward the concept of "welfare" of stock option, and defines the concept of "welfare" of stock option. On this basis, it is pointed out that there is an "ideal state" in the exercise price and performance standard of stock option incentive, which is the key to define the nature of stock option incentive.
【作者單位】： 中央財經(jīng)大學(xué);
【分類號】：F832.51

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本文編號：2293822