發(fā)布時間：2018-02-09 12:00

  本文關鍵詞： 公共資源屬性 村民自治 土地所有權國家獨占 產(chǎn)權制度　出處：《山東大學》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：首先,文章分析了土地本身所具有的財產(chǎn)屬性和公共資源屬性的雙重屬性,并進一步分析土地的公共資源屬性不斷深化并逐步向土地國有化的趨勢發(fā)展。 其次,分析了中國土地制度二元結構的演進過程,并進一步揭示了中國的土地制度的二元結構已經(jīng)是城鄉(xiāng)二元鴻溝不斷擴大的根源制度之一,特別是集體土地制度作為計劃經(jīng)濟的產(chǎn)物,在設計之初是為了充分發(fā)揮其公共資源的屬性,滿足農(nóng)民對生存保障的需要。但是隨著市場經(jīng)濟的崛起,城市國有土地產(chǎn)權制度的確立,城市國有土地的財產(chǎn)屬性得到體現(xiàn),使土地這一商品在市場經(jīng)濟的資源配置作用下財產(chǎn)屬性得到充分的發(fā)揮,并促成了房地產(chǎn)市場的繁榮。而由于集體土地當初對土地財產(chǎn)屬性和交換價值的忽視,使集體土地有了不可彌補的制度缺陷,使其無法進入土地市場,充分發(fā)揮其財產(chǎn)屬性的價值,再加上既得利益者利用這一制度缺陷,維護自己的既得利益,進而導致了城鄉(xiāng)差距的不斷擴大。 再次,文章進一步分析建立國有一元的土地所有制是中國土地改革的最佳選擇,但是如何選擇一條可行性成本低,農(nóng)民獲益大的改革路徑顯得尤為重要。本文從程序正義的角度,闡述通過農(nóng)民自愿以村民大會的議事程序實現(xiàn)以集體土地所有權換取國有土地上的使用權進行轉換。這一轉換過程的結果是類似于“遺贈撫養(yǎng)協(xié)議”的一個權利置換方案,這個“遺贈扶養(yǎng)協(xié)議”所涉及的內(nèi)容涉及深刻的利益調(diào)整必須充分保證實質(zhì)正義,它能否得到農(nóng)民大眾的支持與認可,能否體現(xiàn)自愿與公平是這次土地改革的關鍵和檢驗標準。由此可見,路徑實施的程序體現(xiàn)了村民自治的原則,通過的權利置換方案保證農(nóng)民現(xiàn)有的利益不受損。這樣就保證了程序正義和實體正義的要求。 最后進一步分析了原有集體土地與國有土地的相關法律對接,并形成一元化的土地權利結構模型和行政管理結構模型。從中國的國情分析在改革進程中必須進行的必要制度配套和必須遵循的一些原則,脫離了這些原則,土地改革的初衷就會事與愿違,甚至會出現(xiàn)非常嚴峻的后果。
[Abstract]:First of all, the paper analyzes the dual attributes of the property and public resources of land, and further analyzes the deepening of the public resource attributes of land and the trend of nationalization of land. Secondly, it analyzes the evolution process of the dual structure of China's land system, and further reveals that the dual structure of China's land system has become one of the root systems of the widening urban-rural dual divide. Especially, the collective land system, as a product of planned economy, was designed to give full play to its attribute of public resources and to meet the needs of farmers for survival, but with the rise of market economy, With the establishment of the property right system of urban state-owned land, the property attribute of urban state-owned land is embodied, which makes the property attribute of this commodity play a full role in the market economy resource allocation. And contributed to the prosperity of the real estate market. But because of the neglect of the property attribute and the exchange value of the collective land, the collective land had irreparable institutional defects, which made it unable to enter the land market. To give full play to the value of its property, plus the vested interests to take advantage of the defects of the system, to safeguard their vested interests, which leads to the widening of the gap between urban and rural areas. Thirdly, the article further analyzes that it is the best choice of land reform in China to establish a state-owned land ownership system, but how to choose a feasible one with low cost, The reform path of farmers' benefit is particularly important. This article from the point of view of procedural justice, This paper expounds the conversion of collective land ownership in exchange for the right to use state-owned land through the voluntary procedure of villagers' assembly. The result of this conversion process is a right replacement scheme similar to the "Legacy maintenance Agreement". The contents of this Legacy maintenance Agreement involve profound interest adjustments that must fully guarantee substantive justice. Can it be supported and recognized by the peasant public? Whether or not it is voluntary and fair is the key and test criterion of this land reform. Thus, it can be seen that the procedure for implementing the path reflects the principle of villagers' autonomy. The right replacement program is adopted to ensure that farmers' existing interests are not damaged, thus ensuring the requirements of procedural justice and substantive justice. Finally, it further analyzes the connection of the existing collective land and state-owned land related laws, And form a unified land rights structure model and an administrative structure model. From the point of view of China's national conditions, the necessary institutional support and some principles that must be followed in the process of reform are analyzed and separated from these principles. The original intention of land reform will be counterproductive, and even very serious consequences.
【學位授予單位】：山東大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D922.3;F301

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 吳建,曹家和;農(nóng)村土地制度的新制度經(jīng)濟學分析[J];商業(yè)研究;2003年21期

2 林善浪;農(nóng)村土地規(guī)模經(jīng)營的效率評價[J];當代經(jīng)濟研究;2000年02期

3 張紅宇;中國農(nóng)村土地產(chǎn)權政策:持續(xù)創(chuàng)新——對農(nóng)地使用制度變革的重新評判[J];管理世界;1998年06期

4 王玉堂;灰色土地市場的博弈分析:成因、對策與創(chuàng)新障礙[J];管理世界;1999年02期

5 韓俊;中國農(nóng)村土地制度建設三題[J];管理世界;1999年03期

6 陳鋒武;現(xiàn)行農(nóng)村土地承包制存在的問題及改革思路[J];國土經(jīng)濟;1998年05期

7 王紅良;;論集體土地所有權的民法屬性[J];廣西政法管理干部學院學報;2008年02期

8 孔涇源;;中國農(nóng)村土地制度:變遷過程的實證分析[J];經(jīng)濟研究;1993年02期

9 駱友生,張紅宇;家庭承包責任制后的農(nóng)地制度創(chuàng)新[J];經(jīng)濟研究;1995年01期

10 裴小林;集體土地制:中國鄉(xiāng)村工業(yè)發(fā)展和漸進轉軌的根源[J];經(jīng)濟研究;1999年06期

，

本文編號：1497879